Description
The Subscription Concealed Identifier (SUCI) is a fundamental security and privacy feature introduced in 5G, defined in 3GPP Release 15. It is a one-time-use identifier transmitted by the User Equipment (UE) in place of the permanent Subscription Permanent Identifier (SUPI) during the initial registration procedure, specifically in the Registration Request message. The SUCI is generated by the UE itself using a standardized scheme called ECIES (Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme) profile A. The UE encrypts the SUPI using the public key of the home network's Subscription Identifier De-concealing Function (SIDF), which is securely provisioned in the UE (e.g., in the Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC)). The output is a string that includes the Home Network Public Key Identifier, the ECIES scheme identifier, the ciphertext, and the MAC tag.
Upon receiving the SUCI, the serving network (e.g., the Visited Public Land Mobile Network (VPLMN)) forwards it to the home network (HPLMN) as part of the authentication procedure. The home network's SIDF, which holds the corresponding private key, is the only entity capable of decrypting the SUCI to retrieve the plaintext SUPI. This decryption occurs within the home network's Unified Data Management (UDM) or Authentication Server Function (AUSF). The SUPI is then used for subscriber authentication and to derive the 5G Globally Unique Temporary Identifier (5G-GUTI) for subsequent signaling. Crucially, the serving network never sees the SUPI in clear text, protecting the subscriber's permanent identity from the visited operator and any passive eavesdroppers on the radio link.
The architecture for SUCI involves several network functions. The UE contains the USIM application which stores the home network public key and performs the encryption. The Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) in the serving network receives the SUCI and routes it to the appropriate home network. The SIDF, typically collocated with the UDM/AUSF, performs the de-concealment. SUCI is mandatory for 5G initial registration when the UE does not have a valid 5G-GUTI, making it a cornerstone of 5G's enhanced subscriber privacy. Its use is governed by the subscriber's privacy settings, but the default and encouraged mode is to always use SUCI for initial registration, marking a significant shift from 4G where the permanent International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) was often sent in clear text during initial attach.
Purpose & Motivation
SUCI was created to solve a critical and long-standing privacy vulnerability in cellular networks: the exposure of the user's permanent subscriber identity (IMSI in 2G/3G/4G) over the radio interface. In previous generations, the IMSI was often transmitted in clear text during initial network attachment or in certain failure scenarios. This allowed passive eavesdroppers with inexpensive equipment (IMSI catchers or stingrays) to track individuals' locations and movements, conduct targeted attacks, or perform identity mapping. This vulnerability was a major privacy concern and eroded user trust.
The motivation for SUCI stemmed from regulatory pressures (e.g., GDPR), heightened societal awareness of digital privacy, and the technical opportunity presented by the clean-slate design of the 5G core network (5GC). 3GPP designed SUCI as a key component of 5G's enhanced subscriber privacy architecture. It addresses the limitation of previous temporary identifiers (like TMSI/GUTI) which could not always be used—if a UE entered a new area without a valid temporary ID, it had to fall back to sending the IMSI in clear text. SUCI eliminates this fallback vulnerability by ensuring the permanent identity is never exposed, even on the first contact.
Furthermore, SUCI supports the separation of the serving network from the home network in terms of identity knowledge. This aligns with the network slicing and service-based architecture principles of 5G, where a serving network should provide connectivity without necessarily knowing the subscriber's true identity. By solving the pervasive tracking problem, SUCI enables more secure and privacy-respecting use cases, including critical IoT and government services, where anonymity of the device is paramount until authenticated by the home domain.
What changed in its specifications
The latest release-to-release comparison of specifications that define SUCI. Each summary describes the whole specification, not only this term.
Rel-19 adds clauses 31.1 to 31.7 to TS 23.003 defining identifier and information structures for Ambient IoT devices and areas, plus new normative references. It also adds SNPN support to ProSe identifiers, including an optional NID part in the PLMN ID and a revised temporary identity length.
Full comparison in TS 23.003 →Rel-19 added MPQUIC steering to multi-access PDU sessions, XR and media handling, and an Energy Information Function. It also added Local Offloading Management for edge computing, Vertical Federated Learning for AI/ML, and Ambient IoT text.
Full comparison in TS 23.501 →Technology family
Subscriber and device identifiers · User Equipment
- Phase 1 IMEI, IMSI, MSIN, MSISDN, TMSI
- Phase 2 IMEISV
- R96 TLLI
- R97 P-TMSI
- R98 CTSMSI
- Rel-5 IMPI, IMPU, Temporary Public User Identity
- Rel-8 GUTI, M-TMSI
- Rel-15 5G-GUTI, 5G-S-TMSI, 5G-TMSI, GPSI, NSI, PEI, SUCI, SUPI
- Rel-16 GCI, GLI, Truncated 5G-S-TMSI
- SUCI used together with SUPI
“The UE shall provide a SUCI derived from a SUPI as specified in TS 23.003 [19] and TS 33.501 [29].” TS 23.501
Members and relations were proposed independently by several models and kept only where at least two agree; quotes are verified verbatim against the specifications. Release = first approved version of the defining specification.
Release Timeline
Detected Changes Across Releases
verified against 3GPP sourcesDocumented changes in 6 releases, each verified against the text of 3GPP specifications or approved change requests and shown with the exact wording. The release timeline above shows the same releases. A release without an entry has no documented change for this term.
SUCI is defined and specified for the first time in Rel-15: structure and NAI format in TS 23.003, calculation by USIM or ME and protection schemes in TS 33.501, and NAS handling in TS 24.501.
- “A one-time use subscription identifier, called the SUbscription Concealed Identifier (SUCI), which contains the Scheme-Output, and additional non-concealed information” TS 33.501 v15.20.0
- “The SUCI is a privacy preserving identifier containing the concealed SUPI.” TS 23.003 v15.11.0
- “Based on home operator's decision, indicated by the USIM, the calculation of the SUCI shall be performed either by the USIM or by the ME.” TS 33.501 v15.20.0
In Rel-16 SUCI handling was extended to non-IMSI SUPI types (GLI, GCI, NAI) and to wireline and N5GC access, with null-scheme conditions and SUCI deletion on authentication reject.
- “When the SUPI contains a network specific identifier, a GCI or a GLI, the SUCI shall take the form of a NAI” TS 24.501 v16.15.0
- “For a W-AGF representing an FN-RG, the null scheme shall be used to construct the SUCI” TS 33.501 v16.20.0
- “enter state 5GMM-DEREGISTEREDand delete any stored SUCI.” TS 24.501 v16.15.0
Rel-17 extended SUCI with an anonymous SUCI for EAP methods supporting SUPI privacy, an onboarding SUCI, and NAI and Decorated NAI SUCI formats for SNPN and 5G NSWO.
- “An anonymous SUCI is composed by setting the SUPI Type field to 1 (Network-Specific Identifier), using the null protection scheme” TS 23.003 v17.11.0
- “if the UE is initiating the initial registration for onboarding services in SNPN, an onboarding SUCI shall be included in the 5GS mobile identity IE.” TS 24.501 v17.18.1
- “In case the UDM receives a SUCI, the UDM shall resolve the SUCI to the SUPI before checking the authentication method applicable for the SUPI.” TS 33.501 v17.16.0
Rel-18 extends SUCI with anonymous and onboarding SUCI types, SUCI use for AUN3 devices and 5G NSWO, and new NAI/decorated NAI formats for SUCI.
- “the SUCI can be of type anonymous SUCI if the construction of SUCI as described in clause 6.12 cannot be used” TS 33.501 v18.12.0
- “The 5G-RG shall construct a SUCI using null-scheme from the NAI-based SUPI if the NAI-based SUPI is received from the AUN3 device” TS 33.501 v18.12.0
- “For SNPN scenarios, decorated NAI format for SUCI for 5G-NSWO roaming shall take the following form:” TS 23.003 v18.8.0
UE behaviour for SUCI calculation failure was specified: when the USIM lacks correctly configured SUCI calculation information, the UE's response to an IDENTITY REQUEST for SUCI is implementation specific.
- “if the UE cannot encode the requested identity in the IDENTITY RESPONSE message, e.g. because the information required for the SUCI calculation is not correctly configured” TS 24.501 v19.8.0
- SUCI calculation failure handling TS 24.501CR6335
Rel-20 CRs to the 33.514 security test specification clarify the invalid public key SUCI test for UDM and correct the SUCI de-concealment test procedure.
Defining Specifications
3GPP specifications that define or reference SUCI, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.
| Specification | Title | Release |
|---|---|---|
| TS 23.003 vk10 | Numbering, Addressing and Identification | Rel-20 read |
| TS 23.501 vk30 | 5G System Architecture | Rel-20 read |
| TS 24.501 vk10 | 5GS NAS Protocol Specification | Rel-20 read |
| TS 24.502 vk00 | Non-3GPP Access Network Discovery and Selection | Rel-20 read |
| TS 29.503 vk10 | UDM Service Based Interface | Rel-20 read |
| TS 29.518 vk10 | AMF Service Based Interface | Rel-20 read |
| TS 31.102 vk00 | USIM Application Specification | Rel-20 read |
| TS 31.122 vj00 | USIM UICC Conformance Test Specification | Rel-19 read |
| TS 33.126 vj30 | Lawful Interception Requirements | Rel-19 read |
| TS 33.127 vj80 | Lawful Interception Architecture | Rel-19 read |
| TS 33.501 vk30 | 5G Security Architecture | Rel-20 read |
| TS 33.514 vk20 | UDM Security Assurance Specification | Rel-20 read |
| TS 33.835 vg10 | Study on authentication and key management for apps | Rel-16 read |
| TR 33.841 vg10 | Security aspects; Study on 256-bit algorithms for 5G | Rel-16 read |