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Glossary term · Security

SEPP

Security Edge Protection Proxy

Security →

SEPP is a security proxy deployed at the network edge to protect the Service-Based Interface within and between 5G Core networks by authenticating, authorizing, and securing all inter-PLMN signaling messages.

Introduced
Rel-15
Where
Security
Specifications
10 specs
Also in
Core Network
SEPP Description Purpose What changed Family Neighbours Detected Changes Specifications

Description

The Security Edge Protection Proxy (SEPP) is a fundamental security node introduced in the 5G Core (5GC) architecture. It operates as a non-transparent proxy for all HTTP/2-based Service-Based Interface (SBI) messages that traverse network boundaries, primarily between different Public Land Mobile Networks (PLMNs) in roaming scenarios. The SEPP's primary function is to protect the N32 interface, which is the reference point for interconnectivity between SEPPs of different operators. It sits at the perimeter of a network, inspecting all inbound and outbound SBI traffic to and from Network Functions (NFs) like the AMF, SMF, and NRF.

Architecturally, the SEPP is a dedicated Network Function that implements application-layer security. It works in conjunction with the Network Repository Function (NRF) for service discovery and policy control. For outbound messages destined for another PLMN, the home SEPP receives the SBI request from a producer NF, applies security processing (including potential encryption and integrity protection), and forwards it to the visited PLMN's SEPP. The visited SEPP then validates the message, removes the security encapsulation, and routes it to the appropriate consumer NF within its network. This hop-by-hop security model ensures that the internal network topology and NF identities are hidden from external entities.

The SEPP employs two main security mechanisms for the N32 interface: N32-c and N32-f. N32-c is a control plane interface used for security context establishment and parameter negotiation between two SEPPs before data exchange. N32-f is the forwarding interface that carries the actual protected SBI messages. Protection can be applied using JSON Web Encryption (JWE) for confidentiality and JSON Web Signature (JWS) for integrity and authentication of the HTTP messages. The SEPP also performs message filtering and topology hiding, stripping or modifying sensitive routing information in headers to prevent external networks from mapping the internal NF deployment. Its role is critical for enabling secure roaming, network slicing across operators, and the exposure of network capabilities to third-party application providers via the Network Exposure Function (NEF).

Purpose & Motivation

The SEPP was created to address the significant security challenges introduced by the 5G Core's Service-Based Architecture (SBA) and its reliance on HTTP/2 APIs (the SBI). In previous generations (4G EPC), inter-operator signaling used diameter-based protocols like S6a and S8, which had their own security mechanisms (e.g., IPsec, diameter security). The shift to RESTful APIs and the need for more flexible network exposure created a new attack surface. Without a dedicated edge proxy, HTTP/2 messages between operators would be vulnerable to eavesdropping, tampering, and spoofing, and would expose internal network structures.

The primary problems the SEPP solves are securing the inter-PLMN communication for roaming and enabling safe third-party access. Roaming in 5G requires numerous SBI messages to flow between the home and visited network for authentication, session management, and policy control. The SEPP ensures these messages are authenticated, authorized, and protected end-to-end between the network perimeters. Furthermore, it facilitates topology hiding, which is a regulatory and security requirement for operators to conceal their internal network configuration from partners and potential attackers.

Its creation was motivated by the 3GPP's push for a cloud-native, web-friendly core network. The SBA allows for agile service deployment but inherits web security concerns. The SEPP is the standardized answer to applying robust, application-layer security tailored for telecom needs, replacing ad-hoc security gateways and ensuring a consistent, interoperable security baseline for global 5G deployment, especially for network slicing across administrative domains.

What changed in its specifications

The latest release-to-release comparison of specifications that define SEPP. Each summary describes the whole specification, not only this term.

TS 23.501Rel-18 → Rel-19

Rel-19 added MPQUIC steering to multi-access PDU sessions, XR and media handling, and an Energy Information Function. It also added Local Offloading Management for edge computing, Vertical Federated Learning for AI/ML, and Ambient IoT text.

Full comparison in TS 23.501 →
TS 29.500Rel-18 → Rel-19

Rel-19 adds indirect communication between PLMNs, including NF discovery and selection at the target PLMN, plus authorization for indirect communication with and without delegated discovery. It also adds an Extend-Registration-Timer parameter for IMS disaster restoration and a header restricting Binding Indication updates in notifications.

Full comparison in TS 29.500 →

Architecture

Where it sits in the network

Technology family

Security functions and anchors · Security

  1. Phase 1 AuC
  2. R99 HLR/AuC
  3. Rel-5 HSS
  4. Rel-6 3GPP AAA Server, BSF
  5. Rel-8 ASME, MME
  6. Rel-9 HSS-FE
  7. Rel-15 AMF, ARPF, AUSF, SEAF, SEPP, SIDF
  8. Rel-16 AAnF

Members and relations were proposed independently by several models and kept only where at least two agree; quotes are verified verbatim against the specifications. Release = first approved version of the defining specification.

Release Timeline

Detected Changes Across Releases

verified against 3GPP sources

Documented changes in 6 releases, each verified against the text of 3GPP specifications or approved change requests and shown with the exact wording. The release timeline above shows the same releases. A release without an entry has no documented change for this term.

Rel-15 introduced

SEPP is specified for the first time in Rel-15: a non-transparent edge proxy that protects N32 inter-PLMN signalling with mutual authentication, cipher negotiation, topology hiding and N32-f/N32-c procedures.

  • “The SEPP shall act as a non-transparent proxy node.” TS 33.501 v15.20.0
  • “The SEPP shall protect application layer control plane messages between two NFs belonging to different PLMNs that use the N32 interface” TS 33.501 v15.20.0
  • “The SEPP shall perform mutual authentication and negotiation of cipher suites with the SEPP in the roaming network.” TS 33.501 v15.20.0
Rel-16 specification text

Rel-16 changes SEPP behaviour: multiple PLMN IDs share N32 connections, SEPP supports the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header for TLS toward NFs, and it checks IPX modifications and renegotiates parameters.

  • “If different PLMNs are represented by the PLMN IDs supported by a SEPP, the SEPP shall use separate N32-connections for each pair of home and visited PLMN.” TS 33.501 v16.20.0
  • “The receiving SEPP shall use the modification policy of the cIPX obtained during parameter exchange in the related N32-c connection setup” TS 33.501 v16.20.0
  • “the SEPP shall ignore the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header and route the request using the telescopic FQDN.” TS 29.500 v16.15.0
Rel-17 specification text

SEPP behaviour changed in Rel-17: it now supports SNPN interconnect, can tear down the N32-f TLS connection, handles purposes such as Disaster Roaming, and verifies the originating network ID header.

  • “The N32 interface may also be used between SEPPs from an SNPN and another SNPN or PLMN, for SNPN interconnect scenarios” TS 29.573 v17.7.0
  • “This procedure may also be used to tear down the N32-f TLS connection if the remote SEPP indicated support of the feature NFTLST” TS 29.573 v17.7.0
  • “The receiving SEPP shall check whether the 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id header included in the signalling message belongs to the sending SEPP’s own PLMN or SNPN.” TS 33.501 v17.16.0
Rel-18 specification text

SEPP behaviour changed in Rel-18: new N32 handshake ID and sender N32-f FQDN/port (SNDN32F) handling, Roaming Intermediary terminology, and new Interplmn-Purpose header checks and redirection over non-N32 interfaces.

  • “The n32HandshakeId IE, if the N32 handshake identifier is supported by the initiating SEPP, that may be used to correlate the N32-f connection” TS 29.573 v18.11.0
  • “the receiving SEPP shall compare the value received in the header with the preconfigured value of allowed intended purpose between the source and target PLMN.” TS 29.500 v18.10.0
  • “The receiving SEPP shall reject any message in which a Roaming Intermediary has inserted or relocated references to encBlockIndex.” TS 33.501 v18.12.0
Rel-19 1 CR

SEPP requirements changed in Rel-19: trust anchors now distinguish TLS and PRINS methods, PLMN-ID checks on N32-f messages with mismatch logging were added, and error handling was corrected.

  • “The SEPP shall maintain a set of trust anchors. For N32-c and N32-f when the selected security method is "TLS"” TS 33.501 v19.7.0
  • “The SEPP should support a mode of logging where mismatches are logged.” TS 33.501 v19.7.0
  • Correction on Encrypted Block Locations in SEPP Service Description TS 29.573CR0226
Rel-20 specification text

SEPP behaviour changed: it must now handle Roaming Intermediary PRINS, with RI-to-PLMN mapping checks, protectionPolicyContainer verification and new trust anchor rules for RI identifiers.

  • “If the PLMN-ID(s) in the incoming N32-f message are not consistent with the relevant RI-to-PLMN mapping, the SEPP shall respond to the sending SEPP with "403 Forbidden"” TS 29.573 v20.1.0
  • “the receiving SEPP shall verify that the contained protection policy information or PRINS security profiles match the policy negotiated with the initiating SEPP” TS 29.573 v20.1.0
  • “the SEPP shall map the RI identifiers as extracted from the RI end entity certificate to the associated trust anchor for the purposes of certificate chain verification” TS 33.501 v20.3.0

Defining Specifications

3GPP specifications that define or reference SEPP, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.

SpecificationTitleRelease
TS 23.501 vk30 5G System Architecture Rel-20 read
TR 26.930 vj00 WebRTC Enhancements for Immersive RTC over 5G Rel-19 read
TS 29.500 vk00 5G Service Based Architecture Rel-20 read
TS 29.513 vk10 5G PCC Signalling Flows Rel-20 read
TS 29.573 vk10 5G PLMN Interconnection Interface Rel-20 read
TS 33.117 vk20 Catalogue of Security Requirements and Tests Rel-20 read
TS 33.501 vk30 5G Security Architecture Rel-20 read
TS 33.517 vk10 SEPP Security Assurance Specification Rel-20 read
TS 33.776 vj00 Study of ACME for 5G SBA Rel-19 read
TR 33.841 vg10 Security aspects; Study on 256-bit algorithms for 5G Rel-16 read