UP

IP User Plane Integrity Protection

Security →
Introduced in R99 Also in: Radio Access Network, Security, Services

UP is a security mechanism that ensures the integrity of user plane data packets in 3GPP networks by protecting them against unauthorized modification during transmission.

Category
Security
Introduced
R99
Where
Core Network › 5G Core
Also touches
3 segments
Specifications
42 specs
UP Description Purpose Related Classification Specifications

Description

IP User Plane Integrity Protection (UP) is a cryptographic security feature designed to guarantee the integrity of user data traffic. It operates by generating and verifying integrity checksums, known as Message Authentication Codes (MACs), for IP packets traversing the user plane. The process involves a security algorithm and a secret integrity key shared between the User Equipment (UE) and the network node terminating the protection, typically the gNB in 5G or the eNB in 4G. For each outgoing packet, the sender computes a MAC over the packet payload and certain header fields, appending this MAC to the packet. The receiver independently computes the expected MAC using the same algorithm and key; if the computed MAC matches the received one, the packet's integrity is verified. If not, the packet is discarded, preventing corrupted or tampered data from being processed.

The architecture for UP is integrated within the Packet Data Convergence Protocol (PDCP) layer in both LTE and NR radio access networks. The PDCP entity is responsible for applying ciphering and, when configured, integrity protection for the user plane. The decision to activate UP is controlled by the network via Radio Resource Control (RRC) signaling, based on policy, subscriber profile, and the sensitivity of the data service. The integrity key used is derived as part of the 3GPP Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) procedure, ensuring it is unique to the session and securely established.

UP's role is to provide end-to-end integrity protection for the data link between the UE and the radio access network, safeguarding against over-the-air attacks such as packet injection, replay, or manipulation by a malicious actor. It does not typically provide integrity protection for the entire end-to-end path to the application server, as that is the responsibility of higher-layer protocols like TLS or IPsec. However, within the 3GPP trust boundary, UP is a fundamental layer of defense, enhancing the overall security posture for services like financial transactions, industrial control, and critical communications where data authenticity is paramount.

Purpose & Motivation

UP was introduced to address the growing need for robust security in mobile data services beyond traditional confidentiality protection. Early 3GPP standards primarily focused on ciphering user data to ensure privacy but did not mandate integrity protection for the user plane, leaving it vulnerable to data manipulation attacks. As mobile networks evolved to carry sensitive traffic like mobile banking, corporate VPN access, and IoT command-and-control, the risk of undetected data tampering became a significant concern. Integrity protection ensures that data received is exactly the data sent, which is a critical requirement for trust in digital services.

The motivation for UP's specification stemmed from threat analyses identifying that an attacker with radio access could alter user data packets without detection, potentially leading to fraud, service disruption, or safety issues. For instance, in an unsecured scenario, an attacker could modify transaction amounts in financial data or send false commands to an IoT device. UP solves this by providing a mechanism to detect any modification, ensuring data authenticity and non-repudiation within the radio access segment. Its creation was part of a broader 3GPP effort to strengthen security architecture across releases, aligning with regulatory and industry demands for more secure telecommunications infrastructure.

Initially optional, the adoption and importance of UP have grown with each generation, particularly in 5G where it is a key feature for enabling enhanced Mobile Broadband (eMBB), Ultra-Reliable Low-Latency Communications (URLLC), and massive IoT services. It addresses limitations of previous approaches that relied solely on application-layer security or network perimeter defenses, which might not protect the vulnerable radio link. By integrating integrity at the PDCP layer, UP provides a standardized, efficient, and mandatory-enforceable security baseline for all user plane traffic.

Classification

Part ofPDCP
Related approachesAKA

Evolution Across Releases

R99 Initial

Introduced the initial concept of user plane integrity protection within the 3GPP security architecture framework. Defined the foundational requirements and threat model, identifying the need for data origin authentication and integrity for IP-based user data. Initial specifications laid the groundwork for algorithm development and integration into the protocol stack.

Explore further

Broader topics and technologies where UP plays a role.

Defining Specifications

3GPP specifications that define or reference UP, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.

SpecificationTitleRelease
TR 21.905 vj00 3GPP Technical Terms and Definitions Rel-19
TS 23.153 vj00 Out-of-Band Transcoder Control Stage 2 Rel-19
TS 23.714 ve00 Study on CP-UP separation in EPC Rel-14
TR 23.730 ve00 Study on extended CIoT architecture Rel-14
TR 23.799 ve00 Study on Next Generation System Architecture Rel-14
TS 23.868 v900 Study on IMS Emergency Calls Rel-9
TR 23.910 v1400 UMTS Circuit Switched Bearer Services Overview Rel-5
TR 23.977 vj00 Bandwidth/Resource Savings & Speech Quality Requirements Rel-19
TS 24.502 vj20 5G Core Access via Non-3GPP Networks; Stage 3 Rel-19
TS 25.305 vj00 UTRAN UE Positioning Stage 2 Rel-19
TS 25.331 vj00 UTRAN RRC Protocol Specification Rel-19
TS 25.410 vj00 Iu Interface Introduction for UTRAN Rel-19
TS 25.415 vj00 Iu Interface User Plane Protocol Rel-19
TR 26.919 vj00 Study on 5G Conversational Media Handling Rel-19
TS 28.531 vk00 Management and Orchestration Rel-20
TS 29.244 vj40 PFCP Specification for Control/User Plane Separation Rel-19
TS 29.412 v1810 Trunking Gateway Control Procedures Rel-8
TS 29.414 vj00 Nb Interface Bearer Transport & Control Protocols Rel-19
TS 29.522 vj40 5G NEF Northbound APIs Stage 3 Rel-19
TR 29.820 vh00 Study on PFCP Best Practice Rel-17
TS 29.844 ve00 Control and User Plane Separation for EPC Nodes Rel-14
TS 29.892 vg00 Study on User Plane Protocol in 5GC Rel-16
TS 32.251 vj00 PS Domain Charging Management Rel-19
TR 32.972 vj00 Energy Efficiency Study for 5G Networks Rel-19
TS 33.401 vj10 EPS Security Architecture Rel-19
TS 33.501 vk00 5G Security Architecture and Procedures Rel-20
TS 33.503 vj20 Security for Proximity Services (ProSe) in 5G Rel-19
TR 33.740 vi10 Security and Privacy Aspects of Proximity Based Services in 5G System Phase 2 Rel-18
TS 33.820 v1830 Home NodeB/eNodeB Security Architecture Rel-8
TS 33.825 vg01 Security for 5G URLLC Services Rel-16
TR 33.851 vh10 Security for Industrial IoT in 5G Rel-17
TR 33.853 vh00 Study on User Plane Integrity Protection Rel-17
TS 33.859 vb10 UTRAN Key Hierarchy Enhancement Study Rel-11
TS 33.863 ve20 Security for Battery-Efficient IoT Device to Enterprise Rel-14
TS 36.331 vj00 LTE RRC Protocol Specification Rel-19
TS 36.425 vj00 X2 User Plane Protocol for Dual Connectivity Rel-19
TS 36.938 v900 E-UTRAN to 3GPP2/Mobile WiMAX Mobility Rel-9
TS 38.331 vj00 NR Radio Resource Control (RRC) Protocol Specification Rel-19
TS 38.410 vj10 NG Interface Introduction for NG-RAN to 5GC Rel-19
TS 38.413 vj10 NG Application Protocol (NGAP) Rel-19
TS 38.415 vj10 PDU Session User Plane Protocol Rel-19
TS 48.103 vj00 A Interface User Plane Transport Protocols Rel-19
Patrick Zandl

About the author: Patrick Zandl (b. 1974)

Telecommunications specialist, technology journalist (founder of the Mobil server), and developer who has been running since 2025 — the largest Czech-language resource on AI-assisted programming. Formerly Chief Wizard Architect at Prusa3D and head of development for Turris at CZ.NIC; currently a consultant and instructor on AI implementation in companies.