Description
The IP Multimedia CN subsystem Private Identity (IMPI) is a critical identifier within the 3GPP IMS architecture, defined as a permanent and globally unique credential assigned to a user. It is stored securely in the Home Subscriber Server (HSS) and within the IP Multimedia Services Identity Module (ISIM) application on the user's Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC). The IMPI is used exclusively for authentication and registration procedures, never for routing SIP messages or public communication. It typically follows the format of a Network Access Identifier (NAI), such as user@realm. During IMS registration, the User Equipment (UE) presents the IMPI along with authentication vectors derived from a shared secret key to the Serving-Call Session Control Function (S-CSCF) via the Proxy-CSCF (P-CSCF). The S-CSCF verifies the credentials with the HSS using authentication protocols like Digest AKAv1-MD5 or later, more secure methods. This process establishes a secure registration binding between the IMPI and the user's IP address, enabling subsequent service authorization. The IMPI's separation from public identities ensures that the user's private authentication key is never exposed on the network, providing a foundational layer of security. It is intrinsically linked to a user's subscription and remains constant, unlike temporary identifiers, forming the anchor for the user's IMS service profile and associated public identities (IMPUs).
Purpose & Motivation
The IMPI was created to provide a secure, subscription-based authentication mechanism for the IMS, which was introduced in 3GPP Release 5 to enable IP-based multimedia services over packet-switched networks. Prior to IMS, circuit-switched mobile networks used the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) for authentication, but a new identity was needed for the SIP-based, all-IP service layer that is independent of the underlying access network (e.g., GPRS, WLAN, fixed broadband). The IMPI solves the problem of securely identifying and authenticating a user to the IMS core without revealing permanent credentials during service invocation. It enables a single user with multiple devices or service profiles to have a consistent private identity for authentication, while maintaining multiple public identities for communication. Its creation was motivated by the need for a robust security model that separates authentication (private) from addressing (public), a principle borrowed from Internet security architectures, to prevent impersonation and ensure that only authorized subscribers can access and use IMS services like VoLTE, ViLTE, and RCS.
What changed in its specifications
The latest release-to-release comparison of specifications that define IMPI. Each summary describes the whole specification, not only this term.
Rel-18 brings only minor changes to TS 21.905: 0 clauses changed, with no change attributed to a release feature.
Full comparison in TR 21.905 →Rel-19 adds Enhanced Mission Critical Architecture changes, including location reporting trigger cancel and override indication. It also adds location reporting and location information request procedures for mission critical clients on non-3GPP devices behind a UE or 5G-RG.
Full comparison in TS 23.280 →Technology family
Subscriber and device identifiers · User Equipment
- Phase 1 IMEI, IMSI, MSIN, MSISDN, TMSI
- Phase 2 IMEISV
- R96 TLLI
- R97 P-TMSI
- R98 CTSMSI
- Rel-5 IMPI, IMPU, Temporary Public User Identity
- Rel-8 GUTI, M-TMSI
- Rel-15 5G-GUTI, 5G-S-TMSI, 5G-TMSI, GPSI, NSI, PEI, SUCI, SUPI
- Rel-16 GCI, GLI, Truncated 5G-S-TMSI
- IMPI builds on IMSI
“If the private user identity is not known, the private user identity shall be derived from the IMSI.” TS 23.003
Members and relations were proposed independently by several models and kept only where at least two agree; quotes are verified verbatim against the specifications. Release = first approved version of the defining specification.
Release Timeline
Detected Changes Across Releases
verified against 3GPP sourcesDocumented changes in 11 releases, each verified against the text of 3GPP specifications or approved change requests and shown with the exact wording. The release timeline above shows the same releases. A release without an entry has no documented change for this term.
TS 33.203 v5c0 first specifies the IMPI as the private identity used for IMS AKA authentication, associated with the long-term key in ISIM and HSS, and carried in registration and Cx signalling.
- “The identity used for authenticating a subscriber is the private identity, IMPI, which has the form of a NAI” TS 33.203 v5.12.0
- “The long-term key in the ISIM and the HSS is associated with the IMPI.” TS 33.203 v5.12.0
- “The subscriber may have several IMPUs associated with one IMPI.” TS 33.203 v5.12.0
In TS 33.203 the P-CSCF's stored registration parameters and the REGISTER message flow changed, and TS 29.109 newly specifies the IMPI as the identifier for Zh/Zn BSF–HSS authentication vector requests.
- “the HSS shall derive the user Authentication Vector (AV) information according the IMPI and populates it into SIP-Auth-Data AVP” TS 29.109 v6.9.0
- “A UE starts the bootstrapping procedure by protocol Ub with a BSF giving the IMPI of the user” TS 29.109 v6.9.0
- “REGISTER(Integrity-Protection = Successful, Confidentiality-Protection = Seccessful, IMPI)” TS 33.203 v6.11.0
IMPI handling changed in the Cx and Zh/Zn interfaces: the BSF now sends the IMPI in the Multimedia-Auth-Request and the HSS uses it for GUSS lookup, and IMPI must be sent in SAR for UE-initiated requests.
- “IMPI must be sent in SAR for UE initiated requests” TS 29.228 v7.18.0
- “If GUSS exists for the IMPI, the HSS shall do one of the following:” TS 29.109 v7.13.0
- “the SIP application at the P‑CSCF stores at least the following data: (UE_IP_address, UE_protected_port, P-CSCF_protected_port, SPI, IMPI” TS 33.203 v7.9.0
Rel-8 specifies SIP Digest authentication in IMS keyed on IMPI (SD-AV with H(A1) of IMPI, IMPI in REGISTER), and extends GBA Push to resolve and use IMPI/IMPU.
- “The identity used for authenticating a subscriber is the private identity, IMPI, which has the form of a NAI.” TS 33.203 v8.8.0
- “Every SIP REGISTER message shall contain the IMPI of the user.” TS 33.203 v8.8.0
- IMPI must be sent in SAR for UE initiated requests TS 29.228CR0460
The HSS pushes to the S-CSCF the hash value H(A1) of the IMPI, realm and password instead of pushing the user's password entry.
- “push a new entry for the hash value H(A1), of the IMPI, realm and password to the S-CSCF currently serving the user” TS 33.203 v9.5.0
The IMPI became optional in the SIP REGISTER (SM1), and the P-CSCF, I-CSCF and S-CSCF must derive it from the IMPU when it is omitted, replacing the earlier rule that every REGISTER must contain it.
- “When a registering UE omits the IMPI from the REGISTER request, the IMPI for the registration is derived from the registering IMPU.” TS 33.203 v10.3.0
- “If SM3 does not contain an IMPI the S-CSCF shall derive the IMPI from the IMPU in the REGISTER request” TS 33.203 v10.3.0
- “Every SIP REGISTER message shall contain the IMPI of the user.” TS 33.203 v10.3.0
SA handling at the P-CSCF is now per registered contact, with at most six SAs per direction per registered contact for one IMPI; the HSS derives the AV from the IMPI and authentication scheme (incl. SIP Digest).
- “at most six SAs per direction per registered contact may exist at a P‑CSCF for one IMPI at any one time.” TS 33.203 v11.2.0
- “the HSS shall derive the user Authentication Vector (AV) information according the IMPI and, if present, the authentication scheme” TS 29.109 v11.7.0
IMS security specification adds WebRTC IMS Client requirements and procedures involving IMPI, e.g. determining IMPI/IMPU from third-party authorization info and S-CSCF deriving IMPI from IMPU; Cx gains de-registration without IMPI.
- “shall securely determine from the received authorization information the IMPI and IMPU of the authenticated WIC attempting to register with the IMS network.” TS 33.203 v12.9.0
- “The IMPI can be omitted from the initial SIP Register request, and if that is the case the S-CSCF will try to determine its value” TS 33.203 v12.9.0
- De-registration without IMPI TS 29.228CR0655
IMPI became a supported lawful interception target identifier in the HSS, with new LI events and reported fields, and the WWSF registration scenario now assigns unique IMPU/IMPI pairs from a pool.
- “HSS shall support LI based on SIP-URI, Tel-URI, IMPI.” TS 33.107 v13.8.0
- “Target Identifier with the IMPI, Tel URI or SIP URI of the target (if available).” TS 33.107 v13.8.0
- “each containing a single unique IMPU/IMPI pair, to IMS and can assign individual Public and Private User Identities from this pool.” TS 33.203 v13.4.0
In Zh-interface bootstrapping push procedures, the request may carry either Public-Identity or User-Name (IMPI) depending on the NAF-provided identity, replacing the earlier rule that Public-Identity alone applies when the IMPI is unavailable.
- “In bootstrapping push procedures, either the Public-Identity AVP or the User-Name AVP shall be present in the request, depending on the user identity provided by the NAF.” TS 29.109 v15.0.0
- “In bootstrapping push procedures the IMPI may not be available to the NAF and BSF.” TS 29.109 v15.0.0
SIP Digest authentication in IMS now supports SHA-256 alongside MD5, with the HSS and S-CSCF handling both H(A1) hashes of the IMPI, and the UE selecting an algorithm and including it with the IMPI in SM7.
- “two hashes, called H(A1)_256 and H(A1), of the IMPI, realm, and password” TS 33.203 v17.1.0
- “stores H(A1)_SHA256 and H(A1) and the nonce against the IMPI” TS 33.203 v17.1.0
- “The inclusion of the IMPI, the selected algorithm and an Authorization header in SM7 are mandatory.” TS 33.203 v17.1.0
Defining Specifications
3GPP specifications that define or reference IMPI, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.
| Specification | Title | Release |
|---|---|---|
| TR 21.905 vj20 | 3GPP Terminology and Definitions | Rel-19 read |
| TS 22.066 vj00 | Mobile Number Portability Stage 1 | Rel-19 read |
| TS 23.179 vd50 | MCPTT Functional Architecture | Rel-13 read |
| TS 23.280 vk51 | Mission Critical Services Architecture | Rel-20 read |
| TS 23.379 vk40 | Mission Critical Push-to-Talk Architecture | Rel-20 read |
| TS 23.700 vk10 | AI/ML Application Layer Support Phase 2 | Rel-20 read |
| TS 24.109 vj00 | HTTP Digest AKA & GAA Stage 3 | Rel-19 read |
| TS 26.237 vj00 | IMS for PSS and MBMS Control | Rel-19 read |
| TS 29.109 vj00 | GAA Bootstrapping Interfaces (Zh, Dz, Zn, Zpn) | Rel-19 read |
| TS 31.103 vj10 | IM Services Identity Module Specification | Rel-19 read |
| TS 31.829 vd00 | ISIM-ME Interface Conformance Requirements | Rel-13 read |
| TS 32.182 vj00 | UDC Common Baseline Information Model (CBIM) | Rel-19 read |
| TS 33.107 vj00 | Lawful Interception Architecture & Functions | Rel-19 read |
| TS 33.141 vj00 | Security for Presence Service (Ut reference point) | Rel-19 read |
| TS 33.203 vk00 | IMS Security Features and Mechanisms | Rel-20 read |
| TS 33.222 vj00 | Secure HTTP Access in GAA | Rel-19 read |
| TS 33.804 vc00 | Non-UICC SSO using SIP Digest credentials | Rel-12 read |
| TS 33.978 v800 | Early IMS Security Interim Solution | Rel-8 read |