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Glossary term · Security

KAKMA

AKMA Anchor Key

Security →

KAKMA is the root symmetric key in the AKMA framework, generated from 5G authentication, which serves as the master secret for deriving application-specific keys and anchors application security to the subscriber's network credential.

Introduced
Rel-16
Where
Security
Specifications
2 specs
KAKMA Description Purpose What changed Family Neighbours Detected Changes Specifications

Description

The KAKMA (AKMA Anchor Key) is the foundational cryptographic key within the Authentication and Key Management for Applications (AKMA) system. It is a symmetric key established as a byproduct of a successful primary authentication procedure between the User Equipment (UE) and the 5G Core Network, specifically using 5G AKA or EAP-AKA' protocols. During this authentication, the Authentication Server Function (AUSF) generates the KAKMA. It is then securely stored and managed by a dedicated network function called the AKMA Anchor Function (AAnF) within the subscriber's home network. A corresponding KAKMA is also derived independently by the UE using its stored subscription credentials and the authentication parameters received from the network.

The KAKMA is not used directly to secure any traffic. Instead, its sole purpose is to serve as a root key for deriving other keys, primarily the AKMA Application Keys (KAFs). The derivation of a KAF from the KAKMA uses a Key Derivation Function (KDF) with specific input parameters, including the target Application Function's identity. This ensures cryptographic separation: each application gets a unique key derived from the same root, preventing compromise of one application from affecting others. The AAnF acts as the custodian of the KAKMA for the network side, using it to generate KAFs on-demand for authorized Application Functions.

Architecturally, the KAKMA sits at the heart of the AKMA trust model. It bridges the world of network access security (handled by the AMF, AUSF, and UDM) and application-level security. Its lifecycle is managed by the network and is typically valid for the duration of the UE's registration state or a configured time period. When the UE deregisters or the key expires, the KAKMA is deleted, invalidating all KAFs derived from it, thereby providing centralized security control. The security of the entire AKMA framework hinges on the confidentiality and integrity of the KAKMA, which is protected within the secure environments of the UE's tamper-resistant element and the home network's trusted functions.

Purpose & Motivation

The KAKMA was created to provide a persistent, network-derived cryptographic anchor that extends the trust from 3GPP primary authentication into the application layer. Prior to AKMA, there was no standardized mechanism for applications to leverage the strong, SIM-based authentication of the cellular network. Applications had to establish their own security context from scratch, often with weaker methods. The KAKMA solves this by creating a reusable security asset post-network authentication.

Its existence addresses the problem of authentication silos. Without it, each service provider (Application Function) would need to implement its own authentication and key agreement with the user, leading to a fragmented user experience and complex key management. The KAKMA provides a common root of trust within the home operator's domain, allowing multiple, potentially unrelated, Application Functions to obtain secure, user-specific keys without ever interacting with the user's long-term credential directly.

The motivation is rooted in enabling new service paradigms like secure IoT onboarding, seamless media service access, and identity federation, where the mobile network identity is a valuable asset. By establishing the KAKMA, 3GPP defined a standardized way to bootstrap a wide array of application security sessions, simplifying development for service providers and enhancing security and usability for end-users. It transforms the network from a pure connectivity provider into a trusted security anchor for a digital ecosystem.

What changed in its specifications

The latest release-to-release comparison of specifications that define KAKMA. Each summary describes the whole specification, not only this term.

TS 33.127Rel-18 → Rel-19

Rel-19 adds lawful interception architectures and events for IMS-HSS, 5G LAN, WebRTC, ProSe and 5G PIN. It also adds mission critical security clauses, satellite access charging aspects, and Uncrewed Aerial System interception at the NEF/UAS NF. Further additions cover AR avatar communications and NF discovery by target PLMN.

Full comparison in TS 33.127 →
TS 33.535Rel-18 → Rel-19

Rel-19 brings only minor changes to TS 33.535: 0 clauses changed, with no change attributed to a release feature.

Full comparison in TS 33.535 →

Technology family

Key hierarchies · Security

  1. Phase 1 Kc
  2. R97 GPRS-Kc
  3. R99 CK, IK
  4. Rel-8 KASME, KeNB, KNASenc, KNASint, KRRCenc, KRRCint, KUPenc, NH
  5. Rel-9 GPRS-Kc128, Kc128
  6. Rel-10 KUPint
  7. Rel-15 KAMF, KAUSF, KgNB, KSEAF
  8. Rel-16 A-KID, KAF, KAKMA
  • KAKMA builds on KAUSF
    “KAKMA shall be derived from KAUSF as specified in Annex A.2.” TS 33.535
  • KAKMA extended by KAF
    “KAF is a key derived by ME and AAnF from KAKMA.” TS 33.535
  • KAKMA used together with A-KID
    “A-KID identifies the KAKMA key of the UE.” TS 33.535

Members and relations were proposed independently by several models and kept only where at least two agree; quotes are verified verbatim against the specifications. Release = first approved version of the defining specification.

Release Timeline

Detected Changes Across Releases

verified against 3GPP sources

Documented changes in 3 releases, each verified against the text of 3GPP specifications or approved change requests and shown with the exact wording. The release timeline above shows the same releases. A release without an entry has no documented change for this term.

Rel-16 introduced

TS 33.535 first specifies KAKMA as the AKMA anchor key, derived from KAUSF after primary authentication, stored in AAnF, and used to derive KAF.

Rel-17 specification text

AKMA anchor key KAKMA handling was extended: AAnF now stores GPSI with KAKMA, KAF lifetime rules were refined, and NAS and SBI procedures and an error case for absent KAKMA were specified.

  • “The AAnF stores the AKMA Anchor Key (KAKMA) and SUPI/GPSI for AKMA service, which is received from the AUSF/UDM” TS 33.535 v17.12.0
  • “If KAKMA is not present in the AAnF, the AAnF shall reply with an HTTP "403 Forbidden" status code” TS 29.535 v17.8.0
  • “the UE supporting AKMA shall derive the KAKMA and the AKMA Temporary Identifier (A-TID) from the valid KAUSF if available” TS 24.501 v17.18.1
Rel-18 1 CR

AKMA procedures for KAKMA changed in Rel-18: AAnF can refresh KAKMA by triggering primary authentication via UDM, KAF refresh is linked to KAKMA refresh, and the AKMA context now includes the KAF expiration time.

  • “the AAnF may decide to refresh the KAKMA based on the operator’s local authentication policy by sending the Nudm_UECM_AuthTrigger Request message to the UDM” TS 33.535 v18.8.0
  • “The KAF may be refreshed by the KAKMA refresh defined in clause 6.4.4 as decided by AAnF.” TS 33.535 v18.8.0
  • Link KAF refresh to KAKMA refresh TS 33.535CR0165

Defining Specifications

3GPP specifications that define or reference KAKMA, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.

SpecificationTitleRelease
TS 33.127 vj80 Lawful Interception Architecture Rel-19 read
TS 33.535 vj00 5G AKMA: Authentication and Key Management for Apps Rel-19 read