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Glossary term · Security

SIDF

Subscription Identifier De-concealing Function

Security →

SIDF is the function within the 5G Authentication Server Function that retrieves the permanent subscriber identifier (SUPI) from its concealed form (SUCI) for secure authentication.

Introduced
Rel-15
Where
Security
Specifications
2 specs
SIDF Description Purpose What changed Family Neighbours Detected Changes Specifications

Description

The Subscription Identifier De-concealing Function (SIDF) is a dedicated security entity introduced in the 5G System (5GS) architecture as part of the Authentication Server Function (AUSF). Its primary technical role is to perform the de-concealment operation on the Subscription Concealed Identifier (SUCI) that a User Equipment (UE) sends during initial network registration. The SUCI is a privacy-preserving identifier created by the UE by encrypting the permanent Subscription Permanent Identifier (SUPI) using the home network's public key. When the Serving Network (e.g., a visited operator) receives a SUCI, it forwards it to the home network's AUSF. The AUSF then invokes its internal SIDF component.

The SIDF executes the cryptographic de-concealment process. It uses the home network's private key, which corresponds to the public key provisioned in the UE's Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM), to decrypt the SUCI. This process reveals the plaintext SUPI (typically an IMSI or network-specific identifier). The SIDF is the only network function in the 5G architecture permitted to hold the necessary private key and perform this operation, centralizing a critical security function. After successful de-concealment, the AUSF uses the retrieved SUPI to locate the corresponding authentication credentials in the Unified Data Management (UDM) and proceeds with the primary authentication and key agreement (AKA) procedure.

Architecturally, the SIDF is not a standalone Network Function (NF) but a logical function integrated within the AUSF. This design consolidates sensitive key material and limits its exposure. The interface between the SIDF and the rest of the AUSF is internal. The SIDF's operation is triggered via the Nausf_UEAuthentication service operation. Its successful execution is a prerequisite for all subsequent authentication steps. By ensuring that the SUPI is never transmitted in clear text over the radio access network, the SIDF is a cornerstone of 5G's enhanced subscriber privacy, protecting against IMSI catchers and location tracking attacks that were feasible in previous generations. Its role is purely for identifier resolution; it does not participate in the subsequent key derivation or session establishment.

Purpose & Motivation

The SIDF was created to address a major privacy vulnerability inherent in previous cellular generations (2G, 3G, 4G): the transmission of the permanent subscriber identifier (IMSI) in clear text over the radio interface. This allowed passive eavesdroppers with inexpensive equipment to harvest IMSIs, track users' locations, and profile their movements. 5G's design principle of 'subscription identifier privacy' demanded a solution where the permanent identifier is never exposed outside the secure confines of the home network. The SIDF is the technical enabler of this principle, solving the problem of how a network can authenticate a user without knowing who the user is initially.

The historical context is the evolution from 4G EPS-AKA, where the IMSI could be sent in plain text under certain conditions (e.g., initial attach), to 5G's mandatory use of SUCI for initial registration. The SIDF performs the essential 'keyhole' operation that allows the legitimate home network—and only the home network—to learn the user's true identity. This addresses the limitation of previous approaches where privacy was often an optional add-on or relied on temporary identifiers (GUTI/TMSI) that could still be forced to fall back to IMSI.

Its creation was motivated by stringent regulatory requirements for user privacy (e.g., GDPR) and the industry's need to restore user trust in mobile networks. By centralizing the de-concealment in a single, highly protected function (the SIDF within AUSF), the 5G architecture minimizes the attack surface for credential compromise and establishes a robust foundation for identity protection that is integral to the network's initial access procedure.

What changed in its specifications

The latest release-to-release comparison of specifications that define SIDF. Each summary describes the whole specification, not only this term.

TS 33.501Rel-18 → Rel-19

Rel-19 TS 33.501 adds roaming and inter-PLMN indirect communication authorization, fast re-authentication for non-3GPP mobility, and AI/ML security clauses for positioning and federated learning. It also adds NPN security, NRF access token key retrieval, LTM security, and monitoring-of-signalling-traffic protection.

Full comparison in TS 33.501 →
TS 33.514Rel-17 → Rel-18

Rel-18 added rejection tests for SUCIs with invalid public keys and specified UDM-specific vulnerability testing adaptations.

Full comparison in TS 33.514 →

Technology family

Security functions and anchors · Security

  1. Phase 1 AuC
  2. R99 HLR/AuC
  3. Rel-5 HSS
  4. Rel-6 3GPP AAA Server, BSF
  5. Rel-8 ASME, MME
  6. Rel-9 HSS-FE
  7. Rel-15 AMF, ARPF, AUSF, SEAF, SEPP, SIDF
  8. Rel-16 AAnF
  • SIDF used together with ARPF
    “Upon reception of the Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Request, the UDM shall invoke SIDF. SIDF shall de-conceal SUCI to gain SUPI before UDM can process the request. Based on the NSWO indicator and if NSWO is allowed based on the UE subscription data, the UDM/ARPF shall select the EAP-AKA´ authentication method” TS 33.501

Members and relations were proposed independently by several models and kept only where at least two agree; quotes are verified verbatim against the specifications. Release = first approved version of the defining specification.

Release Timeline

Detected Changes Across Releases

verified against 3GPP sources

Documented changes in 3 releases, each verified against the text of 3GPP specifications or approved change requests and shown with the exact wording. The release timeline above shows the same releases. A release without an entry has no documented change for this term.

Rel-15 introduced

SIDF is specified for the first time as a UDM-offered service that de-conceals the SUPI from the SUCI using the home network private key, with requirements on access rights.

  • “The SIDF is responsible for de-concealment of the SUCI and shall fulfil the following requirements:” TS 33.501 v15.20.0
  • “The SIDF shall be a service offered by UDM.” TS 33.501 v15.20.0
  • “The SIDF shall resolve the SUPI from the SUCI based on the protection scheme used to generate the SUCI.” TS 33.501 v15.20.0
Rel-16 specification text

UDM-SIDF procedures were extended in 33.501 so SUCI de-concealing precedes authentication method selection, including by realm or device indicator, and 33.514 added SIDF requirements and test cases.

  • “SIDF shall de-conceal SUCI to gain SUPI before UDM can process the request.” TS 33.501 v16.20.0
  • “The SIDF shall resolve the SUPI from the SUCI based on the protection scheme used to generate the SUCI.” TS 33.514 v16.5.0
Rel-18 specification text

SIDF gained new test requirements to reject SUCIs with invalid or uncompressed ECIES Profile B public keys, and is invoked to de-conceal SUCI in new authentication flows such as AUN3 and SNPN.

  • “Verify that the SIDF rejects the SUCI if it uses an ECIES protection scheme and contains an invalid point as the UE’s public key for Profile B.” TS 33.514 v18.3.0
  • “Verify that the SIDF rejects the SUCI if it uses the ECIES Profile B protection scheme and contains an uncompressed point as the UE's public key.” TS 33.514 v18.3.0
  • “the UDM invokes SIDF to de-conceal SUCI to gain SUPI if the received SUCI is not an anonymous SUCI.” TS 33.501 v18.12.0

Defining Specifications

3GPP specifications that define or reference SIDF, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.

SpecificationTitleRelease
TS 33.501 vk30 5G Security Architecture Rel-20 read
TS 33.514 vk20 UDM Security Assurance Specification Rel-20 read