Description
The Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI) is a core privacy and security feature in GSM, UMTS, LTE, and 5G networks. It is a temporary alias, assigned by the serving network's Mobility Management Entity (MME) in LTE/5GC or Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN) in UMTS/GPRS, to uniquely identify a User Equipment (UE) within a specific location area or tracking area. The TMSI is used in all signaling messages between the UE and the network over the vulnerable radio interface, replacing the permanent and globally unique International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI).
The TMSI assignment occurs during initial registration or location updating procedures. When a UE first attaches to the network, it may need to identify itself with its IMSI. After successful authentication, the network allocates a TMSI and sends it to the UE encrypted (using the ciphering key established during authentication). The UE stores this TMSI on its SIM/USIM and uses it for subsequent signaling, such as service requests, paging responses, and attach requests. The TMSI has only local significance within the area controlled by the assigning MME/SGSN and may be re-assigned or changed periodically for enhanced security.
From an architectural perspective, the TMSI is managed by the core network's mobility management function. The MME/SGSN maintains the mapping between the TMSI and the UE's permanent IMSI in its local context. If a UE moves to a new area served by a different MME, the new MME may request the IMSI from the UE or the old MME (using the GUTI/P-TMSI which contains routing information), and then assign a new TMSI. The TMSI's primary role is to obfuscate the user's long-term identity on the radio link, making it significantly harder for an eavesdropper to track a specific subscriber's location or activity.
The TMSI is a key component in the paging procedure. To notify an idle UE of an incoming call or data session, the network broadcasts a paging message containing the TMSI. Only the targeted UE, which recognizes its assigned TMSI, will respond. This mechanism protects privacy even during network-initiated contact.
Purpose & Motivation
The TMSI was created to address critical security and privacy vulnerabilities inherent in using a permanent, globally unique identifier (IMSI) over the air interface. Without TMSI, the IMSI would be transmitted in clear text during location updates and other procedures, allowing passive eavesdroppers to easily identify, track, and profile specific subscribers—a severe privacy breach. Furthermore, knowledge of an IMSI could facilitate more active attacks like identity theft or targeted jamming.
The primary problem TMSI solves is subscriber identity confidentiality. By replacing the IMSI with a frequently changing, locally-meaningless temporary value, it becomes computationally infeasible for an attacker to link different radio signaling events to the same real-world subscriber over time and space. This was a fundamental design goal for cellular security from GSM onwards. An additional benefit is the reduction in signaling message size, as a TMSI is typically shorter than an IMSI.
Introduced in the early GSM specifications, TMSI established a foundational principle for cellular security: minimize the exposure of permanent identities. Its evolution through 3G, 4G, and 5G, often as part of larger temporary identifier constructs like P-TMSI, GUTI, and 5G-GUTI, demonstrates its enduring importance. It addressed the limitations of a static identifier in a mobile environment and remains a cornerstone of privacy protection in all modern 3GPP systems.
What changed in its specifications
The latest release-to-release comparison of specifications that define TMSI. Each summary describes the whole specification, not only this term.
Rel-18 brings only minor changes to TS 21.905: 0 clauses changed, with no change attributed to a release feature.
Full comparison in TR 21.905 →Rel-19 brings only minor changes to TS 23.221: 0 clauses changed, with no change attributed to a release feature.
Full comparison in TS 23.221 →Technology family
Subscriber and device identifiers · User Equipment
Members and relations were proposed independently by several models and kept only where at least two agree; quotes are verified verbatim against the specifications. Release = first approved version of the defining specification.
Release Timeline
Detected Changes Across Releases
verified against 3GPP sourcesDocumented changes in 13 releases, each verified against the text of 3GPP specifications or approved change requests and shown with the exact wording. The release timeline above shows the same releases. A release without an entry has no documented change for this term.
Introduced in Phase 1 (release dating of the term; no individual change cited).
TMSI and its reallocation procedure are specified for the first time in this specification version, providing identity confidentiality by protecting users against being identified and located.
- “The purpose of the TMSI reallocation procedure is to provide identity confidentiality , i.e. to protect a user against being identified and located by an intruder” TS 24.008 v3.20.0
- “The TMSI REALLOCATION COMMAND message contains a new combination of TMSI and LAI allocated by the network” TS 24.008 v3.20.0
- “The reallocation of a TMSI can be performed either by a unique procedure defined in this clause” TS 24.008 v3.20.0
TMSI gains a role in Intra Domain Connection of RAN Nodes to Multiple CN Nodes: a TMSI must be allocated to each IMSI-attached MS and carries the NRI used for CN node selection.
- “a TMSI shall be allocated to each IMSI attached mobile station.” TS 24.008 v5.16.0
- “The NRI is part of the temporary identity TMSI (CS domain) or P-TMSI (PS domain)” TS 23.236 v5.4.0
- “The NRI is coded in bits 23 to 14 of TMSI or P-TMSI.” TS 23.236 v5.4.0
TS 24008 changed TMSI handling: TMSI use in CM SERVICE REQUEST for emergency call redirection and LAI change, plus TMSI deletion and combined RAU wording updated, and TS 23.236 re-distribution allocates a null-NRI TMSI.
- “Use of TMSI/IMSI in CM SERVICE REQUEST message in case of emergency call redirection and change of LAI” TS 24.008 v6.20.0
- “it returns a new TMSI/P-TMSI with a null-NRI, and a non-broadcast LAI/RAI in the accept message.” TS 23.236 v6.3.0
- “In case of CS domain a new TMSI is allocated to these UEs using the TMSI re-allocation procedure” TS 23.236 v6.3.0
TMSI handling was extended for EPS interworking: the TIN can indicate "RAT-related TMSI", and the MS must derive IDNNS from a valid TMSI rather than E-UTRAN identities for the CS domain.
- “The normal location updating procedure shall also be started if the MS is configured to use CS fallback and SMS over SGs, or SMS over SGs only” TS 24.008 v8.20.0
- “the E‑UTRAN temporary identities shall not be used to derive the IDNNS: instead the MS shall use its (MSC supplied) TMSI, if that TMSI is valid” TS 23.236 v8.1.0
- “RAT-related TMSI: When the UE is camping on an E-UTRAN cell, the RAT-related TMSI is the GUTI” TS 24.301 v8.10.0
TMSI handling changed: SIM/USIM update-status text now covers GSM Kc128 deletion, and RAU/TAU rules for mapping GUTI and indicating P-TMSI under TIN "RAT-related TMSI" were added for IMS voice termination.
- “If the TIN indicates "P-TMSI" or "RAT‑related TMSI" and the MS holds a valid P-TMSI and a RAI, the MS shall indicate the P-TMSI” TS 24.008 v9.13.0
- “the ME shall delete the GSM Kc128 stored at the moment the status is set to NOT UPDATED” TS 24.008 v9.13.0
- “when the UE performs an intersystem change from A/Gb mode to S1 mode and the TIN indicates "RAT-related TMSI"” TS 24.301 v9.11.0
Rel-10 adds a P-TMSI type IE so the network can tell native from mapped P-TMSI, adds TIN "RAT-related TMSI" handling, and corrects CSFB paging to avoid using TMSI.
- “the network shall use the P-TMSI type IE to determine whether the mobile identity included in the Mobile identity IE is a native P‑TMSI or a mapped P‑TMSI” TS 24.008 v10.16.0
- “The MS shall also include P-TMSI type IE with P-TMSI type set to "native P-TMSI".” TS 24.008 v10.16.0
- Correction of CSFB Paging to avoid the use of TMSI TS 23.272CR0694
The UE must now include a TMSI based NRI container IE in ATTACH REQUEST and TRACKING AREA UPDATE REQUEST when it holds a valid TMSI, and TMSI handling in the combined procedures was revised.
- “If the MS has stored a valid TMSI, the MS shall include the TMSI based NRI container IE in the ATTACH REQUEST message.” TS 24.008 v11.17.1
- “If the UE has stored a valid TMSI, the UE shall include the TMSI based NRI container IE in the TRACKING AREA UPDATE REQUEST message.” TS 24.301 v11.14.0
- “From the LAI and the TMSI based NRI as provided by the UE, the SGSN can select a VLR from the available VLRs.” TS 23.236 v11.0.0
TMSI handling changed: UE behaviour on reject causes now includes T3245 expiry and revised TMSI deletion rules, plus a CR on TMSI handling in combined TAU and paging with TMSI for eDRX UEs.
- “Clarfication for TMSI handling during combined tracking area update procedure” TS 24.301 v13.12.0
- “Paging with TMSI for eDRX UE” TS 24.301 v13.12.0
- “if the tracking area updating attempt counter is equal to 5, the UE shall delete any LAI, TMSI and ciphering key sequence number” TS 24.301 v13.12.0
TS 24.008 changed how the MS handles the TMSI: it is deleted in the eCall inactivity and forbidden-PLMN handling, and the TMSI allocation procedure was corrected.
- “delete any LAI, TMSI, ciphering key sequence number stored in the SIM/USIM, delete any RAI, P-TMSI, P-TMSI signature” TS 24.008 v14.9.0
- “Correction to the TMSI allocation procedure” TS 24.008 v14.9.0
- Paging with TMSI for eDRX UE TS 24.301CR2589
TMSI reallocation procedure text in TS 24.008 was clarified as itemised steps: delete TMSI if IMSI is received, store TMSI in SIM/USIM, and send TMSI REALLOCATION COMPLETE.
- “if the received identity is the IMSI of the relevant mobile station, shall delete any TMSI;” TS 24.008 v15.9.0
- “shall send a TMSI REALLOCATION COMPLETE message to the network.” TS 24.008 v15.9.0
- Clarification during TMSI reallocation procedure. TS 24.008CR3159
UE handling of TMSI changed: new rejection cases with cause #11 now require deleting TMSI and setting update status, and 5G-SRVCC adds MSC Server TMSI reallocation.
- “The MS shall set the update status to U3 ROAMING NOT ALLOWED, shall delete any TMSI, LAI and ciphering key sequence number.” TS 24.008 v16.7.0
- “shall delete the P-TMSI, P-TMSI signature, RAI and GPRS ciphering key sequence number, LAI, TMSI and ciphering key sequence number.” TS 24.301 v16.9.0
- MSC Server performing a TMSI reallocation and a MAP Update Location at 5G-SRVCC TS 23.216CR0371
On AUTHENTICATION REJECT, an MS configured to use timer T3245 now also treats the SIM/USIM as invalid and deletes the TMSI even without integrity protection, and the invalid state ends when T3245 expires.
- “or the MS is configured to use timer T3245 (see 3GPP TS 24.368 [135] or 3GPP TS 31.102 [112])” TS 24.008 v19.5.0
- “until switching off, the SIM/USIM is removed, or the timer T3245 expires as described in subclause 4.1.1.6” TS 24.008 v19.5.0
Defining Specifications
3GPP specifications that define or reference TMSI, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.
| Specification | Title | Release |
|---|---|---|
| TR 21.905 vj20 | 3GPP Terminology and Definitions | Rel-19 read |
| TS 22.022 vj00 | ME Personalisation Features for GSM/3G | Rel-19 read |
| TR 22.944 vj00 | UE Functionality Split Scenarios and Requirements | Rel-19 read |
| TS 23.171 v390 | LCS Stage 2 for UMTS | R99 read |
| TS 23.221 vj00 | 3GPP System Architectural Requirements | Rel-19 read |
| TS 23.236 vj00 | Intra Domain Connection of RAN Nodes to Multiple CN Nodes | Rel-19 read |
| TS 23.251 vj00 | Network Sharing Stage 2 Specification | Rel-19 read |
| TS 23.271 vj00 | LCS Stage 2 Specification | Rel-19 read |
| TS 23.851 v610 | Network Sharing Architecture for 3G Systems | Rel-6 read |
| TR 23.923 v300 | Mobile IP+ Feasibility Study for UMTS/GPRS | R99 read |
| TS 25.301 vj00 | UE-UTRAN Radio Interface Protocol Architecture | Rel-19 read |
| TS 25.302 vj00 | UTRA Physical Layer Services | Rel-19 read |
| TS 25.321 vj00 | MAC Protocol Specification for UTRAN | Rel-19 read |
| TS 25.331 vj01 | UTRAN Radio Resource Control Protocol | Rel-19 read |
| TS 25.413 vj00 | Radio Access Network Application Part (RANAP) | Rel-19 read |
| TR 25.931 vj00 | UTRAN Signalling Procedures Examples | Rel-19 read |
| TS 31.117 vj30 | USAT Tests for Non-Removable UICC | Rel-19 read |
| TS 31.121 vj00 | UICC Application Test Specification | Rel-19 read |
| TS 32.401 vj00 | Performance Management Concept & Requirements | Rel-19 read |
| TS 32.808 v800 | Common Profile Storage Framework for User Data | Rel-8 read |
| TS 33.102 vj10 | 3G Security Architecture Specification | Rel-19 read |
| TS 33.929 | 3GPP TR 33.929 | R99 read |
| TS 43.051 vj00 | GERAN Stage 2 Service Description | Rel-19 read |
| TS 43.318 vj00 | Generic Access Network (GAN) Stage 2 | Rel-19 read |
| TR 43.901 vj00 | Generic Access to A/Gb Interface Feasibility Study | Rel-19 read |
| TR 43.902 vj00 | GAN Enhancements Feasibility Study | Rel-19 read |
| TS 44.060 vj00 | GERAN RLC/MAC Protocol Specification | Rel-19 read |
| TS 44.160 vg00 | GERAN Iu Mode RLC/MAC Protocol Specification | Rel-16 read |
| TS 44.318 vj00 | Generic Access Network (GAN) Interface Procedures | Rel-19 read |
| TS 52.402 vj00 | GSM Performance Management Measurements | Rel-19 read |