Description
The Authentication Pending Flag is a data element stored in the Home Subscriber Server (HSS) and its underlying User Data Repository (UDR), defined in 3GPP TS 29.228 (IP Multimedia Subsystem Cx and Dx interfaces) and TS 29.562 (Evolved Packet System, MME-HSS S6a/S6d interface). It is associated with the subscription record of a Public User Identity (IMPU) - Private User Identity (IMPI) pair and signals that the authentication status of that identity pair has not yet been confirmed. In the IMS architecture, the HSS holds the Authentication Vector (AV) and the authentication scheme (e.g., IMS-AKA, Digest-AKA) for each IMPI, and the flag tracks whether the initial authentication exchange has been successfully completed and validated.
Operationally, when a subscriber is provisioned in the HSS, the Authentication Pending Flag may be set to indicate that the IMPU-IMPI pair is not yet authenticated. The Serving-CSCF (S-CSCF) retrieves the authentication data from the HSS over the Cx interface using the Server-Assignment-Request (SAR) and Multimedia-Authentication-Request (MAR) procedures. If the flag indicates authentication is pending, the S-CSCF will not grant the subscriber full access to IMS services; instead it triggers the authentication challenge (401 Unauthorized with a WWW-Authenticate header) and waits for the UE to respond with valid credentials. Only after successful authentication does the HSS clear the flag and allow the S-CSCF to complete the registration and service authorization.
The flag is carried within the Subscription-Data AVP (Attribute-Value Pair) in the Cx and S6a/S6d Diameter messages, and in the corresponding HTTP/2 representations on the SBI (Service Based Interface) in later releases. It is closely coupled with the Authentication-Scheme, the SIP-Authentication-Scheme, and the SIP-Authentication-Data AVPs. The HSS uses the flag to enforce a state machine for each IMPU-IMPI pair: unauthenticated (pending) → authenticated → potentially de-authenticated on credential change or security events.
In the EPS context (TS 29.562), the flag also influences the MME's handling of attach procedures. If the HSS returns subscription data with the authentication pending indication, the MME may restrict the UE's access to certain APNs or services until the authentication is confirmed, providing a defense-in-depth mechanism against unauthorized use of stolen or cloned credentials.
The flag is a management and security control rather than a protocol message itself. It is manipulated by the HSS provisioning interface (e.g., Sh, Sp, or the UDR's Nudr interface) and by the authentication procedures on Cx/S6a. Its presence in the subscription profile allows operators to stage subscriber activation, perform re-authentication after a security incident, and coordinate authentication state across multiple S-CSCFs and MMEs in a multi-vendor core network.
Purpose & Motivation
The Authentication Pending Flag exists to prevent a subscriber from being granted IMS or EPS services before the network has verified the subscriber's credentials. In early IMS deployments, subscription data could be provisioned and immediately used, creating a window where an attacker with a stolen IMPI/IMPU could register and consume services before the operator detected the fraud. The flag closes this window by making authentication a precondition for service authorization.
It also supports operational workflows such as staged subscriber activation (where the subscription is created but not yet live), re-authentication after credential compromise, and coordination between multiple S-CSCFs. Without the flag, the HSS would have no way to express 'this identity pair exists but is not yet trusted,' forcing operators to either delay provisioning or accept a security gap. The flag provides a standardized, interoperable state indicator that all Cx/S6a-compliant nodes understand.
What changed in its specifications
The latest release-to-release comparison of specifications that define Authentication pending flag. Each summary describes the whole specification, not only this term.
Rel-19 adds a second traffic abatement algorithm alongside the RFC 7683 default. It also extends the OC-OLR AVP and has I/S-CSCFs act on OC-OLR when OC-Ext-Reg-Timer is TRUE.
Full comparison in TS 29.228 →Rel-19 adds IMS AS registration, deregistration, retrieval, subscription, modification, and notification procedures, plus new Nhss_imsEE API clauses for event exposure monitoring.
Full comparison in TS 29.562 →Release Timeline
Evolution Across Releases
An overview written from the defining specifications, not a verified change history. For the exact text, open the specifications listed below.
Defining Specifications
3GPP specifications that define or reference Authentication pending flag, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.
| Specification | Title | Release |
|---|---|---|
| TS 29.228 vk00 | IMS Cx and Dx Interface Procedures | Rel-20 read |
| TS 29.562 vk10 | HSS Nhss Services for IMS and GBA | Rel-20 read |