Description
The Subscription Permanent Identifier (SUPI) is a critical concept in 5G system architecture, defined initially in 3GPP Release 15. It is a globally unique, non-changing identifier that permanently represents a user's subscription within the 3GPP ecosystem. The SUPI is used by the network for identification, authentication, authorization, and accounting purposes. It is stored securely in the Unified Data Management (UDM) and the Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) on the user's device. The SUPI itself is never transmitted in clear text over the air interface to protect user privacy; instead, it is concealed using a privacy-preserving identifier called the Subscription Concealed Identifier (SUCI).
Architecturally, the SUPI is a key input to the 5G Authentication and Key Agreement (5G AKA) and Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)-AKA' procedures. During initial registration, the User Equipment (UE) generates a SUCI by encrypting the SUPI with the home network's public key, using the Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES). This SUCI is sent to the serving network (e.g., visited network in roaming scenarios). The serving network forwards the SUCI to the home network's Authentication Server Function (AUSF), which, with the help of the Subscription Identifier De-concealing Function (SIDF) in the UDM, decrypts it to retrieve the SUPI. The SUPI is then used to fetch the authentication vector and subscription profile from the UDM.
The SUPI can be in two main formats: an IMSI-based format or a Network Access Identifier (NAI) format. The IMSI-based SUPI follows the structure of an International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI), consisting of a Mobile Country Code (MCC), Mobile Network Code (MNC), and Mobile Subscription Identification Number (MSIN). This ensures backward compatibility with legacy systems. The NAI-based SUPI is used for non-3GPP access (e.g., Wi-Fi) and follows the format username@realm. The SUPI's role extends beyond authentication; it is used in policy control (via the Policy Control Function (PCF)), charging (via the Charging Function (CHF)), and network slice selection (via the Network Slice Selection Function (NSSF)). Its permanent nature ensures consistent identification across sessions and mobility events, forming the backbone of subscription management in 5G.
Purpose & Motivation
The SUPI was introduced in 5G Release 15 to address privacy and security shortcomings of previous subscription identifiers, particularly the IMSI used in 4G LTE. In LTE, the IMSI was sometimes transmitted in clear text during initial attach procedures, making it vulnerable to eavesdropping and tracking attacks. This allowed malicious actors to identify and locate users, compromising privacy. The SUPI, combined with the SUCI mechanism, was designed to provide strong subscriber identity privacy by ensuring the permanent identifier is never exposed over the air.
Another motivation was to create a unified subscription identifier that works seamlessly across different access types (3GPP and non-3GPP) and supports emerging services like network slicing and IoT. The legacy IMSI was primarily designed for cellular access, whereas 5G envisions convergence with fixed and wireless local area networks. The SUPI's flexible formats (IMSI-based and NAI-based) accommodate this convergence, enabling consistent subscription management in heterogeneous networks.
Furthermore, the SUPI supports enhanced security protocols and home-routed traffic models in roaming scenarios. By keeping the SUPI concealed until it reaches the home network, it reduces the trust burden on visited networks and mitigates risks associated with international roaming. This aligns with 5G's design principles of security-by-design and privacy-by-design, addressing regulatory requirements like the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The SUPI thus solves the dual problem of providing a robust, permanent subscription anchor while ensuring user privacy in an increasingly connected and scrutinized digital environment.
What changed in its specifications
The latest release-to-release comparison of specifications that define SUPI. Each summary describes the whole specification, not only this term.
Rel-19 adds clauses 31.1 to 31.7 to TS 23.003 defining identifier and information structures for Ambient IoT devices and areas, plus new normative references. It also adds SNPN support to ProSe identifiers, including an optional NID part in the PLMN ID and a revised temporary identity length.
Full comparison in TS 23.003 →Rel-19 added MPQUIC steering to multi-access PDU sessions, XR and media handling, and an Energy Information Function. It also added Local Offloading Management for edge computing, Vertical Federated Learning for AI/ML, and Ambient IoT text.
Full comparison in TS 23.501 →Technology family
Subscriber and device identifiers · User Equipment
- Phase 1 IMEI, IMSI, MSIN, MSISDN, TMSI
- Phase 2 IMEISV
- R96 TLLI
- R97 P-TMSI
- R98 CTSMSI
- Rel-5 IMPI, IMPU, Temporary Public User Identity
- Rel-8 GUTI, M-TMSI
- Rel-15 5G-GUTI, 5G-S-TMSI, 5G-TMSI, GPSI, NSI, PEI, SUCI, SUPI
- Rel-16 GCI, GLI, Truncated 5G-S-TMSI
- SUPI used together with SUCI
“The UE shall provide a SUCI derived from a SUPI as specified in TS 23.003 [19] and TS 33.501 [29].” TS 23.501
- SUPI builds on IMSI
“in this release of the specification, it may indicate an IMSI, a Network Specific Identifier (NSI), a Global Line Identifier (GLI) or a Global Cable Identifier (GCI)” TS 23.003
Members and relations were proposed independently by several models and kept only where at least two agree; quotes are verified verbatim against the specifications. Release = first approved version of the defining specification.
Release Timeline
Detected Changes Across Releases
verified against 3GPP sourcesDocumented changes in 5 releases, each verified against the text of 3GPP specifications or approved change requests and shown with the exact wording. The release timeline above shows the same releases. A release without an entry has no documented change for this term.
SUPI is specified for the first time in Rel-15: a globally unique permanent subscription identifier allocated per subscriber, provisioned in UDM/UDR, privacy-protected via SUCI, and used in UDM services.
- “A globally unique 5G Subscription Permanent Identifier (SUPI) shall be allocated to each subscriber in the 5G System and provisioned in the UDM/UDR.” TS 23.501 v15.13.0
- “The SUPI is privacy protected over-the-air by using the SUCI which is described in clause 6.12.2.” TS 33.501 v15.20.0
- “Each subscriber in the 5G System shall be allocated one 5G Subscription Permanent Identifier (SUPI) for use within the 3GPP system.” TS 23.501 v15.13.0
In Rel-16 SUPI gained new types and uses: GLI/GCI-based SUPI for wireline 5G-RG/FN-RG, non-IMSI SUPI on USIM, SUPI use for SNPN, and SUPI/GPSI translation by NEF.
- “When the SUPI type is GLI, P0 shall be set to GLI taking format of NAI as defined in clause 28.16.2 of TS 23.003 [19].” TS 33.501 v16.20.0
- SUPI definition for 5G-RG and FN-RG TS 23.003CR0567
- “An SNPN-enabled UE is configured with subscriber identifier (SUPI), credentials for each subscribed SNPN identified by the combination of PLMN ID and NID.” TS 23.501 v16.20.0
In Rel-17 SUPI gained an anonymous SUPI in NAI format for AAA-based authentication, and IMSI-based SUPI plus SUPI format handling for SNPN access with Credentials Holder credentials.
- “The anonymous SUPI shall be a NAI format.” TS 33.501 v17.16.0
- “the SUPI shall also contain identification for the Credentials Holder” TS 23.501 v17.15.0
- “the UDM shall provide the AUSF with the SUPI or anonymous SUPI” TS 33.501 v17.16.0
SUPI handling was extended in Rel-18: SUPI usable for AUN3 devices (NAI-based SUPI, anonymous SUCI), returned in AKMA and UPF responses, and supported for ID translation and GMLC ranging/sidelink positioning.
- “The 5G-RG shall construct a SUCI using null-scheme from the NAI-based SUPI if the NAI-based SUPI is received from the AUN3 device in step 3.” TS 33.501 v18.12.0
- “NOTE: SUPI is only used to retrieve Ranging and Sidelink Positioning Privacy profile by GMLC.” TS 29.503 v18.13.0
- Support for SUPI access in AKMA Application Key information TS 29.535CR0039
In Rel-19 the UDM gains support for multiple SUPI to GPSI conversion, returning lists of SUPIs/GPSIs per identity, and SUPI becomes a mandatory UE identifier in the 29.572 location service.
- Support for Multiple SUPI to GPSI Conversion in UDM TS 29.503CR1305
- “the UDM shall respond with "200 OK" with the message body containing the list of SUPIs/GPSIs that belong to each provided GPSI/SUPI.” TS 29.503 v19.7.0
- Inclusion of SUPI as Mandatory UE Identifier TS 29.572CR0397
Defining Specifications
3GPP specifications that define or reference SUPI, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.
| Specification | Title | Release |
|---|---|---|
| TS 23.003 vk10 | Numbering, Addressing and Identification | Rel-20 read |
| TS 23.501 vk30 | 5G System Architecture | Rel-20 read |
| TS 23.700 vk10 | AI/ML Application Layer Support Phase 2 | Rel-20 read |
| TS 24.501 vk10 | 5GS NAS Protocol Specification | Rel-20 read |
| TS 24.502 vk00 | Non-3GPP Access Network Discovery and Selection | Rel-20 read |
| TS 24.526 vk00 | 5GS UE Policies | Rel-20 read |
| TS 28.204 vi11 | Charging management | Rel-18 read |
| TR 28.840 vi10 | Technical Report | Rel-18 read |
| TS 29.503 vk10 | UDM Service Based Interface | Rel-20 read |
| TS 29.504 vk10 | Nudr Unified Data Repository Services | Rel-20 read |
| TS 29.505 vk00 | UDR Services for Subscription Data | Rel-20 read |
| TS 29.507 vk10 | Access and Mobility Policy Control | Rel-20 read |
| TS 29.508 vk10 | Session Management Event Exposure Service | Rel-20 read |
| TS 29.514 vk10 | Policy Authorization Service | Rel-20 read |
| TS 29.515 vk10 | Ngmlc Location Services API | Rel-20 read |
| TS 29.517 vk10 | AF Event Exposure Service | Rel-20 read |
| TS 29.518 vk10 | AMF Service Based Interface | Rel-20 read |
| TS 29.519 vk10 | 5G UDR Policy and Application Data Services | Rel-20 read |
| TS 29.520 vk10 | 5G NWDAF Services | Rel-20 read |
| TS 29.521 vk10 | Binding Support Management Service | Rel-20 read |
| TS 29.523 vk10 | Policy Control Event Exposure Service | Rel-20 read |
| TS 29.525 vk10 | UE Policy Control Service | Rel-20 read |
| TS 29.541 vk00 | NEF South-Bound Interfaces for NIDD and SMS | Rel-20 read |
| TS 29.550 vk00 | Nsoraf Service Based Interface for SOR-AF | Rel-20 read |
| TS 29.571 vk10 | 5G Common Data Types | Rel-20 read |
| TS 29.591 vk10 | NEF Southbound Services | Rel-20 read |
| TS 29.594 vk00 | 5G Spending Limit Control Service (Nchf) | Rel-20 read |
| TS 29.890 vg00 | CT3 5G System Technical Report | Rel-16 read |
| TS 31.102 vk00 | USIM Application Specification | Rel-20 read |
| TS 32.255 vk30 | 5G Data Connectivity Converged Charging | Rel-20 read |
| TS 32.256 vk10 | 5G Connection and Mobility Charging | Rel-20 read |
| TS 32.291 vk10 | 5G Charging Service-Based Interface | Rel-20 read |
| TS 33.126 vj30 | Lawful Interception Requirements | Rel-19 read |
| TS 33.127 vj80 | Lawful Interception Architecture | Rel-19 read |
| TS 33.501 vk30 | 5G Security Architecture | Rel-20 read |
| TS 33.514 vk20 | UDM Security Assurance Specification | Rel-20 read |
| TR 33.741 vi01 | Home Network Triggered Authentication | Rel-18 read |
| TS 33.749 vj00 | Study on security aspects of edge computing enhancement | Rel-19 read |
| TS 33.835 vg10 | Study on authentication and key management for apps | Rel-16 read |
| TR 33.841 vg10 | Security aspects; Study on 256-bit algorithms for 5G | Rel-16 read |
| TS 33.938 vj30 | 5G Standalone Cryptographic Inventory | Rel-19 read |