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Glossary term · Identifier

IMSI

International Mobile Subscriber Identity

Identifier →

IMSI is a globally unique permanent identifier assigned to a mobile subscriber, stored on the SIM/USIM, and used by the network for identification, authentication, and retrieving the subscriber's profile.

Introduced
Phase 1
Where
Services › IMS
Specifications
77 specs
Also in
Core Network, Radio Access Network, Security, Management, User Equipment, Testing
IMSI Description Purpose What changed Family Neighbours Detected Changes Specifications

Description

The International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) is a critical identifier in GSM, UMTS, LTE, and 5G systems. It is a 15-digit (or shorter) numeric code permanently associated with a subscriber and stored within the SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) or USIM (Universal SIM). Structurally, the IMSI is composed of three parts: the Mobile Country Code (MCC, 3 digits), the Mobile Network Code (MNC, 2 or 3 digits), and the Mobile Subscriber Identification Number (MSIN, 9-10 digits). The MCC and MNC together identify the home PLMN (Public Land Mobile Network) of the subscriber, while the MSIN uniquely identifies the subscriber within that network.

In network operations, the IMSI is used during the initial attach procedure when a mobile device connects to the network. The device sends the IMSI to the serving network element (e.g., MME in LTE, AMF in 5G), which then uses it to query the home network's HSS (Home Subscriber Server) or equivalent database (like AUC) for authentication vectors and subscriber profile data. The authentication process involves the network generating a challenge using a secret key (Ki) associated with the IMSI. For privacy reasons, the IMSI is not transmitted openly frequently; instead, a temporary identifier like TMSI (Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity) or GUTI (Globally Unique Temporary Identity) is used after initial authentication to avoid IMSI exposure over the air interface.

The IMSI's role extends beyond mere identification. It is the primary key for subscriber data in network databases, linking to subscription details, service profiles, QoS parameters, and security credentials. In mobility management, it helps in tracking area updates and handovers between cells. In session management, it is used to correlate charging records (CDRs) with the correct subscriber account. Its standardized format enables international roaming, as a visited network can identify the subscriber's home network using the MCC/MNC and establish the appropriate roaming agreements and routing.

Purpose & Motivation

The IMSI was created to provide a standardized, globally unique, and permanent identifier for mobile subscribers, solving the problems of subscriber identification and roaming in early analog cellular systems. Before GSM, identifiers were often network-specific, hindering interoperability and international roaming. The IMSI, introduced with GSM, allowed any network worldwide to uniquely identify a subscriber and contact their home network for authentication and service profile retrieval, enabling seamless global mobility.

Its design addresses several key requirements: uniqueness (ensured by the MCC/MNC/MSIN structure), permanence (tied to the subscription, not the device), and security (stored securely on the SIM). The separation of the home network identifier (MCC/MNC) from the subscriber identifier (MSIN) simplifies routing of signaling messages for roaming subscribers. The IMSI is fundamental to the security architecture of cellular networks, as it is linked to the subscriber's secret authentication key (Ki). Without a robust, standardized permanent identity like the IMSI, functions like lawful interception, international roaming billing, and subscriber management would be extremely complex or impossible on a global scale.

What changed in its specifications

The latest release-to-release comparison of specifications that define IMSI. Each summary describes the whole specification, not only this term.

TR 21.905Rel-17 → Rel-18

Rel-18 brings only minor changes to TS 21.905: 0 clauses changed, with no change attributed to a release feature.

Full comparison in TR 21.905 →

Technology family

Subscriber and device identifiers · User Equipment

  1. Phase 1 IMEI, IMSI, MSIN, MSISDN, TMSI
  2. Phase 2 IMEISV
  3. R96 TLLI
  4. R97 P-TMSI
  5. R98 CTSMSI
  6. Rel-5 IMPI, IMPU, Temporary Public User Identity
  7. Rel-8 GUTI, M-TMSI
  8. Rel-15 5G-GUTI, 5G-S-TMSI, 5G-TMSI, GPSI, NSI, PEI, SUCI, SUPI
  9. Rel-16 GCI, GLI, Truncated 5G-S-TMSI
  • IMSI extended by SUPI
    “in this release of the specification, it may indicate an IMSI, a Network Specific Identifier (NSI), a Global Line Identifier (GLI) or a Global Cable Identifier (GCI)” TS 23.003
  • IMSI extended by IMPI
    “If the private user identity is not known, the private user identity shall be derived from the IMSI.” TS 23.003
  • IMSI extended by CTSMSI
    “The default Individual CTSMSI contains the least significant portion of the IMSI. This is the default CTS‑MS identity.” TS 23.003

Members and relations were proposed independently by several models and kept only where at least two agree; quotes are verified verbatim against the specifications. Release = first approved version of the defining specification.

Release Timeline

Detected Changes Across Releases

verified against 3GPP sources

Documented changes in 18 releases, each verified against the text of 3GPP specifications or approved change requests and shown with the exact wording. The release timeline above shows the same releases. A release without an entry has no documented change for this term.

Phase 1 introduced

Introduced in Phase 1 (release dating of the term; no individual change cited).

R99 specification text

TS 23.003 v3f0 first specifies the IMSI: its numeric format, 15-digit maximum, allocation to each subscriber, and its three-part composition (MCC, MNC, MSIN).

  • “A unique International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) shall be allocated to each mobile subscriber in the GSM system.” TS 23.003 v3.15.0
  • “The overall number of digits in IMSI shall not exceed 15 digits.” TS 23.003 v3.15.0
  • “IMSI is composed of three parts:” TS 23.003 v3.15.0
Rel-4 1 CR

Optional IMSI paging after SGSN restart was removed in TS 23.007, changing the paging procedure that uses the IMSI.

  • Removal of an optional IMSI paging after SGSN restart TS 23.007CR007
Rel-5 specification text

TS 23.003 Rel-5 extends IMSI to GSM/UMTS and adds rules for deriving the IMS home network domain name and private user identity from the IMSI when there is no ISIM.

  • “If there is no ISIM application, the private user identity is not known. If the private user identity is not known, the private user identity shall be derived from the IMSI.” TS 23.003 v5.11.0
  • “If there is no ISIM application, the UE shall derive the home network domain name from the IMSI as described in the following steps:” TS 23.003 v5.11.0
  • “A unique International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) shall be allocated to each mobile subscriber in the GSM/UMTS system.” TS 23.003 v5.11.0
Rel-6 specification text

TS 23.003 Rel-6 specifies how the WLAN UE derives the home domain name, Root NAI, Decorated NAI and default W-APN Operator Identifier from the IMSI for WLAN access.

  • “the WLAN UE shall derive the home network domain name from the IMSI as described in the following steps” TS 23.003 v6.17.0
  • “When the username part includes the IMSI, the Root NAI shall be built according to the following steps:” TS 23.003 v6.17.0
  • “This default W-APN Operator Identifier is derived from the IMSI as follows:” TS 23.003 v6.17.0
Rel-7 1 CR

Rel-7 adds a rule that the visited-network BM-SC derives the home network domain name from the IMSI during MBMS roaming activation, and corrects how the UE derives identifiers from the IMSI.

  • “the BM-SC in the visted network shall derive the home network domain name from the IMSI as described in the following steps” TS 23.003 v7.11.0
  • Correction of derivation of identifiers, by the UE, using the IMSI TS 23.003CR0131r2
Rel-8 1 CR

IMSI usage was extended to EPS: IMSI is allocated in the GSM/UMTS/EPS system and MME may correlate TMSI to it, with IMSI attach/detach in EMM procedures and IMSI-derived NAIs for S5/S8, S2a/S2b and S2c.

  • “A unique International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) shall be allocated to each mobile subscriber in the GSM/UMTS/EPS system.” TS 23.003 v8.21.0
  • “At S5/S8 reference point, the NAI is generated by S-GW based on the IMSI.” TS 23.003 v8.21.0
  • Deletion of IMSI in the Update Bearer Request TS 29.274CR0178
Rel-9 specification text

Rel-9 adds emergency attach handling of IMSI: IMSI or IMEI use for emergency bearer services, unauthenticated IMSI marking, and IMEI-based NAI when IMSI is unavailable or unauthenticated.

  • “For emergency attached UEs IMSI is included if available and if the IMSI cannot be authenticated then the IMSI shall be marked as unauthenticated.” TS 23.401 v9.16.0
  • “The IMEI shall be included when the UE has no IMSI, no valid GUTI and no valid P-TMSI.” TS 23.401 v9.16.0
  • “when UE is performing emergency attach and IMSI is not available or not authenticated, on the IMEI” TS 23.003 v9.15.0
Rel-10 1 CR

UE and network behaviour around IMSI changed: UEs configured for Attach with IMSI at PLMN change now identify by IMSI, and IMSI was added to the DDN message.

  • “the UE shall include the IMSI in the EPS mobile identity IE in the ATTACH REQUEST message.” TS 24.301 v10.15.0
  • “a UE configured to perform Attach with IMSI at PLMN change (see TS 24.368 [69]) shall identify itself by its IMSI instead of any stored temporary identifier.” TS 23.401 v10.13.0
  • Adding IMSI to DDN TS 29.274CR0892
Rel-11 1 CR

IMSI-related procedures changed: IMSI detach/attach handling in EMM, authentication GUTI/IMSI mapping failure handling, and IMSI being provided to the S-CSCF and carried in Suspend Notification.

  • “If the DETACH REQUEST message received by the UE contains detach type "IMSI detach", and the UE initiated detach procedure is with detach type "IMSI detach", the UE need not re-attach to non-EPS services.” TS 24.301 v11.14.0
  • “the network should send an AUTHENTICATION REJECT message to the UE.” TS 24.301 v11.14.0
  • Providing the IMSI to the S-CSCF TS 29.228CR0557
Rel-12 2 CRs

IMSI handling changed in Rel-12: new Decorated NAI built from the IMSI, IMSI encoding over Cx and a dummy IMSI in Resume Notification, plus the rule that the HSS-ID must not equal a complete IMSI.

  • IMSI based Decorated NAI TS 23.003CR0394
  • “When the username part of Decorated NAI includes the IMSI and the service provider has a PLMN ID” TS 23.003 v12.9.0
  • Dummy IMSI in Resume Notification TS 29.274CR1418
Rel-13 2 CRs

IMSI handling changed in Rel-13: the UE can now include IMSI in the Attach Request under revised conditions, IMSI is provided in the DECOR redirection procedure, and IMSI is carried in NIR and the Context Response.

  • “The UE shall include the IMSI in the EPS mobile identity IE in the ATTACH REQUEST message if the selected PLMN is neither the registered PLMN” TS 24.301 v13.12.0
  • Providing IMSI in DÉCOR redirection procedure TS 23.401CR2936
  • IMSI in NIR TS 29.336CR0061
Rel-14 1 CR

In Rel-14 the IMSI gained new roles in emergency attach: an IMSI-based Emergency NAI is constructed when the IMSI is available, and the network handles an unauthenticated IMSI by requesting the IMEI.

  • “based on the IMSI or the IMEI (depending on the interface and information element) when the UE is performing an emergency attach and IMSI is available in the UE” TS 23.003 v14.7.0
  • “if the IMSI is not authenticated by the network, the network requests the IMEI from the UE” TS 23.003 v14.7.0
  • Inclusion of IMSI in the Modify Bearer Request message TS 29.060CR1041
Rel-15 specification text

In Rel-15 the IMSI gains a role as a 5G SUPI type and in IMSI-Group membership, and the UE's rules for including the IMSI in ATTACH REQUEST (EPS mobile identity) were specified.

  • “a SUPI type: in this release of the specification, it may indicate an IMSI or a network specific identifier” TS 23.003 v15.11.0
  • “If a 5G subscriber's IMSI belongs to an IMSI-Group identified by a given IMSI-Group Identifier X” TS 23.003 v15.11.0
  • “otherwise the UE shall include the IMSI in the EPS mobile identity IE.” TS 24.301 v15.8.0
Rel-16 specification text

Rel-16 specifies IMSI use for RLOS attach (included if available, IMEI otherwise, marked unauthenticated if unverifiable) and extends SUPI type/SUCI handling for IMSI-based identifiers.

  • “the IMSI shall be included if available and if the UE does not have a valid GUTI or a valid P-TMSI available.” TS 23.401 v16.14.0
  • “If the RLOS attached UE has USIM but the IMSI cannot be successfully authenticated, then the IMSI shall be marked as unauthenticated.” TS 23.401 v16.14.0
Rel-17 specification text

Rel-17 adds an IMSI offset mechanism for Multi-USIM UEs: the UE requests an offset in Attach/TAU, the MME negotiates it and derives an alternative IMSI used for paging occasions.

  • “the UE shall include the IMSI offset value in the Requested IMSI offset IE in the ATTACH REQUEST message.” TS 24.301 v17.12.0
  • “the MME shall calculate an alternative IMSI value using the IMSI offset value and store it in the UE context” TS 24.301 v17.12.0
  • “Alternative IMSI value = [MCC] [MNC] [(MSIN value + Accepted IMSI Offset) mod (MSIN address space)]” TS 23.401 v17.11.0
Rel-18 1 CR

The MME UE context in TS 23.401 now includes MSISDN alongside IMSI, and the Context Response and Create Session Request carry MSISDN. CR0669 removes NID from the realm for IMSI-based SUCI.

  • “The MME UE context includes IMSI, MSISDN, ME Identity, UE security context, UE Network Capability, AMBR” TS 23.401 v18.8.0
  • Removal of Network Identifiers (NID) from the realm for IMSI based SUCI. TS 23.003CR0669
  • “it sends a Create Session Request (IMSI, MSISDN, bearer contexts, MME Address and TEID, Type” TS 23.401 v18.8.0
Rel-19 specification text

New IMSI-matching storage rules apply to the disaster-condition PLMN lists and the disaster roaming wait range, which the UE must delete if the USIM IMSI differs from the one stored in the ME.

  • “The stored lists of type "lists of PLMN(s) to be used in disaster condition" can only be used if the IMSI from the USIM matches” TS 24.301 v19.8.0
  • “The disaster roaming wait range can only be used if the IMSI from the USIM matches the IMSI stored in the non-volatile memory of the ME” TS 24.301 v19.8.0

Defining Specifications

3GPP specifications that define or reference IMSI, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.

SpecificationTitleRelease
TS 21.111 vj00 USIM and UICC Requirements for 3G Rel-19 read
TR 21.905 vj20 3GPP Terminology and Definitions Rel-19 read
TS 22.022 vj00 ME Personalisation Features for GSM/3G Rel-19 read
TS 22.240 vj00 3GPP Generic User Profile Requirements Rel-19 read
TR 22.944 vj00 UE Functionality Split Scenarios and Requirements Rel-19 read
TR 22.975 v310 UMTS Numbering and Addressing Requirements R99 read
TR 22.980 vj00 Network Composition Feasibility Study Rel-19 read
TS 23.125 v700 Flow Based Charging Architecture Rel-7 read
TS 23.218 vj00 IMS Call Model Specification Rel-19 read
TS 23.221 vj00 3GPP System Architectural Requirements Rel-19 read
TS 23.228 vk10 IP Multimedia Core Network Subsystem Rel-20 read
TS 23.271 vj00 LCS Stage 2 Specification Rel-19 read
TS 23.280 vk51 Mission Critical Services Architecture Rel-20 read
TS 23.806 v700 Voice Call Continuity between CS and IMS Rel-7 read
TS 23.815 v500 IMS Charging Implications Rel-5 read
TS 23.851 v610 Network Sharing Architecture for 3G Systems Rel-6 read
TR 23.976 vj00 Push Service Requirements Analysis Rel-19 read
TS 24.229 vk10 IMS SIP/SDP Call Control Protocol Rel-20 read
TS 24.501 vk10 5GS NAS Protocol Specification Rel-20 read
TS 25.304 vj10 UE Idle Mode Procedures Rel-19 read
TS 25.331 vj01 UTRAN Radio Resource Control Protocol Rel-19 read
TS 25.367 vj00 Home NodeB Mobility Procedures Rel-19 read
TS 25.410 vj00 Iu Interface Introduction for UTRAN Rel-19 read
TS 25.413 vj00 Radio Access Network Application Part (RANAP) Rel-19 read
TS 25.423 vj00 UTRAN RNSAP Specification Rel-19 read
TS 25.705 vd00 Small Data Enhancements for UMTS Rel-13 read
TR 25.931 vj00 UTRAN Signalling Procedures Examples Rel-19 read
TS 29.172 vj00 EPC LCS Protocol (ELP) specification Rel-19 read
TS 29.274 vk00 GTPv2-C Control Plane Protocol Rel-20 read
TS 29.275 vj00 PMIPv6 Mobility & Tunnelling Protocols Stage 3 Rel-19 read
TS 29.276 vj00 EPS S101/S121/S103 Interfaces Stage 3 Rel-19 read
TS 29.277 vj00 S102 Interface Protocol Specification Rel-19 read
TR 29.949 vj00 VoLTE IMS Roaming Architecture & Procedures Rel-19 read
TS 31.102 vk00 USIM Application Specification Rel-20 read
TS 31.117 vj30 USAT Tests for Non-Removable UICC Rel-19 read
TS 31.121 vj00 UICC Application Test Specification Rel-19 read
TR 31.900 vj00 3GPP TS 31.900: Security Interworking Guidance Rel-19 read
TS 32.182 vj00 UDC Common Baseline Information Model (CBIM) Rel-19 read
TS 32.240 vk10 3GPP Charging Architecture and Principles Rel-20 read
TS 32.250 vj00 Circuit Switched Offline Charging Rel-19 read
TS 32.251 vj00 PS Domain Charging Management Rel-19 read
TS 32.270 vj00 MMS Charging Management Specification Rel-19 read
TS 32.271 vj20 3GPP LCS Charging Management Spec Rel-19 read
TS 32.272 vj00 Charging for Push-to-Talk over Cellular (PoC) Rel-19 read
TS 32.276 vj00 VCS Online Charging from Proxy Function Rel-19 read
TS 32.277 vj20 Charging Management for Proximity Services (ProSe) Rel-19 read
TS 32.278 vj00 Monitoring Events Offline Charging Specification Rel-19 read
TS 32.293 vj00 Proxy Function in Domestic Service Provider Rel-19 read
TS 32.296 vj00 Online Charging System (OCS) Architecture Rel-19 read
TS 32.401 vj00 Performance Management Concept & Requirements Rel-19 read
TS 32.808 v800 Common Profile Storage Framework for User Data Rel-8 read
TS 32.849 vd00 VoLTE Roaming Charging Scenarios Rel-13 read
TS 32.850 ve00 IMS Charging Correlation Methods Study Rel-14 read
TS 33.102 vj10 3G Security Architecture Specification Rel-19 read
TS 33.105 vj00 3G Security: Cryptographic Algorithm Requirements Rel-19 read
TS 33.107 vj00 Lawful Interception Architecture & Functions Rel-19 read
TS 33.108 vj00 LI Handover Interface Specification Rel-19 read
TS 33.320 vj00 H(e)NB Subsystem Security Architecture Rel-19 read
TS 33.401 vj20 EPS Security Architecture Rel-19 read
TS 33.820 v830 H(e)NB Security Threats and Countermeasures Rel-8 read
TS 33.843 vf10 Security Study for ProSe UE-to-Network Relay Rel-15 read
TS 36.304 vj30 LTE UE Idle Mode Procedures Rel-19 read
TS 36.331 vj40 E-UTRA Radio Resource Control (RRC) Protocol Rel-19 read
TS 37.320 vj40 MDT Overall Description (Stage 2) Rel-19 read
TS 38.304 vj30 NR UE Idle and Inactive State Procedures Rel-19 read
TS 38.331 vj40 NR Radio Resource Control (RRC) Rel-19 read
TS 41.033 ve00 GSM Lawful Interception Interface Requirements Rel-14 read
TS 43.020 vj00 Security Procedures for GSM Rel-19 read
TS 43.051 vj00 GERAN Stage 2 Service Description Rel-19 read
TS 43.318 vj00 Generic Access Network (GAN) Stage 2 Rel-19 read
TR 43.901 vj00 Generic Access to A/Gb Interface Feasibility Study Rel-19 read
TR 43.902 vj00 GAN Enhancements Feasibility Study Rel-19 read
TS 44.060 vj00 GERAN RLC/MAC Protocol Specification Rel-19 read
TS 44.160 vg00 GERAN Iu Mode RLC/MAC Protocol Specification Rel-16 read
TS 44.318 vj00 Generic Access Network (GAN) Interface Procedures Rel-19 read
TS 51.010 vj00 SIM Application Toolkit Conformance Testing Rel-19 read
TS 52.402 vj00 GSM Performance Management Measurements Rel-19 read