Description
The International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) is a critical identifier in GSM, UMTS, LTE, and 5G systems. It is a 15-digit (or shorter) numeric code permanently associated with a subscriber and stored within the SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) or USIM (Universal SIM). Structurally, the IMSI is composed of three parts: the Mobile Country Code (MCC, 3 digits), the Mobile Network Code (MNC, 2 or 3 digits), and the Mobile Subscriber Identification Number (MSIN, 9-10 digits). The MCC and MNC together identify the home PLMN (Public Land Mobile Network) of the subscriber, while the MSIN uniquely identifies the subscriber within that network.
In network operations, the IMSI is used during the initial attach procedure when a mobile device connects to the network. The device sends the IMSI to the serving network element (e.g., MME in LTE, AMF in 5G), which then uses it to query the home network's HSS (Home Subscriber Server) or equivalent database (like AUC) for authentication vectors and subscriber profile data. The authentication process involves the network generating a challenge using a secret key (Ki) associated with the IMSI. For privacy reasons, the IMSI is not transmitted openly frequently; instead, a temporary identifier like TMSI (Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity) or GUTI (Globally Unique Temporary Identity) is used after initial authentication to avoid IMSI exposure over the air interface.
The IMSI's role extends beyond mere identification. It is the primary key for subscriber data in network databases, linking to subscription details, service profiles, QoS parameters, and security credentials. In mobility management, it helps in tracking area updates and handovers between cells. In session management, it is used to correlate charging records (CDRs) with the correct subscriber account. Its standardized format enables international roaming, as a visited network can identify the subscriber's home network using the MCC/MNC and establish the appropriate roaming agreements and routing.
Purpose & Motivation
The IMSI was created to provide a standardized, globally unique, and permanent identifier for mobile subscribers, solving the problems of subscriber identification and roaming in early analog cellular systems. Before GSM, identifiers were often network-specific, hindering interoperability and international roaming. The IMSI, introduced with GSM, allowed any network worldwide to uniquely identify a subscriber and contact their home network for authentication and service profile retrieval, enabling seamless global mobility.
Its design addresses several key requirements: uniqueness (ensured by the MCC/MNC/MSIN structure), permanence (tied to the subscription, not the device), and security (stored securely on the SIM). The separation of the home network identifier (MCC/MNC) from the subscriber identifier (MSIN) simplifies routing of signaling messages for roaming subscribers. The IMSI is fundamental to the security architecture of cellular networks, as it is linked to the subscriber's secret authentication key (Ki). Without a robust, standardized permanent identity like the IMSI, functions like lawful interception, international roaming billing, and subscriber management would be extremely complex or impossible on a global scale.
What changed in its specifications
The latest release-to-release comparison of specifications that define IMSI. Each summary describes the whole specification, not only this term.
Rel-18 brings only minor changes to TS 21.905: 0 clauses changed, with no change attributed to a release feature.
Full comparison in TR 21.905 →Technology family
Subscriber and device identifiers · User Equipment
- Phase 1 IMEI, IMSI, MSIN, MSISDN, TMSI
- Phase 2 IMEISV
- R96 TLLI
- R97 P-TMSI
- R98 CTSMSI
- Rel-5 IMPI, IMPU, Temporary Public User Identity
- Rel-8 GUTI, M-TMSI
- Rel-15 5G-GUTI, 5G-S-TMSI, 5G-TMSI, GPSI, NSI, PEI, SUCI, SUPI
- Rel-16 GCI, GLI, Truncated 5G-S-TMSI
- IMSI extended by SUPI
“in this release of the specification, it may indicate an IMSI, a Network Specific Identifier (NSI), a Global Line Identifier (GLI) or a Global Cable Identifier (GCI)” TS 23.003
- IMSI extended by IMPI
“If the private user identity is not known, the private user identity shall be derived from the IMSI.” TS 23.003
- IMSI extended by CTSMSI
“The default Individual CTSMSI contains the least significant portion of the IMSI. This is the default CTS‑MS identity.” TS 23.003
Members and relations were proposed independently by several models and kept only where at least two agree; quotes are verified verbatim against the specifications. Release = first approved version of the defining specification.
Release Timeline
Detected Changes Across Releases
verified against 3GPP sourcesDocumented changes in 18 releases, each verified against the text of 3GPP specifications or approved change requests and shown with the exact wording. The release timeline above shows the same releases. A release without an entry has no documented change for this term.
Introduced in Phase 1 (release dating of the term; no individual change cited).
TS 23.003 v3f0 first specifies the IMSI: its numeric format, 15-digit maximum, allocation to each subscriber, and its three-part composition (MCC, MNC, MSIN).
- “A unique International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) shall be allocated to each mobile subscriber in the GSM system.” TS 23.003 v3.15.0
- “The overall number of digits in IMSI shall not exceed 15 digits.” TS 23.003 v3.15.0
- “IMSI is composed of three parts:” TS 23.003 v3.15.0
TS 23.003 Rel-5 extends IMSI to GSM/UMTS and adds rules for deriving the IMS home network domain name and private user identity from the IMSI when there is no ISIM.
- “If there is no ISIM application, the private user identity is not known. If the private user identity is not known, the private user identity shall be derived from the IMSI.” TS 23.003 v5.11.0
- “If there is no ISIM application, the UE shall derive the home network domain name from the IMSI as described in the following steps:” TS 23.003 v5.11.0
- “A unique International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) shall be allocated to each mobile subscriber in the GSM/UMTS system.” TS 23.003 v5.11.0
TS 23.003 Rel-6 specifies how the WLAN UE derives the home domain name, Root NAI, Decorated NAI and default W-APN Operator Identifier from the IMSI for WLAN access.
- “the WLAN UE shall derive the home network domain name from the IMSI as described in the following steps” TS 23.003 v6.17.0
- “When the username part includes the IMSI, the Root NAI shall be built according to the following steps:” TS 23.003 v6.17.0
- “This default W-APN Operator Identifier is derived from the IMSI as follows:” TS 23.003 v6.17.0
Rel-7 adds a rule that the visited-network BM-SC derives the home network domain name from the IMSI during MBMS roaming activation, and corrects how the UE derives identifiers from the IMSI.
- “the BM-SC in the visted network shall derive the home network domain name from the IMSI as described in the following steps” TS 23.003 v7.11.0
- Correction of derivation of identifiers, by the UE, using the IMSI TS 23.003CR0131r2
IMSI usage was extended to EPS: IMSI is allocated in the GSM/UMTS/EPS system and MME may correlate TMSI to it, with IMSI attach/detach in EMM procedures and IMSI-derived NAIs for S5/S8, S2a/S2b and S2c.
- “A unique International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) shall be allocated to each mobile subscriber in the GSM/UMTS/EPS system.” TS 23.003 v8.21.0
- “At S5/S8 reference point, the NAI is generated by S-GW based on the IMSI.” TS 23.003 v8.21.0
- Deletion of IMSI in the Update Bearer Request TS 29.274CR0178
Rel-9 adds emergency attach handling of IMSI: IMSI or IMEI use for emergency bearer services, unauthenticated IMSI marking, and IMEI-based NAI when IMSI is unavailable or unauthenticated.
- “For emergency attached UEs IMSI is included if available and if the IMSI cannot be authenticated then the IMSI shall be marked as unauthenticated.” TS 23.401 v9.16.0
- “The IMEI shall be included when the UE has no IMSI, no valid GUTI and no valid P-TMSI.” TS 23.401 v9.16.0
- “when UE is performing emergency attach and IMSI is not available or not authenticated, on the IMEI” TS 23.003 v9.15.0
UE and network behaviour around IMSI changed: UEs configured for Attach with IMSI at PLMN change now identify by IMSI, and IMSI was added to the DDN message.
- “the UE shall include the IMSI in the EPS mobile identity IE in the ATTACH REQUEST message.” TS 24.301 v10.15.0
- “a UE configured to perform Attach with IMSI at PLMN change (see TS 24.368 [69]) shall identify itself by its IMSI instead of any stored temporary identifier.” TS 23.401 v10.13.0
- Adding IMSI to DDN TS 29.274CR0892
IMSI-related procedures changed: IMSI detach/attach handling in EMM, authentication GUTI/IMSI mapping failure handling, and IMSI being provided to the S-CSCF and carried in Suspend Notification.
- “If the DETACH REQUEST message received by the UE contains detach type "IMSI detach", and the UE initiated detach procedure is with detach type "IMSI detach", the UE need not re-attach to non-EPS services.” TS 24.301 v11.14.0
- “the network should send an AUTHENTICATION REJECT message to the UE.” TS 24.301 v11.14.0
- Providing the IMSI to the S-CSCF TS 29.228CR0557
IMSI handling changed in Rel-12: new Decorated NAI built from the IMSI, IMSI encoding over Cx and a dummy IMSI in Resume Notification, plus the rule that the HSS-ID must not equal a complete IMSI.
- IMSI based Decorated NAI TS 23.003CR0394
- “When the username part of Decorated NAI includes the IMSI and the service provider has a PLMN ID” TS 23.003 v12.9.0
- Dummy IMSI in Resume Notification TS 29.274CR1418
IMSI handling changed in Rel-13: the UE can now include IMSI in the Attach Request under revised conditions, IMSI is provided in the DECOR redirection procedure, and IMSI is carried in NIR and the Context Response.
- “The UE shall include the IMSI in the EPS mobile identity IE in the ATTACH REQUEST message if the selected PLMN is neither the registered PLMN” TS 24.301 v13.12.0
- Providing IMSI in DÉCOR redirection procedure TS 23.401CR2936
- IMSI in NIR TS 29.336CR0061
In Rel-14 the IMSI gained new roles in emergency attach: an IMSI-based Emergency NAI is constructed when the IMSI is available, and the network handles an unauthenticated IMSI by requesting the IMEI.
- “based on the IMSI or the IMEI (depending on the interface and information element) when the UE is performing an emergency attach and IMSI is available in the UE” TS 23.003 v14.7.0
- “if the IMSI is not authenticated by the network, the network requests the IMEI from the UE” TS 23.003 v14.7.0
- Inclusion of IMSI in the Modify Bearer Request message TS 29.060CR1041
In Rel-15 the IMSI gains a role as a 5G SUPI type and in IMSI-Group membership, and the UE's rules for including the IMSI in ATTACH REQUEST (EPS mobile identity) were specified.
- “a SUPI type: in this release of the specification, it may indicate an IMSI or a network specific identifier” TS 23.003 v15.11.0
- “If a 5G subscriber's IMSI belongs to an IMSI-Group identified by a given IMSI-Group Identifier X” TS 23.003 v15.11.0
- “otherwise the UE shall include the IMSI in the EPS mobile identity IE.” TS 24.301 v15.8.0
Rel-16 specifies IMSI use for RLOS attach (included if available, IMEI otherwise, marked unauthenticated if unverifiable) and extends SUPI type/SUCI handling for IMSI-based identifiers.
- “the IMSI shall be included if available and if the UE does not have a valid GUTI or a valid P-TMSI available.” TS 23.401 v16.14.0
- “If the RLOS attached UE has USIM but the IMSI cannot be successfully authenticated, then the IMSI shall be marked as unauthenticated.” TS 23.401 v16.14.0
Rel-17 adds an IMSI offset mechanism for Multi-USIM UEs: the UE requests an offset in Attach/TAU, the MME negotiates it and derives an alternative IMSI used for paging occasions.
- “the UE shall include the IMSI offset value in the Requested IMSI offset IE in the ATTACH REQUEST message.” TS 24.301 v17.12.0
- “the MME shall calculate an alternative IMSI value using the IMSI offset value and store it in the UE context” TS 24.301 v17.12.0
- “Alternative IMSI value = [MCC] [MNC] [(MSIN value + Accepted IMSI Offset) mod (MSIN address space)]” TS 23.401 v17.11.0
The MME UE context in TS 23.401 now includes MSISDN alongside IMSI, and the Context Response and Create Session Request carry MSISDN. CR0669 removes NID from the realm for IMSI-based SUCI.
- “The MME UE context includes IMSI, MSISDN, ME Identity, UE security context, UE Network Capability, AMBR” TS 23.401 v18.8.0
- Removal of Network Identifiers (NID) from the realm for IMSI based SUCI. TS 23.003CR0669
- “it sends a Create Session Request (IMSI, MSISDN, bearer contexts, MME Address and TEID, Type” TS 23.401 v18.8.0
New IMSI-matching storage rules apply to the disaster-condition PLMN lists and the disaster roaming wait range, which the UE must delete if the USIM IMSI differs from the one stored in the ME.
- “The stored lists of type "lists of PLMN(s) to be used in disaster condition" can only be used if the IMSI from the USIM matches” TS 24.301 v19.8.0
- “The disaster roaming wait range can only be used if the IMSI from the USIM matches the IMSI stored in the non-volatile memory of the ME” TS 24.301 v19.8.0
Defining Specifications
3GPP specifications that define or reference IMSI, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.
| Specification | Title | Release |
|---|---|---|
| TS 21.111 vj00 | USIM and UICC Requirements for 3G | Rel-19 read |
| TR 21.905 vj20 | 3GPP Terminology and Definitions | Rel-19 read |
| TS 22.022 vj00 | ME Personalisation Features for GSM/3G | Rel-19 read |
| TS 22.240 vj00 | 3GPP Generic User Profile Requirements | Rel-19 read |
| TR 22.944 vj00 | UE Functionality Split Scenarios and Requirements | Rel-19 read |
| TR 22.975 v310 | UMTS Numbering and Addressing Requirements | R99 read |
| TR 22.980 vj00 | Network Composition Feasibility Study | Rel-19 read |
| TS 23.125 v700 | Flow Based Charging Architecture | Rel-7 read |
| TS 23.218 vj00 | IMS Call Model Specification | Rel-19 read |
| TS 23.221 vj00 | 3GPP System Architectural Requirements | Rel-19 read |
| TS 23.228 vk10 | IP Multimedia Core Network Subsystem | Rel-20 read |
| TS 23.271 vj00 | LCS Stage 2 Specification | Rel-19 read |
| TS 23.280 vk51 | Mission Critical Services Architecture | Rel-20 read |
| TS 23.806 v700 | Voice Call Continuity between CS and IMS | Rel-7 read |
| TS 23.815 v500 | IMS Charging Implications | Rel-5 read |
| TS 23.851 v610 | Network Sharing Architecture for 3G Systems | Rel-6 read |
| TR 23.976 vj00 | Push Service Requirements Analysis | Rel-19 read |
| TS 24.229 vk10 | IMS SIP/SDP Call Control Protocol | Rel-20 read |
| TS 24.501 vk10 | 5GS NAS Protocol Specification | Rel-20 read |
| TS 25.304 vj10 | UE Idle Mode Procedures | Rel-19 read |
| TS 25.331 vj01 | UTRAN Radio Resource Control Protocol | Rel-19 read |
| TS 25.367 vj00 | Home NodeB Mobility Procedures | Rel-19 read |
| TS 25.410 vj00 | Iu Interface Introduction for UTRAN | Rel-19 read |
| TS 25.413 vj00 | Radio Access Network Application Part (RANAP) | Rel-19 read |
| TS 25.423 vj00 | UTRAN RNSAP Specification | Rel-19 read |
| TS 25.705 vd00 | Small Data Enhancements for UMTS | Rel-13 read |
| TR 25.931 vj00 | UTRAN Signalling Procedures Examples | Rel-19 read |
| TS 29.172 vj00 | EPC LCS Protocol (ELP) specification | Rel-19 read |
| TS 29.274 vk00 | GTPv2-C Control Plane Protocol | Rel-20 read |
| TS 29.275 vj00 | PMIPv6 Mobility & Tunnelling Protocols Stage 3 | Rel-19 read |
| TS 29.276 vj00 | EPS S101/S121/S103 Interfaces Stage 3 | Rel-19 read |
| TS 29.277 vj00 | S102 Interface Protocol Specification | Rel-19 read |
| TR 29.949 vj00 | VoLTE IMS Roaming Architecture & Procedures | Rel-19 read |
| TS 31.102 vk00 | USIM Application Specification | Rel-20 read |
| TS 31.117 vj30 | USAT Tests for Non-Removable UICC | Rel-19 read |
| TS 31.121 vj00 | UICC Application Test Specification | Rel-19 read |
| TR 31.900 vj00 | 3GPP TS 31.900: Security Interworking Guidance | Rel-19 read |
| TS 32.182 vj00 | UDC Common Baseline Information Model (CBIM) | Rel-19 read |
| TS 32.240 vk10 | 3GPP Charging Architecture and Principles | Rel-20 read |
| TS 32.250 vj00 | Circuit Switched Offline Charging | Rel-19 read |
| TS 32.251 vj00 | PS Domain Charging Management | Rel-19 read |
| TS 32.270 vj00 | MMS Charging Management Specification | Rel-19 read |
| TS 32.271 vj20 | 3GPP LCS Charging Management Spec | Rel-19 read |
| TS 32.272 vj00 | Charging for Push-to-Talk over Cellular (PoC) | Rel-19 read |
| TS 32.276 vj00 | VCS Online Charging from Proxy Function | Rel-19 read |
| TS 32.277 vj20 | Charging Management for Proximity Services (ProSe) | Rel-19 read |
| TS 32.278 vj00 | Monitoring Events Offline Charging Specification | Rel-19 read |
| TS 32.293 vj00 | Proxy Function in Domestic Service Provider | Rel-19 read |
| TS 32.296 vj00 | Online Charging System (OCS) Architecture | Rel-19 read |
| TS 32.401 vj00 | Performance Management Concept & Requirements | Rel-19 read |
| TS 32.808 v800 | Common Profile Storage Framework for User Data | Rel-8 read |
| TS 32.849 vd00 | VoLTE Roaming Charging Scenarios | Rel-13 read |
| TS 32.850 ve00 | IMS Charging Correlation Methods Study | Rel-14 read |
| TS 33.102 vj10 | 3G Security Architecture Specification | Rel-19 read |
| TS 33.105 vj00 | 3G Security: Cryptographic Algorithm Requirements | Rel-19 read |
| TS 33.107 vj00 | Lawful Interception Architecture & Functions | Rel-19 read |
| TS 33.108 vj00 | LI Handover Interface Specification | Rel-19 read |
| TS 33.320 vj00 | H(e)NB Subsystem Security Architecture | Rel-19 read |
| TS 33.401 vj20 | EPS Security Architecture | Rel-19 read |
| TS 33.820 v830 | H(e)NB Security Threats and Countermeasures | Rel-8 read |
| TS 33.843 vf10 | Security Study for ProSe UE-to-Network Relay | Rel-15 read |
| TS 36.304 vj30 | LTE UE Idle Mode Procedures | Rel-19 read |
| TS 36.331 vj40 | E-UTRA Radio Resource Control (RRC) Protocol | Rel-19 read |
| TS 37.320 vj40 | MDT Overall Description (Stage 2) | Rel-19 read |
| TS 38.304 vj30 | NR UE Idle and Inactive State Procedures | Rel-19 read |
| TS 38.331 vj40 | NR Radio Resource Control (RRC) | Rel-19 read |
| TS 41.033 ve00 | GSM Lawful Interception Interface Requirements | Rel-14 read |
| TS 43.020 vj00 | Security Procedures for GSM | Rel-19 read |
| TS 43.051 vj00 | GERAN Stage 2 Service Description | Rel-19 read |
| TS 43.318 vj00 | Generic Access Network (GAN) Stage 2 | Rel-19 read |
| TR 43.901 vj00 | Generic Access to A/Gb Interface Feasibility Study | Rel-19 read |
| TR 43.902 vj00 | GAN Enhancements Feasibility Study | Rel-19 read |
| TS 44.060 vj00 | GERAN RLC/MAC Protocol Specification | Rel-19 read |
| TS 44.160 vg00 | GERAN Iu Mode RLC/MAC Protocol Specification | Rel-16 read |
| TS 44.318 vj00 | Generic Access Network (GAN) Interface Procedures | Rel-19 read |
| TS 51.010 vj00 | SIM Application Toolkit Conformance Testing | Rel-19 read |
| TS 52.402 vj00 | GSM Performance Management Measurements | Rel-19 read |