CHAP

Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol

Security →
Introduced in Rel-4 Also in: Services

CHAP is a three-way authentication protocol used in 3GPP systems to securely verify the identity of network points and user equipment during connection setup, employing a challenge-response mechanism without sending clear-text passwords.

Category
Security
Introduced
Rel-4
Where
Core Network › 5G Core
Also touches
1 segments
Specifications
8 specs
CHAP Description Purpose Related Classification Detected Changes Specifications

Description

The Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP) is a Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) authentication mechanism that provides secure identity verification through a three-way handshake process. Unlike basic password authentication, CHAP never transmits the actual password over the network, instead using cryptographic hashing to prove knowledge of the shared secret. The protocol operates through a challenge-response mechanism where the authenticator sends a random challenge value to the peer, which then computes a response using a one-way hash function (typically MD5) applied to the challenge combined with the shared secret. This response is sent back to the authenticator, which performs the same calculation and compares results to verify the peer's identity.

CHAP's architecture involves three main components: the authenticator (network side), the peer (client side), and a shared secret known to both parties. The protocol begins with the authenticator generating a random challenge value and sending it to the peer. The peer calculates the response by applying the hash function to the concatenation of the challenge, the shared secret, and an identifier. This response is transmitted back to the authenticator, which independently computes the expected value using its stored copy of the shared secret. If the values match, authentication succeeds; otherwise, the connection is terminated.

In 3GPP systems, CHAP is implemented within various network elements and interfaces to secure different types of connections. It's particularly important for Packet Data Protocol (PDP) context activation, where it authenticates mobile devices attempting to establish data sessions. The protocol supports periodic re-authentication, where the authenticator can send new challenges at random intervals during an established connection to ensure the peer's continued legitimacy. This prevents session hijacking and ensures that only authenticated devices maintain network access.

CHAP's implementation in 3GPP networks follows specific adaptations defined in technical specifications, including proper integration with authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA) servers and home subscriber servers (HSS). The protocol works in conjunction with other security mechanisms like EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol) and is often used as part of broader authentication frameworks. Its design ensures compatibility with various network architectures while maintaining strong security properties through proper key management and cryptographic operations.

The protocol's effectiveness depends on proper implementation of several security practices: using sufficiently long and random challenge values, maintaining the confidentiality of shared secrets, employing strong hash functions, and implementing proper error handling. CHAP's simplicity and effectiveness have made it a foundational authentication mechanism in telecommunications networks, providing reliable identity verification while minimizing exposure of sensitive credentials during transmission.

Purpose & Motivation

CHAP was developed to address significant security vulnerabilities in early network authentication methods, particularly those that transmitted passwords in clear text or used weak cryptographic protection. Before CHAP, authentication protocols like PAP (Password Authentication Protocol) sent credentials without encryption, making them susceptible to interception and replay attacks. The telecommunications industry needed a more robust authentication mechanism that could protect against eavesdropping, man-in-the-middle attacks, and credential theft while maintaining reasonable computational overhead.

The protocol's creation was motivated by the growing need for secure remote access in dial-up and emerging data networks during the 1990s. As telecommunications networks evolved from circuit-switched voice to packet-switched data services, the risk of unauthorized access increased significantly. CHAP provided a standardized way to authenticate devices and users without exposing sensitive information, using cryptographic techniques that were computationally feasible for the hardware of that era. Its design specifically addressed the limitations of previous approaches by eliminating password transmission and incorporating protection against replay attacks through random challenges.

In 3GPP systems, CHAP serves critical functions in securing mobile data connections, particularly for GPRS and subsequent packet data services. It authenticates user equipment during PDP context activation, ensuring that only authorized devices can access network resources. The protocol also supports roaming scenarios where authentication must be performed across different network operators' domains. By providing a standardized authentication framework, CHAP enables interoperability between equipment from different vendors while maintaining consistent security levels across diverse network deployments.

Classification

Part ofAAA
Related approachesPAPEAP

Release Timeline

Detected Changes Across Releases

from 3GPP Change Requests

Specific changes extracted from the „Change history“ tables of 3GPP specifications (12 CRs across 2 releases). Complements the general historical overview above with the evidence-based evolution of this function.

Rel-16 1 change

In Release 16, a correction was made regarding the support of the CHAP (Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol) function for Rel-15 N1 mode UEs. The change specifically addressed the support for the PAP/CHAP protocols within that context.

  • Correction on PAP/CHAP supporting Rel-15 N1 mode UE TS 29.561CR0072
Rel-17 11 changes

In Release 17, the specifications were updated to provide clearer and more detailed procedures for using PAP/CHAP authentication within 5G systems. This included explicitly adding PAP/CHAP protocol information and message flows for both RADIUS and Diameter interfaces, along with necessary RFC references and clarifications. Furthermore, the release introduced a rule to avoid including both PAP/CHAP and EAP identifiers simultaneously in a PDU session establishment request.

  • Adding a note for IPv4/IPv6 Non-transparent access to DN using PAP/CHAP TS 29.561CR0058
  • Adding PAP/CHAP in RADIUS message flow(successful case) TS 29.561CR0061
  • Adding PAP/CHAP in Diameter message flow(successful case) TS 29.561CR0062
  • Adding the RFC reference of PAP/CHAP protocol identifier contents and related abbreviations TS 24.008CR3252
  • Adding the abbreviations of PAP/CHAP in TS 24.501 and fixing a minor grammatical error in the NOTE on PAP/CHAP TS 24.501CR2882
  • Avoid including both PAP/CHAP and EAP identifiers in PDU session establishment request TS 24.501CR2941

+ 5 more changes

Explore further

Broader topics and technologies where CHAP plays a role.

Defining Specifications

3GPP specifications that define or reference CHAP, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.

SpecificationTitleRelease
TR 21.905 vj00 3GPP Technical Terms and Definitions Rel-19
TS 23.179 vd50 MCPTT Functional Architecture Rel-13
TS 23.379 vk00 MCPTT Functional Architecture Rel-20
TS 24.008 vj50 3GPP TS 24008: Core Network Protocols Rel-19
TS 24.501 vj50 5G NAS Protocols Specification Rel-19
TS 29.061 vj00 Packet Domain Interworking for PLMN Rel-19
TS 29.561 vj30 5G Interworking with External Data Networks Rel-19
TS 32.808 v1800 Common User Profile Storage Framework Rel-8
Patrick Zandl

About the author: Patrick Zandl (b. 1974)

Telecommunications specialist, technology journalist (founder of the Mobil server), and developer who has been running since 2025 — the largest Czech-language resource on AI-assisted programming. Formerly Chief Wizard Architect at Prusa3D and head of development for Turris at CZ.NIC; currently a consultant and instructor on AI implementation in companies.