Description
AKMA (Authentication and Key Management for Applications) is a standardized security architecture within 3GPP that provides a mechanism for application functions (AFs) to securely authenticate user equipment (UE) and establish cryptographic keys for securing application-layer communication. It operates by reusing the credentials and authentication procedures from the 3GPP primary authentication (e.g., 5G-AKA or EAP-AKA'), thereby avoiding the need for separate, application-specific authentication protocols. The core idea is to derive application-specific keys from the long-term key material established during the UE's initial network attachment, enabling efficient and secure bootstrapping for a wide range of services.
The architecture involves several key functional entities: the AKMA Anchor Function (AAnF), the Network Exposure Function (NEF), and the Application Function (AF). The AAnF, typically collocated with the Authentication Server Function (AUSF) in the home network, is the central component. It generates and manages the AKMA Application Key (K_AF) for a specific UE and AF pair. The K_AF is derived from the anchor key (K_AKMA), which itself is derived from the primary authentication key (e.g., K_AUSF). The NEF acts as a secure intermediary, allowing the AF (which may be located in a third-party domain) to request the K_AF from the AAnF without direct access to core network functions.
The procedure begins when a UE successfully completes 3GPP primary authentication. The AUSF generates the K_AKMA and provides it to the AAnF. The UE can independently derive the same K_AKMA. When the UE wants to access a service from an AF, it provides an AKMA Application Key Identifier (A-KID) to the AF. The AF, via the NEF, uses this A-KID to request the corresponding K_AF from the AAnF. The AAnF generates the K_AF specific to that UE and AF pair and provides it to the AF. Subsequently, both the UE (which can derive the same K_AF) and the AF possess a shared secret key for securing their communication, enabling mutual authentication and enabling the establishment of further application-layer security contexts (e.g., TLS-PSK).
AKMA's role is to decouple application security from network access security, providing a scalable and standardized method for service providers to offer secure services. It is particularly valuable for services that require persistent secure sessions or frequent re-authentication, as it avoids repeated full network authentication procedures. By leveraging the robust security of the 3GPP ecosystem, AKMA enhances trust in third-party applications and enables new business models for network operators and application providers.
Purpose & Motivation
AKMA was created to address the growing need for secure, efficient authentication and key management for application-layer services in mobile networks. Prior to AKMA, application functions often had to implement their own authentication mechanisms, such as username/password, OAuth, or custom certificate-based methods. These approaches introduced several problems: they created a fragmented security landscape, increased complexity for users (multiple credentials), incurred significant signaling overhead (separate authentication runs), and did not inherently leverage the strong, subscriber-based authentication already performed by the mobile network.
The historical context is the evolution towards service-based architectures in 5G and the proliferation of IoT and edge computing applications. These services require lightweight, yet secure, methods to authenticate devices and establish keys without burdening the core network with redundant authentication traffic. AKMA solves this by reusing the trust established during the initial 3GPP access authentication. It allows Application Functions, whether operated by the network operator or a trusted third party, to securely obtain keys derived from that initial authentication, ensuring end-to-end security based on the subscriber's identity and the network's security credentials.
This approach addresses limitations of previous methods by providing a standardized, network-operator-anchored security framework. It reduces latency for service access, minimizes signaling load, enhances user experience through seamless authentication (single sign-on concept for network services), and provides a consistent security baseline across diverse applications. It is a key enabler for secure network exposure and monetization of network capabilities through APIs.
Classification
Release Timeline
Detected Changes Across Releases
from 3GPP Change RequestsSpecific changes extracted from the „Change history“ tables of 3GPP specifications (70 CRs across 4 releases). Complements the general historical overview above with the evidence-based evolution of this function.
In Release 16, the AKMA function was newly introduced into the 5G System reference architecture, establishing the specific reference points N61, N62, and N63 to support its service-based interfaces. This release included foundational procedures and context management, while subsequent Change Requests focused on corrections and clarifications to aspects like key lifetimes, re-authentication, and error handling for these interfaces.
- Clarifications on error response handling in AKMA process TS 33.535CR0009
- Re-authentication in AKMA TS 33.535CR0013
- Adding AKMA context description TS 33.535CR0020
- Corrections to AKMA key lifetimes TS 33.535CR0024
- Corrections and clarifications to AKMA procedures TS 33.535CR0025
- AKMA SBA interface clarifications TS 33.535CR0032
+ 2 more changes
In Release 17, the AKMA function was formally introduced into the 5G reference architecture, defining new reference points N61, N62, and N63 for its support. The release specified new security profiles, including a profile for TLS 1.3 to utilize AKMA-derived application keys, and introduced procedures for key management and selection between AKMA and legacy GBA methods. It also added specific network functions and service operations, such as the Naanf_AKMA_ContextRemove, and detailed UE impacts including handling for scenarios where a valid KAUSF is not available.
- Introduction of AKMA into the reference architecture TS 23.501CR2457
- Adding profiles of TLS to use AKMA keys TS 24.109CR0070
- Adding AKMA based profile for TLS 1.3 TS 24.109CR0072
- The impact on UE due to the introduction of Authentication and Key Management for Applications (AKMA) TS 24.501CR2794
- AKMA Indication TS 29.503CR0523
- Naanf_AKMA_ContextRemove service operation TS 29.535CR0012
+ 29 more changes
In Release 18, the AKMA function was enhanced with new capabilities including support for OAuth2 scopes in the Naanf_AKMA API, the addition of a DTLS-based Ua protocol and IETF OSCORE as a Ua protocol option, and updates to support roaming restrictions and policy control in the AAnF. Furthermore, procedures were updated for AKMA service disabling, including notification via the NEF, and enhancements were made to related UDM services and the Nudm_EventExposure_Subscribe service for AKMA. These changes also included security enhancements for AKMA phase 2 and support for SUPI access in AKMA application key information.
- Update the Nudm_EventExposure_Subscribe for AKMA service TS 29.503CR1253
- OAuth2 scopes in Naanf_AKMA API TS 29.535CR0030
- Update AKMA procedures to support Roaming restrictions. TS 29.535CR0046
- AKMA phase 2 security enhancement TS 33.535CR0154
- Add AKMA Ua protocol based on DTLS to TS 33.535 TS 33.535CR0164
- IETF OSCORE as AKMA Ua protocol TS 33.535CR0175
+ 18 more changes
In Release 19, the AKMA function was updated with clarifications and corrections to improve operational reliability. The enhancements specifically addressed the procedure for an Application Function to disable encryption for a roaming UE using AKMA services. Furthermore, corrections were made to the Naanf_AKMA service descriptions and to the name of the data type used for the AKMA service disablement notification.
Explore further
Broader topics and technologies where AKMA plays a role.
Defining Specifications
3GPP specifications that define or reference AKMA, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.
| Specification | Title | Release |
|---|---|---|
| TS 23.501 vk00 | 5G System Architecture Stage 2 | Rel-20 |
| TS 24.109 vj00 | HTTP Digest AKA & GAA Stage 3 | Rel-19 |
| TS 24.501 vj50 | 5G NAS Protocols Specification | Rel-19 |
| TS 24.554 vj40 | 5G Proximity Services (ProSe) Protocols | Rel-19 |
| TS 29.503 vj50 | UDM Service Based Interface Stage 3 | Rel-19 |
| TS 29.522 vj40 | 5G NEF Northbound APIs Stage 3 | Rel-19 |
| TS 29.535 vj40 | 5G AKMA Anchor Services Stage 3 Protocol | Rel-19 |
| TS 33.127 vj50 | Lawful Interception Architecture and Functions | Rel-19 |
| TS 33.503 vj20 | Security for Proximity Services (ProSe) in 5G | Rel-19 |
| TS 33.533 vj00 | Security for 5G Ranging & Sidelink Positioning | Rel-19 |
| TS 33.535 vj00 | 5G AKMA: Authentication and Key Management for Apps | Rel-19 |
| TS 33.700 | 3GPP TR 33.700 | Rel-16 |
| TR 33.739 vi10 | Study on security enhancement of support for | Rel-18 |
| TR 33.741 vi01 | Home Network Triggered Authentication | Rel-18 |
| TS 33.749 vj00 | Study on security aspects of edge computing enhancement | Rel-19 |
| TS 33.835 vg10 | Study on authentication and key management for apps | Rel-16 |