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Glossary term · Security

SIM

Subscriber Identity Module

Security →

SIM is a secure, removable smart card or embedded chip that stores a subscriber's unique identity and authentication keys to enable secure network access and user identification in mobile networks.

Introduced
Phase 1
Where
Services › IMS
Specifications
49 specs
Also in
User Equipment, Radio Access Network, Security
SIM Description Purpose What changed Family Neighbours Detected Changes Specifications

Description

The Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) is a pivotal security component in 3GPP networks, functioning as a tamper-resistant hardware security module. Physically, it has evolved from a full-size card (1FF) to the now-standard nano-SIM (4FF) and the embedded SIM (eSIM). Logically, it contains a microprocessor and persistent memory running a dedicated operating system. Its primary secure storage includes the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI), which uniquely identifies the subscriber globally, and a long-term secret key (Ki). These two elements are central to the Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocol.

The SIM works in conjunction with the mobile device (ME) and the network's Authentication Centre (AuC/UDM). When a device attempts to attach to a network, it presents the IMSI from the SIM to the network. The network operator's AuC/UDM, which also holds the IMSI and corresponding Ki, uses this to generate a challenge (RAND) and an expected response (XRES) using cryptographic algorithms (e.g., MILENAGE for 5G AKA). The RAND is sent to the device. The SIM card receives this RAND via the device, uses its stored Ki and the same algorithm to compute a response (RES) and ciphering/integrity keys (CK, IK). The device sends the RES back to the network. If the RES matches the XRES, authentication is successful, and the session keys are established for securing the air interface. The SIM performs the critical cryptographic computations internally; the Ki never leaves the secure boundary of the SIM chip, providing a high level of security against software attacks on the device.

Beyond core authentication, the SIM stores other vital data. This includes the Integrated Circuit Card Identifier (ICCID), which uniquely identifies the SIM card itself, the Abbreviated Dialing Numbers (phonebook), Short Message Service (SMS) messages, and network-specific settings like the Preferred PLMN list. In modern iterations like the eSIM, the SIM functionality is soldered onto the device's circuit board but remains a logically separate, secure element. The eSIM enables remote SIM provisioning (RSP), allowing operators to download and activate subscription profiles over-the-air (OTA), revolutionizing logistics and enabling new connectivity models for IoT and consumer devices. The SIM, therefore, is not just an identity token but a secure, programmable platform that anchors trust in the entire mobile ecosystem.

Purpose & Motivation

The SIM was created to solve critical problems of security, mobility, and service portability in the emerging digital GSM network in the early 1990s. Prior to GSM, analog cellular systems like AMPS relied on a factory-programmed Electronic Serial Number (ESN) in the phone, tightly coupling the subscriber identity to the hardware. This made changing phones cumbersome and offered weak authentication, making the systems vulnerable to cloning fraud.

The SIM's primary purpose was to separate subscriber identity and subscription from the mobile device hardware. This solved several problems: 1) Security: By storing the secret key (Ki) in a secure, removable element, it provided strong mutual authentication between subscriber and network, drastically reducing fraud. 2) Mobility and Convenience: A subscriber could move their subscription to any compatible phone simply by moving the SIM card, enabling true personal mobility. 3) Service Portability: It allowed operators to pre-configure network settings and services on the card. The evolution from physical SIM to eSIM was motivated by the need for greater flexibility in an increasingly connected world. For IoT devices deployed in hard-to-reach locations, physically swapping SIMs is impractical. For consumers, eSIMs allow easy switching between operators and enable dual-SIM functionality without multiple card slots. The eSIM and remote provisioning standards address the logistical challenges of SIM distribution and the desire for more dynamic, user-centric subscription management, while maintaining and even enhancing the foundational security role of the original SIM concept.

What changed in its specifications

The latest release-to-release comparison of specifications that define SIM. Each summary describes the whole specification, not only this term.

TR 21.905Rel-17 → Rel-18

Rel-18 brings only minor changes to TS 21.905: 0 clauses changed, with no change attributed to a release feature.

Full comparison in TR 21.905 →
TS 22.038Rel-4 → Rel-5

Rel-5 added USAT definitions, proactive key press indication, ISIM reference, and removed network-specific bearer and communication control restrictions.

Full comparison in TS 22.038 →

Technology family

Subscriber identity modules · User Equipment › SIM/USIM

  1. Phase 1 IC card SIM, ID-1 SIM, Plug-in SIM, SIM
  2. R96 proactive SIM, SAT
  3. R99 UICC, USAT, USIM
  4. Rel-5 ISIM
  5. Rel-17 MUSIM

Also in this family (introduction release not pinned to a single defining specification): eSIM, eUICC

  • SIM counterpart in another generation: USIM
    “If a USIM application is present on the UICC, a 3GPP ME shall only use the USIM application regardless of the radio access technology in use. In this case, a possibly existing SIM application shall never be used by a 3GPP ME.” TS 31.102

Members and relations were proposed independently by several models and kept only where at least two agree; quotes are verified verbatim against the specifications. Release = first approved version of the defining specification.

Release Timeline

Detected Changes Across Releases

verified against 3GPP sources

Documented changes in 13 releases, each verified against the text of 3GPP specifications or approved change requests and shown with the exact wording. The release timeline above shows the same releases. A release without an entry has no documented change for this term.

Phase 1 introduced

Introduced in Phase 1 (release dating of the term; no individual change cited).

R99 specification text

The SIM is specified for the first time in these R99 documents: 24008 sets SIM validity and update status handling, 27007 adds SIM-related AT commands, and 23122 covers SIM-stored PLMN selector data.

  • “The SIM shall be considered as invalid for GPRS and non-GPRS services until switching off or the SIM is removed.” TS 24.008 v3.20.0
  • “the SIM contains also the LAI of the LA where the subscriber is registered” TS 24.008 v3.20.0
  • “that VPLMN is added to a list of "forbidden PLMNs" in the SIM” TS 23.122 v3.10.0
Rel-5 specification text

SIM/USIM handling was extended in Rel-5: the SIM/USIM is now treated as invalid after authentication reject, and its stored update-status data fields are specified for both SIM and USIM.

  • “The SIM/USIM shall be considered as invalid for GPRS and non-GPRS services until switching off or the SIM/USIM is removed.” TS 24.008 v5.16.0
  • “If the SIM receives an Update Record EFsms instruction formatted according to TS 23.048[8], the SIM Toolkit Framework shall verify the security of the SMS.” TS 51.013 v5.7.0
  • “A ToolkitException COMMAND_NOT_ALLOWED shall be thrown if the proactive command to be sent is not allowed by the SIM Toolkit Framework.” TS 51.013 v5.7.0
Rel-7 specification text

PLMN selection now uses SIM-stored EHPLMN lists and SIM data fields: operators control behaviour by SIM configuration, and SIM-MCC/SIM-MNC are read from EHPLMN entries.

  • “The operator shall be able to control by SIM configuration whether an MS that supports this option shall perform this alternative behaviour.” TS 23.122 v7.12.1
  • “based on an optional data field on the SIM either only the highest priority available EHPLMN is to be presented to the user” TS 23.122 v7.12.1
  • “The MCC part of the IMSI or of additional entries in the EHPLMN list read from the SIM.” TS 23.122 v7.12.1
Rel-8 specification text

For a SIM without access technology storage, the MS no longer assumes GSM as highest priority; the priority ordering among access technologies is now implementation dependent.

  • “The priority ordering amongst the access technologies is implementation dependent.” TS 23.122 v8.12.0
Rel-10 specification text

The MS now starts timer T3245 when it marks the SIM/USIM invalid or forbids PLMNs, erases the forbidden lists on expiry and sets the SIM/USIM valid again; SIM-related card-slot handling was also added.

  • “Upon expiry of the timer T3245, the MS shall erase the "forbidden PLMN list" and the "forbidden PLMNs for GPRS service" list and set the SIM/USIM to valid” TS 24.008 v10.16.0
  • “Set command forces an attempt to select and register the GSM/UMTS/EPS network operator using the SIM/USIM card installed in the currently selected card slot.” TS 27.007 v10.8.0
  • “If the value stored in the SIM, or the default value for T (when no value is stored in the SIM), is less than the MinimumPeriodicSearchTimer” TS 23.122 v10.5.0
Rel-11 specification text

ME behaviour tied to SIM changed: START value handling when a SIM is inserted, SIM/USIM stored update-status contents, and the IMSI-unknown-in-HLR case now treats a SIM as invalid for non-GPRS services only.

  • “if a SIM is inserted, the ME shall read the STARTCS and STARTPS value from the non-volatile memory.” TS 24.008 v11.17.1
  • “An "IMSI unknown in HLR" response to an LR; (Any SIM in the ME is then considered "invalid" for non-GPRS services.)” TS 23.122 v11.4.0
  • “the ME shall store the current START value used by the lower layer for this domain on the USIM or, if a SIM is inserted, in the non-volatile memory.” TS 24.008 v11.17.1
Rel-14 1 CR

The MS now indicates "switch off" in the detach type IE when detach is triggered by SIM/USIM removal, and handles a counter for "SIM/USIM considered invalid for non-GPRS services" events.

  • “If the detach procedure is triggered due to SIM/USIM removal, the MS shall indicate "switch off" in the detach type IE.” TS 24.008 v14.9.0
  • Detach procedure triggered due to SIM/USIM removal TS 24.008CR3013
  • “if the MS maintains a counter for "SIM/USIM considered invalid for non-GPRS services" events” TS 24.008 v14.9.0
Rel-15 2 CRs

Handling of the MS counters for "SIM/USIM considered invalid" events was corrected, including incrementing the non-GPRS counter in Iu mode only once per RRC connection, and the related SIM/USIM storage and PLMN handling.

  • “in Iu mode, increment the counter for "SIM/USIM considered invalid for non-GPRS services" events, if not already incremented over the same RRC connection;” TS 24.008 v15.9.0
  • Correction of the handling of counters for "SIM/USIM considered invalid" events TS 24.008CR3088
  • Corrections to handling of EFFPLMN file in the SIM and of "forbidden PLMNs for GPRS service" list TS 23.122CR0326
Rel-16 1 CR

SIM handling changed in Rel-16: SIM/USIM invalidity and removal now apply to SNPN access mode ("list of subscriber data"), and SIM-related PLMN selection and limited-service rules were extended to SNPN, RLOS and 5GS.

  • “SIM/USIM is removed or the entry of the "list of subscriber data" with the SNPN identity of the current SNPN is updated” TS 24.008 v16.7.0
  • “or the SIM is not inserted, or there is no valid entry in "list of subscriber data" in case the MS is operating in SNPN access mode” TS 23.122 v16.12.0
  • Handling of the forbidden TAI list for regional provision of service and forbidden SNPN lists when the SIM is removed in case of AKA-based SNPN TS 23.122CR0459
Rel-17 2 CRs

Rel-17 changed how the MS behaves with the SIM, for example forbidden-list lists in the SIM and the no-SIM state now also cover disaster roaming, SNPN emergency registration and onboarding.

  • Emergency registration to an SNPN by a UE in the limited service state or no SIM state TS 23.122CR0703
  • Attempt to obtain onboarding services during the No SIM state TS 23.122CR0764
  • “This list is deleted when the MS is switched off, the SIM is removed or periodically (with period in the range 12 to 24 hours).” TS 23.122 v17.10.0
Rel-18 1 CR

In TS 23.122 the SIM-related behaviour changed: a VPLMN is added to the SIM's forbidden PLMN list, and the SIM controls alternative registration behaviour, with a 'No SIM' state clarified for SNPN.

  • “The operator shall be able to control by SIM configuration whether an MS that supports this option is permitted to perform this alternative behaviour.” TS 23.122 v18.11.0
  • “An MS in "No SIM" state configured with default UE credentials for primary authentication may perform SNPN selection procedure for onboarding services in SNPN.” TS 23.122 v18.11.0
  • No SIM state in the UE while accessing localized services in SNPN TS 23.122CR1144
Rel-19 1 CR

New AT commands (+CLOGSIMAPDU, +CLOGBUFFSIMAPDU) for logging SIM APDUs were added, and SIM handling in PLMN selection and T3245-related invalid-SIM behaviour was extended.

  • “20.2.8 Log SIM APDU +CLOGSIMAPDU” TS 27.007 v19.6.0
  • New AT Command for Logging and Buffering SIM APDU +CLOGBUFFSIMAPDU TS 27.007CR0904
  • “The SIM/USIM shall be considered as invalid until switching off, the SIM/USIM is removed, or the timer T3245 expires” TS 24.008 v19.5.0

Defining Specifications

3GPP specifications that define or reference SIM, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.

SpecificationTitleRelease
TS 21.111 vj00 USIM and UICC Requirements for 3G Rel-19 read
TS 21.133 v410 3G Security: Threat Analysis & Requirements Rel-4 read
TR 21.905 vj20 3GPP Terminology and Definitions Rel-19 read
TS 22.022 vj00 ME Personalisation Features for GSM/3G Rel-19 read
TS 22.038 vj00 USIM Application Toolkit (USAT) Stage 1 Rel-19 read
TS 22.057 vj00 Mobile Execution Environment (MExE) Stage 1 Rel-19 read
TS 22.066 vj00 Mobile Number Portability Stage 1 Rel-19 read
TS 22.100 v370 UMTS Service Requirements for Release '99 R99 read
TS 22.101 vl00 3GPP Service Principles for PLMNs Rel-21 read
TS 22.121 v531 Virtual Home Environment Service Requirements Rel-5 read
TS 22.226 vj00 Global Text Telephony (GTT) Stage 1 Rel-19 read
TS 22.234 vd10 3GPP-WLAN Interworking Index Specification Rel-13 read
TR 22.907 v313 UMTS IC Card and Terminal Concepts R99 read
TR 22.944 vj00 UE Functionality Split Scenarios and Requirements Rel-19 read
TR 22.967 vj00 eCall Emergency Data Transmission Rel-19 read
TR 22.980 vj00 Network Composition Feasibility Study Rel-19 read
TS 23.048 v590 Secured Packets Structure for SMS and UICC Management Rel-5 read
TS 23.050 3GPP TS 23.050 R99 read
TS 23.057 vj00 Mobile Execution Environment (MExE) Specification Rel-19 read
TS 23.067 vj00 Enhanced Multi-Level Precedence and Pre-emption Service Rel-19 read
TS 23.110 vj00 Access Stratum Services Specification Rel-19 read
TS 23.127 v610 Virtual Home Environment Stage 2 Specification Rel-6 read
TS 23.171 v390 LCS Stage 2 for UMTS R99 read
TS 23.228 vk10 IP Multimedia Core Network Subsystem Rel-20 read
TS 23.234 vd10 3GPP-WLAN Interworking Index Rel-13 read
TS 23.271 vj00 LCS Stage 2 Specification Rel-19 read
TR 23.758 vh00 Study on Edge Application Architecture Rel-17 read
TS 23.804 v710 SMS/MMS over IP Access Networks Rel-7 read
TS 24.234 vc20 3GPP-WLAN Interworking Procedures Rel-12 read
TS 25.305 vj00 UTRAN UE Positioning Stage 2 Rel-19 read
TS 26.804 vk10 5G Media Delivery Architecture Extensions Rel-20 read
TR 26.967 vj00 eCall via CTM Suitability Analysis Rel-19 read
TS 27.007 vk00 AT Command Interface for Mobile Terminals Rel-20 read
TS 29.198 v340 OSA R99 API Stage 3 Specification R99 read
TS 31.115 vj00 Secured Packet Structure for UICC Applications Rel-19 read
TS 31.131 vj00 C Language Binding for (U)SIM API Rel-19 read
TR 31.900 vj00 3GPP TS 31.900: Security Interworking Guidance Rel-19 read
TS 32.102 vj00 Telecom Management Physical Architecture Framework Rel-19 read
TS 32.240 vk10 3GPP Charging Architecture and Principles Rel-20 read
TS 32.272 vj00 Charging for Push-to-Talk over Cellular (PoC) Rel-19 read
TS 32.277 vj20 Charging Management for Proximity Services (ProSe) Rel-19 read
TS 33.401 vj20 EPS Security Architecture Rel-19 read
TS 34.131 vj00 SIM API C Language Test Specification Rel-19 read
TR 35.934 vj00 Tuak algorithm set for 3GPP auth & key gen Rel-19 read
TS 36.896 ve00 Study on Flexible eNB-ID and Cell-ID in E-UTRAN Rel-14 read
TS 43.318 vj00 Generic Access Network (GAN) Stage 2 Rel-19 read
TR 43.901 vj00 Generic Access to A/Gb Interface Feasibility Study Rel-19 read
TR 43.902 vj00 GAN Enhancements Feasibility Study Rel-19 read
TS 51.013 vj00 SIM API for Java Card Test Specification Rel-19 read