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Glossary term · Identifier

IMEI

International Mobile Station Equipment Identities

Identifier →

IMEI is a globally unique 15-digit number that permanently identifies a mobile device and is used by networks for identification, validation, and security functions like blacklisting.

Introduced
Phase 1
Where
Core Network › Evolved Packet Core
Specifications
32 specs
Also in
Services, Management, Radio Access Network, User Equipment, Security
IMEI Description Purpose What changed Family Neighbours Detected Changes Specifications

Description

The International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) is a critical identifier in mobile telecommunications, serving as a permanent, factory-assigned serial number for a mobile station (MS). It is a 15-digit decimal number, structured into several distinct parts. The first eight digits constitute the Type Allocation Code (TAC), which identifies the device model and its manufacturer. The following six digits are the unique serial number (SNR) assigned by the manufacturer. The final digit is a Luhn algorithm-based check digit (CD), used to validate the sequence of the preceding 14 digits. The IMEI is programmed into the device's firmware or hardware during manufacturing and is not intended to be changed by the user.

From a network operations perspective, the IMEI is reported by the device to the network during initial registration and attachment procedures. The network can request the IMEI via specific signaling messages, such as the Identity Request in NAS (Non-Access Stratum) procedures. The serving network entity, typically the MME in LTE or the AMF in 5G, can then forward this IMEI to the Equipment Identity Register (EIR) or a similar network function. The EIR contains lists (white, grey, black) against which the reported IMEI is checked. This process enables the network operator to permit, monitor, or deny service based on the device's status, such as blocking service to devices reported as stolen.

The IMEI's role extends beyond simple identification. It is a cornerstone for lawful interception, fraud prevention, and device analytics. For lawful interception, authorities may use the IMEI to uniquely identify a target device for surveillance. In fraud prevention, operators use IMEI blacklists to disable stolen phones across their networks, significantly reducing the resale value of stolen property and deterring theft. Furthermore, aggregated IMEI data helps manufacturers and operators analyze device populations, model penetration, and plan for network technology support (e.g., gauging the number of 5G-capable devices on the network). Its standardized format ensures global interoperability, allowing a device's identity to be recognized and processed consistently across different operators and countries.

Purpose & Motivation

The IMEI was created to solve the fundamental problem of uniquely and permanently identifying the physical mobile equipment itself, independent of the user's subscription (which is identified by the IMSI on the SIM/USIM). Prior to its standardization, there was no reliable, global method for networks to identify device types or track individual hardware units. This limitation made it difficult to combat mobile phone theft, as a stolen phone could simply be used with a different SIM card. It also hindered accurate device analytics and made implementing device-specific policies or restrictions nearly impossible.

The introduction of the IMEI in 3GPP Release 99 provided a standardized, tamper-resistant identifier that is hard-coded into the device. This allowed for the creation of centralized Equipment Identity Registers (EIRs), where operators could share lists of stolen devices. A key motivation was to protect consumers and operators by reducing the incentive for phone theft, thereby enhancing overall network security. Furthermore, it enabled regulatory compliance for device type approval and provided a mechanism for network operators to manage device access, for instance, by barring devices that are not type-approved for their network or that pose a security risk.

What changed in its specifications

The latest release-to-release comparison of specifications that define IMEI. Each summary describes the whole specification, not only this term.

TR 21.905Rel-17 → Rel-18

Rel-18 brings only minor changes to TS 21.905: 0 clauses changed, with no change attributed to a release feature.

Full comparison in TR 21.905 →
TS 23.271Rel-18 → Rel-19

Rel-19 brings only minor changes to TS 23.271: 0 clauses changed, with no change attributed to a release feature.

Full comparison in TS 23.271 →

Technology family

Subscriber and device identifiers · User Equipment

  1. Phase 1 IMEI, IMSI, MSIN, MSISDN, TMSI
  2. Phase 2 IMEISV
  3. R96 TLLI
  4. R97 P-TMSI
  5. R98 CTSMSI
  6. Rel-5 IMPI, IMPU, Temporary Public User Identity
  7. Rel-8 GUTI, M-TMSI
  8. Rel-15 5G-GUTI, 5G-S-TMSI, 5G-TMSI, GPSI, NSI, PEI, SUCI, SUPI
  9. Rel-16 GCI, GLI, Truncated 5G-S-TMSI
  • IMEI extended by PEI
    “a PEI type: in this release of the specification, it may indicate an IMEI or IMEISV, a MAC address or an IEEE Extended Unique Identifier (EUI-64)” TS 23.003
  • IMEI extended by IMEISV
    “The SVN is a separate field from the IMEI, although it is associated with the IMEI. When the network requests the IMEI from the MS, it may also request that the SVN is also sent towards the network.” TS 22.016

Members and relations were proposed independently by several models and kept only where at least two agree; quotes are verified verbatim against the specifications. Release = first approved version of the defining specification.

Release Timeline

Detected Changes Across Releases

verified against 3GPP sources

Documented changes in 15 releases, each verified against the text of 3GPP specifications or approved change requests and shown with the exact wording. The release timeline above shows the same releases. A release without an entry has no documented change for this term.

Phase 1 introduced

Introduced in Phase 1 (release dating of the term; no individual change cited).

R99 specification text

TS 23.003 for R99 defines the IMEI structure for the first time, with its composition, the Luhn check digit and its relation to IMEISV, and TS 33.107 adds IMEI as an interception target identity.

  • “The International Mobile station Equipment Identity (IMEI) is composed as shown in figure 10.” TS 23.003 v3.15.0
  • “The Check Digit is defined according to the Luhn formula, as defined in annex B.” TS 23.003 v3.15.0
  • “The target identities for 3GMS interception can be at least on of the following: IMSI, MSISDN or IMEI.” TS 33.107 v3.5.0
Rel-4 specification text

TS 23.003 gained a modification to enhance IMEI security in clause 6.2, and the IMEI check-digit text was reworded, while lawful interception specs updated IMEI as a target identity.

  • “Modification of clause 6.2 to enhance IMEI security” TS 23.003 v4.9.0
  • “The target identities for 3GMS CS and GPRS interception at the SGSN, GGSN, 3G MSC Server and 3G GMSC Server can be at least on of the following: IMSI, MSISDN or IMEI.” TS 33.107 v4.3.0
Rel-5 1 CR

The IMEI structure in TS 23.003 was restructured to combine the TAC and FAC, with the check digit text reworded as a non-transmitted element.

  • Restructuring the IMEI to combine the TAC and FAC TS 23.003CR044
  • “The check digit is not part of the digits transmitted when the IMEI is checked, as described below.” TS 23.003 v5.11.0
Rel-6 specification text

Lawful interception specs were revised so IMEI is a target identity for CS and PS interception, with added notes on IMEI availability and limitations at the 3G Gateway, ICEs and during mobility procedures.

  • “Some communication content during a mobility procedure may not be intercepted when interception is based on MSISDN (only PS interception) or IMEI.” TS 33.107 v6.6.0
  • “in case the IMEI is not available, interception based on IMEI is not applicable at 3G ICEs.” TS 33.107 v6.6.0
  • “Interception based on IMEI could lead to a delay in start of interception at the beginning of a call” TS 33.108 v6.10.0
Rel-8 specification text

IMEI gained new roles in Rel-8: a form of the SIP/IMS instance-id based on an IMEI URN (RFC 7254), and a target identity for interception in the PDN-GW and other nodes.

  • “When an IMEI is available, the instance-id shall take the form of a IMEI URN (see IETF RFC 7254 [79]).” TS 23.003 v8.21.0
  • “Interception in the PDN-GW shall be based on one or more of NAI, MSISDN, IMEI.” TS 33.107 v8.12.0
Rel-9 1 CR

IMEI gained a new role: an IMEI-based Emergency NAI (imei<IMEI>@sos.invalid) is defined for emergency attach when IMSI is unavailable or unauthenticated.

  • “or, when UE is performing emergency attach and IMSI is not available or not authenticated, on the IMEI” TS 23.003 v9.15.0
  • “the Emergency NAI for Limited Service State then takes the form of imei219551288888888@sos.invalid” TS 23.003 v9.15.0
  • IMEI Based NAI definitions for emergency services TS 23.003CR0199r1
Rel-10 specification text

TS 23.003 now specifies using IMEI to build the Emergency NAI for I-WLAN IMS emergency calls and the IMEI-TAC to identify a relay node's vendor-specific OAM system.

  • “the Emergency NAI shall be an NAI compliant with IETF RFC 4282 [53] consisting of username and realm, either constructed with IMEI or MAC address” TS 23.003 v10.10.0
  • “identified using the relay node type allocation code from IMEI or IMEISV (IMEI-TAC), MNC and MCC from IMSI” TS 23.003 v10.10.0
Rel-11 specification text

Lawful interception specs added IMEI as a target identity at the CSCF, with IMS IMEI interception extracting the IMEI from the Instance ID and reporting it to DF2.

  • “The target identities for multi-media at the CSCF can be one or more of the following: SIP URI, TEL URL, or IMEI.” TS 33.107 v11.6.0
  • “The CSCF shall be responsible for extracting the IMEI from the Instance ID where required for a specific target interception and providing the IMEI to the DF2.” TS 33.107 v11.6.0
  • “the IMEI shall be extracted and converted to the reporting format defined for partyInformation (imei).” TS 33.108 v11.7.0
Rel-12 specification text

IMEI handling was extended: TS 23.003 adds RFC 7255 considerations for using the IMEI URN as instance-id, and TS 33.107 adds IMEI as a target identity for HNB, HeNB and ProSe interception.

  • “RFC 7255 [104] specifies additional considerations for using the IMEI as an instance-id.” TS 23.003 v12.9.0
  • “The target identities for 3GPP HNB interception can be IMSI, MSISDN, IMEI, or ME Id.” TS 33.107 v12.13.0
  • “target identity include IMSI, IMEI, ProSe UE ID;” TS 33.107 v12.13.0
Rel-13 1 CR

IMEI(SV) is now signalled over additional interfaces (SWx/STa/SWm for WLAN access, GTP S2a/S2b, Gx) and IMEI is added as a target identity and reported field in lawful interception specs.

  • “For an untrusted WLAN access, this grouped AVP shall contain the IMEI AVP and, if available, the Software-Version AVP.” TS 29.273 v13.8.0
  • Conveying the IMEI of devices to the EPC TS 29.212CR1413
  • “Transfer of IMEI from 3GPP AAA Server to HSS over SWx” TS 29.273 v13.8.0
Rel-14 1 CR

IMEI handling was extended in Rel-14: IMEI check procedures over STa/SWm for WLAN access, IMEI retrieval for emergency attach with unauthenticated IMSI, and IMEI-based NAI construction.

  • “if the IMEI(SV) is available, check the Mobile Equipment's identity status towards the EIR, using the ME Identity Check procedure” TS 29.273 v14.5.0
  • “the network requests the IMEI from the UE and the network shall then construct a NAI based on the IMEI” TS 23.003 v14.7.0
  • Request IMEI from UE with unauthenticated IMSI via untrusted WLAN TS 24.302CR0594
Rel-15 2 CRs

TS 23.003 added an IMEI-based SIP URI identity, carried in P-Preferred-Identity for unauthenticated emergency sessions, with the IMEI encoded per the RFC 7254 imeival ABNF.

  • “A SIP URI for an IMEI based identity shall take the form "sip:user@domain" where by the user part shall contain the IMEI.” TS 23.003 v15.11.0
  • IMEI based SIP URI for P-Preferred-Identity TS 23.003CR0486
  • IMEI retrieval over Sh TS 29.328CR0597
Rel-16 2 CRs

IMEI handling was changed: PEI may now be a MAC address or EUI-64 instead of only IMEI/IMEISV, and IMEI is no longer required for non-3GPP-only UEs.

  • “in this release of the specification, it may indicate an IMEI or IMEISV, a MAC address or an IEEE Extended Unique Identifier (EUI-64)” TS 23.003 v16.12.0
  • IMEI not required for non-3GPP only UEs TS 24.501CR1348
  • Correct obtaining IMEI after Mobility from 5GC TS 24.301CR3226
Rel-17 3 CRs

Rel-17 added IMEI handling: IMEI conveyed over Gx/Gxx/Sd and Rx, subscription to IMEI change notifications, IMEI update synchronization, and a corrected IMEI target identifier description.

  • IMEI over Gx Gxx Sd reference points TS 29.212CR1704
  • Subscription to notification of IMEI change TS 29.328CR0635
  • Correction of IMEI Target Identifier description TS 33.127CR0171

Defining Specifications

3GPP specifications that define or reference IMEI, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.

SpecificationTitleRelease
TS 21.133 v410 3G Security: Threat Analysis & Requirements Rel-4 read
TR 21.905 vj20 3GPP Terminology and Definitions Rel-19 read
TS 22.022 vj00 ME Personalisation Features for GSM/3G Rel-19 read
TR 22.944 vj00 UE Functionality Split Scenarios and Requirements Rel-19 read
TS 23.171 v390 LCS Stage 2 for UMTS R99 read
TS 23.271 vj00 LCS Stage 2 Specification Rel-19 read
TS 24.229 vk10 IMS SIP/SDP Call Control Protocol Rel-20 read
TS 24.259 vj00 Personal Network Management (PNM) Protocol Details Rel-19 read
TS 24.484 vk10 Mission Critical Services Configuration Management Rel-20 read
TS 24.501 vk10 5GS NAS Protocol Specification Rel-20 read
TS 25.331 vj01 UTRAN Radio Resource Control Protocol Rel-19 read
TS 25.413 vj00 Radio Access Network Application Part (RANAP) Rel-19 read
TR 25.931 vj00 UTRAN Signalling Procedures Examples Rel-19 read
TS 27.007 vk00 AT Command Interface for Mobile Terminals Rel-20 read
TS 29.172 vj00 EPC LCS Protocol (ELP) specification Rel-19 read
TS 29.275 vj00 PMIPv6 Mobility & Tunnelling Protocols Stage 3 Rel-19 read
TS 32.240 vk10 3GPP Charging Architecture and Principles Rel-20 read
TS 32.250 vj00 Circuit Switched Offline Charging Rel-19 read
TS 32.251 vj00 PS Domain Charging Management Rel-19 read
TS 32.272 vj00 Charging for Push-to-Talk over Cellular (PoC) Rel-19 read
TS 32.278 vj00 Monitoring Events Offline Charging Specification Rel-19 read
TS 32.293 vj00 Proxy Function in Domestic Service Provider Rel-19 read
TS 32.401 vj00 Performance Management Concept & Requirements Rel-19 read
TS 32.808 v800 Common Profile Storage Framework for User Data Rel-8 read
TS 32.849 vd00 VoLTE Roaming Charging Scenarios Rel-13 read
TS 32.850 ve00 IMS Charging Correlation Methods Study Rel-14 read
TS 33.107 vj00 Lawful Interception Architecture & Functions Rel-19 read
TS 33.108 vj00 LI Handover Interface Specification Rel-19 read
TS 33.401 vj20 EPS Security Architecture Rel-19 read
TS 36.331 vj40 E-UTRA Radio Resource Control (RRC) Protocol Rel-19 read
TS 41.033 ve00 GSM Lawful Interception Interface Requirements Rel-14 read
TS 52.402 vj00 GSM Performance Management Measurements Rel-19 read