Description
The KAF (AKMA Application Key) is a crucial security element within the Authentication and Key Management for Applications (AKMA) framework standardized by 3GPP. It is a symmetric cryptographic key uniquely generated for a specific user equipment (UE) and a specific Application Function (AF). The KAF is not directly provisioned but is dynamically derived from a root key known as the KAKMA (AKMA Anchor Key), which itself is established during the primary 5G AKA or EAP-AKA' authentication procedure between the UE and the network. The derivation process involves input parameters such as the AF's identity (e.g., its FQDN), ensuring key separation so that each UE-AF pair has a distinct KAF.
The generation of the KAF is a distributed process. The UE and the AKMA Anchor Function (AAnF) in the home network independently compute the same KAF using the shared KAKMA and the agreed-upon derivation inputs. The AAnF then securely provides this KAF to the requesting AF over the Naf interface. This architecture ensures the AF never learns the root KAKMA, and the UE never exposes the KAF externally, maintaining a strong security chain. The KAF's primary role is to enable the establishment of a secure channel, typically using TLS-PSK (Pre-Shared Key) or similar mechanisms, between the UE and the AF.
Once established, the KAF is used to secure application-layer communications. It can directly serve as a pre-shared key for TLS or be used to derive further session keys for encryption and integrity protection of application data. This model offloads authentication and key management from the application server to the 3GPP security infrastructure, leveraging the robust, subscription-based network authentication. The KAF's lifecycle is tied to the underlying KAKMA; it remains valid as long as the KAKMA is valid, which is typically aligned with the UE's registration state, providing a balance between security and service continuity.
Purpose & Motivation
The KAF was introduced to solve the problem of repetitive and inefficient authentication for over-the-top (OTT) and operator-hosted applications accessing 3GPP networks. Before AKMA, applications often required their own authentication mechanisms (like usernames/passwords or API tokens), which were separate from the robust cellular network authentication. This created a poor user experience, increased credential management overhead, and could introduce security weaknesses if application-level credentials were weak or poorly managed.
AKMA, and specifically the KAF, was created to leverage the strong, primary authentication performed by the 3GPP core network (5GC) for securing application access. Its purpose is to enable seamless and secure bootstrapping of application security. By deriving the KAF from the already-established network authentication, it eliminates the need for the user to perform a separate log-in for trusted applications. This is particularly valuable for services that require a verified mobile subscriber identity and for IoT scenarios where manual intervention is impossible.
The motivation stems from the need for a standardized, network-centric authentication framework for applications, moving beyond basic network access security. It addresses the limitation of previous approaches where application security was siloed. KAF provides a standardized way for Application Functions to obtain cryptographically strong keys tied to a proven subscriber identity, enabling new business models like identity-as-a-service and secure IoT service enablement directly from the 3GPP network trust anchor.
What changed in its specifications
The latest release-to-release comparison of specifications that define KAF. Each summary describes the whole specification, not only this term.
Rel-19 adds the ImsSessionManagement and ImsEventExposure APIs, a new AIoT API (Nnef_AIoT), and an AddressingParamProvision API for static UE IP addressing. It also adds ProSe Layer-2/Layer-3 relay parameters, an MSISDN verification operation for Nnef_UEId, and QoS monitoring attributes to the EASDeployment API.
Full comparison in TS 29.522 →Rel-19 adds lawful interception architectures and events for IMS-HSS, 5G LAN, WebRTC, ProSe and 5G PIN. It also adds mission critical security clauses, satellite access charging aspects, and Uncrewed Aerial System interception at the NEF/UAS NF. Further additions cover AR avatar communications and NF discovery by target PLMN.
Full comparison in TS 33.127 →Technology family
Key hierarchies · Security
- Phase 1 Kc
- R97 GPRS-Kc
- R99 CK, IK
- Rel-8 KASME, KeNB, KNASenc, KNASint, KRRCenc, KRRCint, KUPenc, NH
- Rel-9 GPRS-Kc128, Kc128
- Rel-10 KUPint
- Rel-15 KAMF, KAUSF, KgNB, KSEAF
- Rel-16 A-KID, KAF, KAKMA
- KAF builds on KAKMA
“KAF is a key derived by ME and AAnF from KAKMA.” TS 33.535
Members and relations were proposed independently by several models and kept only where at least two agree; quotes are verified verbatim against the specifications. Release = first approved version of the defining specification.
Release Timeline
Detected Changes Across Releases
verified against 3GPP sourcesDocumented changes in 4 releases, each verified against the text of 3GPP specifications or approved change requests and shown with the exact wording. The release timeline above shows the same releases. A release without an entry has no documented change for this term.
KAF, the AKMA Application Key derived from KAKMA by ME and AAnF for securing Ua* between UE and AF, is specified for the first time, with lifetime, derivation and request procedures.
- “KAF is a key derived by ME and AAnF from KAKMA.” TS 33.535 v16.2.0
- “The key derivation of KAF shall be performed as specified in Annex A.4.” TS 33.535 v16.2.0
- “AF with the AKMA service enabling requests for AKMA Application Key, called KAF, from the AAnF using A-KID.” TS 33.535 v16.2.0
KAF handling was changed in TS 33.535: KAF can continue in use for the current application session after a new KAKMA is established, and AAnF returns SUPI/GPSI together with KAF and its expiration time.
- “the AKMA Application Key KAF can continue to be used for the duration of the current application session or until its lifetime expires, whichever comes first.” TS 33.535 v17.12.0
- “The AAnF sends Naanf_AKMA_ApplicationKey_Get response to the AF with SUPI/GPSI, KAF and the KAF expiration time.” TS 33.535 v17.12.0
- KAF lifetime expiration in clause 5.2 TS 33.535CR0060
KAF gains a maximum lifetime and expiration time stored in the AKMA context, can be refreshed with KAKMA refresh as decided by AAnF, and is returned to the AF with its expiration time.
- “The KAF may be refreshed by the KAKMA refresh defined in clause 6.4.4 as decided by AAnF.” TS 33.535 v18.8.0
- “The AKMA Application Key (KAF) shall be provided with a maximum lifetime based on the operator’s local authentication policy.” TS 33.535 v18.8.0
- KAF re-keying after expiration triggered by AAnF TS 33.535CR0201
The requirement to return the GPSI in the AKMA Application Key information for the UE was removed from the specification text.
- “Return GPSI in the AKMA Application Key information for the UE.” TS 29.522 v20.1.0
Defining Specifications
3GPP specifications that define or reference KAF, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.
| Specification | Title | Release |
|---|---|---|
| TS 29.522 vk10 | NEF Northbound Interface | Rel-20 read |
| TS 33.127 vj80 | Lawful Interception Architecture | Rel-19 read |
| TS 33.535 vj00 | 5G AKMA: Authentication and Key Management for Apps | Rel-19 read |