Description
The Authentication Server Function (AUSF) is a critical component within the 5G Core (5GC) network's security architecture, specifically part of the Security Anchor Function (SEAF) framework. It resides in the home public land mobile network (HPLMN) and is responsible for executing the primary authentication procedure with the User Equipment (UE). The AUSF interfaces with the Unified Data Management (UDM) function to retrieve authentication credentials and subscription data, and with the Security Anchor Function (SEAF), typically co-located with the Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) in the serving network, to relay authentication vectors and results. The AUSF does not store long-term credentials itself; instead, it acts as a relay and processing node that orchestrates the 5G Authentication and Key Agreement (5G-AKA) or Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)-based methods defined by 3GPP.
During the authentication procedure, when a UE attempts to register with the network, the SEAF/AMF requests authentication from the AUSF. The AUSF, in turn, interacts with the UDM/ARPF (Authentication Credential Repository and Processing Function) to obtain an authentication vector. This vector contains a random challenge (RAND), an expected response (XRES*), a network authentication token (AUTN), and the crucial keying material: the anchor key (K_AUSF). The AUSF forwards the RAND and AUTN to the UE via the SEAF. The UE computes a response (RES*) using its stored subscriber key and sends it back. The AUSF compares the received RES* with the XRES* from the UDM. Upon successful verification, the AUSF generates the primary session keys: K_SEAF (for the SEAF) and the anchor key K_AUSF, which serves as the root for deriving further keys for subsequent security contexts.
The AUSF's role is pivotal in establishing a chain of trust. The K_AUSF key it generates or receives becomes the root key for the entire security context of that registration session. From K_AUSF, further keys are derived for access network security (K_AMF), NAS signaling integrity and confidentiality, and user plane integrity (if enabled). This hierarchical key derivation ensures key separation and limits the impact of a key compromise. Furthermore, the AUSF supports re-authentication and key refresh procedures. Its architecture is designed as a stateless function, with the UDM holding the permanent state, which aids in scalability and reliability within cloud-native deployments.
A key architectural advancement in 5G is the separation of the authentication server (AUSF) from the subscription data repository (UDM). This enhances security by limiting the exposure of sensitive long-term keys and allows for independent scaling of authentication workloads. The AUSF also plays a role in supporting authentication for non-3GPP access (e.g., Wi-Fi) via the Non-3GPP InterWorking Function (N3IWF) and is integral to the security framework for network slicing, ensuring that authentication policies can be slice-specific. Its interfaces, such as Nausf (service-based interface) and N13 (reference point interface to the UDM), are defined for these interactions.
Purpose & Motivation
The AUSF was introduced in 3GPP Release 15 as a fundamental part of the new 5G Service-Based Architecture (SBA) to address evolving security requirements that were inadequately served by previous generations. In 4G EPS, the authentication function was integrated within the Home Subscriber Server (HSS) and Mobility Management Entity (MME) through the S6a interface. This monolithic approach presented limitations in scalability, flexibility, and security granularity. The 5G design principles demanded a more decomposed, cloud-native, and service-based architecture to support diverse use cases like massive IoT, ultra-reliable low-latency communications, and network slicing.
The primary purpose of the AUSF is to provide a dedicated, scalable function for executing robust primary authentication. By separating authentication from subscription data management (handled by the UDM), the system achieves a stronger security posture through the principle of least privilege. No single network function holds all sensitive data (long-term key and subscription profile), reducing the attack surface. This separation also allows the AUSF to be optimized for high-volume authentication transactions, which is critical for IoT scenarios with millions of devices. Furthermore, the AUSF enables the support of new, more flexible authentication methods like EAP-5G, which allows for integration with non-3GPP credentials and third-party authentication servers, a necessity for enterprise and industrial applications.
Another key motivation was to establish a permanent security anchor in the home network. The K_AUSF key generated during authentication remains stable in the home network even if the UE moves between different serving networks or access types (3GPP, non-3GPP). This 'home control' model enhances security by ensuring the home operator always verifies the subscriber's identity and controls the root of the key hierarchy. It solves the problem of key context transfer across network borders that existed in previous systems, providing a cleaner and more secure mobility security framework. The AUSF is, therefore, not just an evolutionary step but a foundational redesign for 5G security, enabling trust, scalability, and service flexibility.
What changed in its specifications
The latest release-to-release comparison of specifications that define AUSF. Each summary describes the whole specification, not only this term.
Rel-19 added MPQUIC steering to multi-access PDU sessions, XR and media handling, and an Energy Information Function. It also added Local Offloading Management for edge computing, Vertical Federated Learning for AI/ML, and Ambient IoT text.
Full comparison in TS 23.501 →Rel-19 adds satellite NG-RAN access text, LP-WUS/WUR assistance and disabling, ATUC RAT utilization control, and network-controlled slice selection with S-NSSAI time validity to TS 24.501. It also adds ATSSS Phase 4 multi-access and 5G ProSe multi-hop relay support.
Full comparison in TS 24.501 →Architecture
Where it sits in the network
- Mobile Network → 5G Core → AUSF (Subscriber Management)
Evolution Lineage
- Evolved from: HSS (4G→5G)
- Network evolution overview →
Technology family
Core network elements and functions · Core Network
- Phase 1 AuC, EIR, GMSC, HLR, IWF, MSC, VLR
- Phase 2 SMS-GMSC, SMS-IWMSC
- R96 GGSN, SGSN
- R99 3G-SGSN, GLR, IM-GSN, IM-MSC
- Rel-4 CS-MGW, GMSC Server, MSC Server
- Rel-5 HSS, SLF
- Rel-6 3GPP AAA Server
- Rel-7 PCEF, PCRF
- Rel-8 ANDSF, BBERF, ePDG, MME, PGW, SGW
- Rel-9 HLR-FE, HSS-FE, UDR
- Rel-10 L-GW
- Rel-11 TDF
- Rel-14 PGW-C, PGW-U, SGW-C, SGW-U, TDF-C, TDF-U
- Rel-15 AMF, AUSF, PCF, SMF, SMF+PGW-C, UDM, UPF
- AUSF counterpart in another generation: AuC (not stated verbatim in the specifications)
Security functions and anchors · Security
- Phase 1 AuC
- R99 HLR/AuC
- Rel-5 HSS
- Rel-6 3GPP AAA Server, BSF
- Rel-8 ASME, MME
- Rel-9 HSS-FE
- Rel-15 AMF, ARPF, AUSF, SEAF, SEPP, SIDF
- Rel-16 AAnF
- AUSF used together with ARPF
“A subsequent authentication based on the KAUSF stored in the AUSF gives somewhat weaker guarantees than an authentication directly involving the ARPF and the USIM.” TS 33.501
- AUSF used together with SEAF
“the AUSF shall send the anchor key KSEAF derived from KAUSF to the SEAF.” TS 33.501
- AUSF used together with AAnF
“AUSF provides the SUPI and AKMA key material (A-KID, KAKMA) of the UE to the AAnF.” TS 33.535
- AUSF counterpart in another generation: 3GPP AAA Server (not stated verbatim in the specifications)
Members and relations were proposed independently by several models and kept only where at least two agree; quotes are verified verbatim against the specifications. Release = first approved version of the defining specification.
Release Timeline
Detected Changes Across Releases
verified against 3GPP sourcesDocumented changes in 6 releases, each verified against the text of 3GPP specifications or approved change requests and shown with the exact wording. The release timeline above shows the same releases. A release without an entry has no documented change for this term.
The AUSF is specified for the first time in Rel-15: it performs UE primary authentication, derives KAUSF and KSEAF, and exposes the Nausf_UEAuthentication service to the AMF/SEAF.
- “The AUSF provides UE authentication service to requester NF.” TS 23.501 v15.13.0
- “The AUSF shall then generate the 5G AV from the 5G HE AV received from the UDM/ARPF” TS 33.501 v15.20.0
- “N12: Reference point between AMF and AUSF.” TS 23.501 v15.13.0
In Rel-16 the AUSF gained new behaviour: it stores the latest KAUSF, maintains CounterSoR and CounterUPU for steering of roaming and UE parameters update, and offers new service operations.
- “To generate the UPU-MAC-IAUSF, the AUSF shall use the CounterUPU. The CounterUPU shall be incremented by the AUSF for every new computation” TS 33.501 v16.20.0
- “If the control plane solution for Steering of Roaming is supported by the HPLMN, the AUSF shall store the latest KAUSF” TS 33.501 v16.20.0
- Add UPU protection in AUSF functionality TS 29.509CR0072
In Rel-17 the AUSF gained new roles: authenticating via AAA Server/NSSAAF for SNPN, onboarding and Disaster Roaming, serving NSWOF and ProSe, and stricter serving-network authorization checks.
- “For the Disaster Roaming, the AUSF shall check the local configuration and, if allowed, the AUSF sends Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Request to the UDM.” TS 33.501 v17.16.0
- “In SNPN onboarding scenarios, if the UE is authenticated successfully, the AUSF may include in the response the FQDN(s) and/or IP address(es)” TS 29.509 v17.12.0
- “The AUSF acts as EAP authenticator and interacts with the AAA Server to execute the primary authentication procedure.” TS 33.501 v17.16.0
AUSF procedures were extended in Rel-18: it now returns the MSK to the AMF/SEAF or W-AGF, handles onboarding and anonymous SUCI, supports NSWO, and takes on ProSe authentication.
- “The AUSF shall send to the AMF/SEAF an Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message including the EAP-Success, the MSK, and the SUPI.” TS 33.501 v18.12.0
- “in case the AUSF receives an onboarding indication, the AUSF shall perform steps 6-10 and 14-17 as described in Annex I.2.2.2.” TS 33.501 v18.12.0
- Verification of the serving network name by the AUSF TS 33.501CR1876
AUSF selection now prefers instances that explicitly support the default Routing Indicator, and EAP-TLS responses from the AUSF now carry version-dependent TLS information elements.
- “the AUSF NF consumer selects an AUSF instance that explicitly indicates support for the default value of the Routing Indicator, if any” TS 23.501 v19.9.0
- “which further includes information elements such as server_hello, server_certificate, certificate_request etc. depending on the TLS version.” TS 33.501 v19.7.0
- AUSF Selection with Default Routing Indicator TS 23.501CR6471
AUSF's role was extended: it may now receive a Disaster Roaming indication from the AMF for Indirect Network Sharing for Disaster Condition, and SMF+PGW-C is now added as an NSSAAF consumer alongside AUSF.
- “in the case of Indirect Network Sharing for Disaster Condition as specified in the clause 5.18.6 of TS 23.501 [2], the AMF may provide the indication of Disaster Roaming service in its request to AUSF” TS 23.502 v20.3.0
- Verification of stored AUSF instance after successful authentication TS 33.514CR0040
Defining Specifications
3GPP specifications that define or reference AUSF, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.
| Specification | Title | Release |
|---|---|---|
| TS 23.501 vk30 | 5G System Architecture | Rel-20 read |
| TR 23.758 vh00 | Study on Edge Application Architecture | Rel-17 read |
| TS 24.501 vk10 | 5GS NAS Protocol Specification | Rel-20 read |
| TS 24.502 vk00 | Non-3GPP Access Network Discovery and Selection | Rel-20 read |
| TS 26.891 vg00 | Media Distribution Services in 5G System | Rel-16 read |
| TS 29.503 vk10 | UDM Service Based Interface | Rel-20 read |
| TS 29.509 vk00 | 3GPP TS 29509: Nausf Service Based Interface | Rel-20 read |
| TS 29.535 vk10 | AAnF Service Based Interface | Rel-20 read |
| TS 32.255 vk30 | 5G Data Connectivity Converged Charging | Rel-20 read |
| TS 33.127 vj80 | Lawful Interception Architecture | Rel-19 read |
| TS 33.501 vk30 | 5G Security Architecture | Rel-20 read |
| TS 33.514 vk20 | UDM Security Assurance Specification | Rel-20 read |
| TS 33.535 vj00 | 5G AKMA: Authentication and Key Management for Apps | Rel-19 read |
| TS 33.545 vk10 | NR Femto Security Architecture | Rel-20 read |
| TS 33.701 vj00 | Study on mitigations against bidding down attacks | Rel-19 read |
| TR 33.739 vi10 | Study on security enhancement of support for | Rel-18 read |
| TR 33.741 vi01 | Home Network Triggered Authentication | Rel-18 read |
| TS 33.794 vj10 | Study on Zero Trust Security Enablers for 5G | Rel-19 read |
| TS 33.835 vg10 | Study on authentication and key management for apps | Rel-16 read |