KAKMA

AKMA Anchor Key

Security →
Introduced in Rel-16

KAKMA is the root symmetric key in the AKMA framework, generated from 5G authentication, which serves as the master secret for deriving application-specific keys and anchors application security to the subscriber's network credential.

Category
Security
Introduced
Rel-16
Where
Core Network › 5G Core
Specifications
2 specs
KAKMA Description Purpose Related Classification Detected Changes Specifications

Description

The KAKMA (AKMA Anchor Key) is the foundational cryptographic key within the Authentication and Key Management for Applications (AKMA) system. It is a symmetric key established as a byproduct of a successful primary authentication procedure between the User Equipment (UE) and the 5G Core Network, specifically using 5G AKA or EAP-AKA' protocols. During this authentication, the Authentication Server Function (AUSF) generates the KAKMA. It is then securely stored and managed by a dedicated network function called the AKMA Anchor Function (AAnF) within the subscriber's home network. A corresponding KAKMA is also derived independently by the UE using its stored subscription credentials and the authentication parameters received from the network.

The KAKMA is not used directly to secure any traffic. Instead, its sole purpose is to serve as a root key for deriving other keys, primarily the AKMA Application Keys (KAFs). The derivation of a KAF from the KAKMA uses a Key Derivation Function (KDF) with specific input parameters, including the target Application Function's identity. This ensures cryptographic separation: each application gets a unique key derived from the same root, preventing compromise of one application from affecting others. The AAnF acts as the custodian of the KAKMA for the network side, using it to generate KAFs on-demand for authorized Application Functions.

Architecturally, the KAKMA sits at the heart of the AKMA trust model. It bridges the world of network access security (handled by the AMF, AUSF, and UDM) and application-level security. Its lifecycle is managed by the network and is typically valid for the duration of the UE's registration state or a configured time period. When the UE deregisters or the key expires, the KAKMA is deleted, invalidating all KAFs derived from it, thereby providing centralized security control. The security of the entire AKMA framework hinges on the confidentiality and integrity of the KAKMA, which is protected within the secure environments of the UE's tamper-resistant element and the home network's trusted functions.

Purpose & Motivation

The KAKMA was created to provide a persistent, network-derived cryptographic anchor that extends the trust from 3GPP primary authentication into the application layer. Prior to AKMA, there was no standardized mechanism for applications to leverage the strong, SIM-based authentication of the cellular network. Applications had to establish their own security context from scratch, often with weaker methods. The KAKMA solves this by creating a reusable security asset post-network authentication.

Its existence addresses the problem of authentication silos. Without it, each service provider (Application Function) would need to implement its own authentication and key agreement with the user, leading to a fragmented user experience and complex key management. The KAKMA provides a common root of trust within the home operator's domain, allowing multiple, potentially unrelated, Application Functions to obtain secure, user-specific keys without ever interacting with the user's long-term credential directly.

The motivation is rooted in enabling new service paradigms like secure IoT onboarding, seamless media service access, and identity federation, where the mobile network identity is a valuable asset. By establishing the KAKMA, 3GPP defined a standardized way to bootstrap a wide array of application security sessions, simplifying development for service providers and enhancing security and usability for end-users. It transforms the network from a pure connectivity provider into a trusted security anchor for a digital ecosystem.

Classification

Part ofAKMA
Related approachesKAF

Release Timeline

Detected Changes Across Releases

from 3GPP Change Requests

Specific changes extracted from the „Change history“ tables of 3GPP specifications (2 CRs across 1 releases). Complements the general historical overview above with the evidence-based evolution of this function.

Studied in Rel-16, normative work from Rel-18.

Rel-18 2 changes

In Release 18, the specifications for the KAKMA (AKMA Anchor Key) function were enhanced to introduce a re-keying procedure related to HONTRA. Furthermore, the update established a defined linkage between the refresh procedures for the Key Application Function (KAF) and the refresh of the KAKMA itself, ensuring synchronized key management.

  • KAKMA re-keying relaed to HONTRA TS 33.535CR0155
  • Link KAF refresh to KAKMA refresh TS 33.535CR0165

Explore further

Broader topics and technologies where KAKMA plays a role.

Defining Specifications

3GPP specifications that define or reference KAKMA, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.

SpecificationTitleRelease
TS 33.127 vj50 Lawful Interception Architecture and Functions Rel-19
TS 33.535 vj00 5G AKMA: Authentication and Key Management for Apps Rel-19
Patrick Zandl

About the author: Patrick Zandl (b. 1974)

Telecommunications specialist, technology journalist (founder of the Mobil server), and developer who has been running since 2025 — the largest Czech-language resource on AI-assisted programming. Formerly Chief Wizard Architect at Prusa3D and head of development for Turris at CZ.NIC; currently a consultant and instructor on AI implementation in companies.