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Glossary term · Security

SEAF

Security Anchor Functionality

Security →

SEAF is the primary security anchor point within the 5G serving network, part of the AUSF, managing authentication and key agreement procedures with the UE.

Introduced
Rel-15
Where
Security
Specifications
6 specs
Also in
Core Network
SEAF Description Purpose What changed Family Neighbours Detected Changes Specifications

Description

The Security Anchor Functionality (SEAF) is a fundamental security component within the 5G System (5GS) architecture, defined as a sub-function of the Authentication Server Function (AUSF). Its primary role is to serve as the security termination point in the serving network during primary authentication and key agreement (AKA) procedures. The SEAF does not perform authentication calculations itself but orchestrates the process by interacting with the home network's Authentication Credential Repository and Processing Function (ARPF/UDM). It receives authentication vectors from the home network and uses them to authenticate the User Equipment (UE). Upon successful authentication, the SEAF derives the anchor key (K_SEAF) from the home network key (K_AUSF), establishing a security association rooted in the serving network. This K_SEAF is then used to derive further keys for securing Non-Access Stratum (NAS) signaling between the UE and the Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF). The SEAF's location in the serving network is crucial for security localization, reducing latency and dependency on the home network for subsequent security procedures like re-authentication and key refresh. Architecturally, the SEAF is co-located with the AUSF, and its interfaces, such as Nausf, are used for communication with the AMF. Its operation is central to the 5G security framework, providing a clear separation between home and serving network security responsibilities and enabling features like seamless mobility and network slicing with isolated security contexts.

Purpose & Motivation

The SEAF was introduced in 3GPP Release 15 as part of the new 5G security architecture to address limitations of previous generations, particularly 4G EPS. In EPS, the MME in the serving network acted as the security endpoint, which created a complex key hierarchy and potential vulnerabilities during inter-MME handovers. The primary motivation for SEAF was to provide a dedicated, stable security anchor in the serving network that is separate from the mobility management function (AMF). This separation of concerns enhances security by isolating the long-term anchor key (K_SEAF) and simplifies key management during mobility events. It solves the problem of key chaining and reduces the attack surface by localizing the primary security context. Furthermore, the SEAF design supports the 5G requirement for serving network visibility and control over authentication, which is essential for regulatory compliance and enabling new business models like network slicing, where each slice may require independent security anchoring from the serving network's perspective.

What changed in its specifications

The latest release-to-release comparison of specifications that define SEAF. Each summary describes the whole specification, not only this term.

TS 23.501Rel-18 → Rel-19

Rel-19 added MPQUIC steering to multi-access PDU sessions, XR and media handling, and an Energy Information Function. It also added Local Offloading Management for edge computing, Vertical Federated Learning for AI/ML, and Ambient IoT text.

Full comparison in TS 23.501 →
TS 29.509Rel-18 → Rel-19

Rel-19 adds indirect network sharing to TS 29.509. It changes how the serving network name and AUSF redirection behave in those scenarios.

Full comparison in TS 29.509 →

Technology family

Security functions and anchors · Security

  1. Phase 1 AuC
  2. R99 HLR/AuC
  3. Rel-5 HSS
  4. Rel-6 3GPP AAA Server, BSF
  5. Rel-8 ASME, MME
  6. Rel-9 HSS-FE
  7. Rel-15 AMF, ARPF, AUSF, SEAF, SEPP, SIDF
  8. Rel-16 AAnF
  • SEAF used together with AUSF
    “the AUSF shall send the anchor key KSEAF derived from KAUSF to the SEAF.” TS 33.501
  • SEAF used together with AMF
    “The SEAF shall derive the KAMF from KSEAF and send it to the AMF which is used by the AMF to derive NAS security keys.” TS 33.501

Members and relations were proposed independently by several models and kept only where at least two agree; quotes are verified verbatim against the specifications. Release = first approved version of the defining specification.

Release Timeline

Detected Changes Across Releases

verified against 3GPP sources

Documented changes in 5 releases, each verified against the text of 3GPP specifications or approved change requests and shown with the exact wording. The release timeline above shows the same releases. A release without an entry has no documented change for this term.

Rel-15 introduced

SEAF is specified for the first time in Rel-15, providing authentication in the serving network via the AMF, initiating authentication, handling SUCI and deriving KAMF from KSEAF.

  • “The security anchor function (SEAF) provides the authentication functionality via the AMF in the serving network.” TS 33.501 v15.20.0
  • “The SEAF shall invoke the Nausf_UEAuthentication service by sending a Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request message to the AUSF” TS 33.501 v15.20.0
  • “The SEAF shall support primary authentication using SUCI.” TS 33.501 v15.20.0
Rel-16 1 CR

Rel-16 adds SEAF/AMF behaviour for non-5G-capable device authentication via W-AGF, forwarding EAP-TLS messages and Nausf requests to the AUSF, and a clarification to SEAF.

  • “The AMF/SEAF forwards the EAP-Response/EAP-TLS [client_hello] message to the AUSF in a Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request message.” TS 33.501 v16.20.0
  • “The AMF/SEAF selects the AUSF based on the SUCI in the received registration request” TS 33.501 v16.20.0
  • Clarification to SEAF TS 33.501CR0835
Rel-17 specification text

SEAF/AUSF authentication requirements changed: the AUSF now checks the SEAF's serving network entitlement via the 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id header, and SEAF-originated Disaster Roaming indication is handled.

  • “the AUSF shall check that the requesting SEAF in the serving network identified by the 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id header specified in TS 29.500 [74] is entitled” TS 33.501 v17.16.0
  • “the SEPP in the SEAF's network ensures that the 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id is included.” TS 33.501 v17.16.0
  • “if received from SEAF, Disaster Roaming service indication;” TS 33.501 v17.16.0
Rel-18 specification text

In Rel-18 the AMF/SEAF gains new roles: it decides on and starts UDM-triggered re-authentication, handles AUN3 device authentication, and forwards the EAP-Success together with the MSK to the W-AGF.

  • “the AMF/SEAF shall decide whether to run the primary authentication procedure based on its own local authentication policy, and the UE state” TS 33.501 v18.12.0
  • “14b. The AMF/SEAF forwards to the W-AGF the EAP-Success message and the MSK in an Authentication Result message” TS 33.501 v18.12.0
  • “The AMF/SEAF shall select the AUSF based on the SUCI in the received registration request” TS 33.501 v18.12.0
Rel-19 specification text

In the EAP-TLS authentication flow, the AUSF-to-SEAF Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response content changed: the server_key_exchange and server_hello_done elements were dropped, and the TLS-version-dependent EAP-Request/EAP-TLS elements were made generic.

  • “The AUSF sends EAP-Request/EAP-TLS message with information elements that depend on the TLS version to the SEAF” TS 33.501 v19.7.0
  • “server_hello, server_certificate, certificate_request etc. depending on the TLS version.” TS 33.501 v19.7.0

Defining Specifications

3GPP specifications that define or reference SEAF, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.

SpecificationTitleRelease
TS 23.501 vk30 5G System Architecture Rel-20 read
TS 29.509 vk00 3GPP TS 29509: Nausf Service Based Interface Rel-20 read
TS 33.501 vk30 5G Security Architecture Rel-20 read
TR 33.741 vi01 Home Network Triggered Authentication Rel-18 read
TS 33.835 vg10 Study on authentication and key management for apps Rel-16 read
TR 33.841 vg10 Security aspects; Study on 256-bit algorithms for 5G Rel-16 read