IMEI

International Mobile Station Equipment Identities

Identifier →
Introduced in R99 Also in: Services, Radio Access Network, User Equipment, Management, Security

IMEI is a globally unique 15-digit number that permanently identifies a mobile device and is used by networks for identification, validation, and security functions like blacklisting.

Category
Identifier
Introduced
R99
Where
Core Network › Evolved Packet Core
Also touches
5 segments
Specifications
32 specs
IMEI Description Purpose Related Classification Detected Changes Specifications

Description

The International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) is a critical identifier in mobile telecommunications, serving as a permanent, factory-assigned serial number for a mobile station (MS). It is a 15-digit decimal number, structured into several distinct parts. The first eight digits constitute the Type Allocation Code (TAC), which identifies the device model and its manufacturer. The following six digits are the unique serial number (SNR) assigned by the manufacturer. The final digit is a Luhn algorithm-based check digit (CD), used to validate the sequence of the preceding 14 digits. The IMEI is programmed into the device's firmware or hardware during manufacturing and is not intended to be changed by the user.

From a network operations perspective, the IMEI is reported by the device to the network during initial registration and attachment procedures. The network can request the IMEI via specific signaling messages, such as the Identity Request in NAS (Non-Access Stratum) procedures. The serving network entity, typically the MME in LTE or the AMF in 5G, can then forward this IMEI to the Equipment Identity Register (EIR) or a similar network function. The EIR contains lists (white, grey, black) against which the reported IMEI is checked. This process enables the network operator to permit, monitor, or deny service based on the device's status, such as blocking service to devices reported as stolen.

The IMEI's role extends beyond simple identification. It is a cornerstone for lawful interception, fraud prevention, and device analytics. For lawful interception, authorities may use the IMEI to uniquely identify a target device for surveillance. In fraud prevention, operators use IMEI blacklists to disable stolen phones across their networks, significantly reducing the resale value of stolen property and deterring theft. Furthermore, aggregated IMEI data helps manufacturers and operators analyze device populations, model penetration, and plan for network technology support (e.g., gauging the number of 5G-capable devices on the network). Its standardized format ensures global interoperability, allowing a device's identity to be recognized and processed consistently across different operators and countries.

Purpose & Motivation

The IMEI was created to solve the fundamental problem of uniquely and permanently identifying the physical mobile equipment itself, independent of the user's subscription (which is identified by the IMSI on the SIM/USIM). Prior to its standardization, there was no reliable, global method for networks to identify device types or track individual hardware units. This limitation made it difficult to combat mobile phone theft, as a stolen phone could simply be used with a different SIM card. It also hindered accurate device analytics and made implementing device-specific policies or restrictions nearly impossible.

The introduction of the IMEI in 3GPP Release 99 provided a standardized, tamper-resistant identifier that is hard-coded into the device. This allowed for the creation of centralized Equipment Identity Registers (EIRs), where operators could share lists of stolen devices. A key motivation was to protect consumers and operators by reducing the incentive for phone theft, thereby enhancing overall network security. Furthermore, it enabled regulatory compliance for device type approval and provided a mechanism for network operators to manage device access, for instance, by barring devices that are not type-approved for their network or that pose a security risk.

Classification

Related approachesEIRIMSI

Release Timeline

Detected Changes Across Releases

from 3GPP Change Requests

Specific changes extracted from the „Change history“ tables of 3GPP specifications (2 CRs across 1 releases). Complements the general historical overview above with the evidence-based evolution of this function.

Rel-16 2 changes

In Release 16, the specifications were updated to clarify that an IMEI is not required for User Equipment (UEs) that access the network solely via non-3GPP access technologies. Furthermore, the release formally enhanced support for both the IMEI and IMEISV identity formats within the network protocols and procedures.

  • IMEI not required for non-3GPP only UEs TS 24.501CR1348
  • IMEI and IMEISV formats support TS 24.501CR1732

Explore further

Broader topics and technologies where IMEI plays a role.

Defining Specifications

3GPP specifications that define or reference IMEI, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.

SpecificationTitleRelease
TS 21.133 v1400 3G Security Requirements Rel-5
TR 21.905 vj00 3GPP Technical Terms and Definitions Rel-19
TS 22.022 vj00 ME Personalisation Features for GSM/3G Rel-19
TR 22.944 vj00 UE Functionality Split Scenarios and Requirements Rel-19
TS 23.171 v1300 LCS Stage 2 Specification for UMTS Rel-4
TS 23.271 vj00 LCS Stage 2 Specification Rel-19
TS 24.229 vj50 IMS call control protocol based on SIP and SDP Rel-19
TS 24.259 vj00 Personal Network Management (PNM) Protocol Details Rel-19
TS 24.484 vj30 MCS Configuration Management Rel-19
TS 24.501 vj50 5G NAS Protocols Specification Rel-19
TS 25.331 vj00 UTRAN RRC Protocol Specification Rel-19
TS 25.413 vj00 Radio Access Network Application Part (RANAP) Rel-19
TR 25.931 vj00 UTRAN Signalling Procedures Examples Rel-19
TS 27.007 vj40 AT Command Set for UE Rel-19
TS 29.172 vj00 EPC LCS Protocol (ELP) specification Rel-19
TS 29.275 vj00 PMIPv6 Mobility & Tunnelling Protocols Stage 3 Rel-19
TS 32.240 vj40 Charging Management Architecture & Principles Rel-19
TS 32.250 vj00 Circuit Switched Offline Charging Rel-19
TS 32.251 vj00 PS Domain Charging Management Rel-19
TS 32.272 vj00 Charging for Push-to-Talk over Cellular (PoC) Rel-19
TS 32.278 vj00 Monitoring Events Offline Charging Specification Rel-19
TS 32.293 vj00 Proxy Function in Domestic Service Provider Rel-19
TS 32.401 vj00 Performance Management Concept & Requirements Rel-19
TS 32.808 v1800 Common User Profile Storage Framework Rel-8
TS 32.849 vd00 IMS Roaming Charging Study Rel-13
TS 32.850 ve00 IMS Charging Correlation Methods Study Rel-14
TS 33.107 vj00 Lawful Interception Architecture & Functions Rel-19
TS 33.108 vj00 LI Handover Interface Specification Rel-19
TS 33.401 vj10 EPS Security Architecture Rel-19
TS 36.331 vj00 LTE RRC Protocol Specification Rel-19
TS 41.033 ve00 GSM Lawful Interception Interface Requirements Rel-14
TS 52.402 vj00 GSM Performance Management Measurements Rel-19
Patrick Zandl

About the author: Patrick Zandl (b. 1974)

Telecommunications specialist, technology journalist (founder of the Mobil server), and developer who has been running since 2025 — the largest Czech-language resource on AI-assisted programming. Formerly Chief Wizard Architect at Prusa3D and head of development for Turris at CZ.NIC; currently a consultant and instructor on AI implementation in companies.