Description
The Local interface is defined in 3GPP security specifications (notably TS 33.234 for WLAN interworking and TS 33.259 for UICC hosting) as the communication path between two distinct physical entities within what is logically considered a single user equipment: a Remote Device that provides radio access capabilities (for example, WLAN or cellular connectivity) and a UICC Hosting Device that contains the UICC (SIM/USIM/ISIM). The interface allows the remote device to reach the UICC's security functions, credentials, and applications even though the UICC is not physically embedded in the remote device.
Architecturally, the local interface sits below the application-level protocols that the remote device uses to interact with the UICC. In the UICC hosting model, the remote device and the UICC hosting device are connected over a short-range link (such as Bluetooth or another local bearer), and the local interface carries the commands and responses that would normally traverse the ISO 7816 or USB interface between a terminal and an embedded UICC. The interface therefore must provide integrity and confidentiality protections, since the credentials exchanged over it are security-critical. TS 33.259 specifies the security mechanisms that protect this interface, including authentication between the remote device and the UICC hosting device and protection of the data exchanged.
The local interface is a key enabler of the 'UICC hosting' concept, where a device without an embedded UICC can still use UICC-based authentication by pairing with a nearby device that hosts the UICC. This is particularly relevant for WLAN interworking scenarios (TS 33.234), where a WLAN-capable device needs to authenticate to a 3GPP network using credentials stored on a UICC that resides in a separate device. The interface abstracts the physical separation so that, from the network's perspective, the combination of remote device and UICC hosting device behaves as a single WLAN UE.
Security on the local interface is essential because the link between the two devices is typically wireless and potentially exposed to eavesdropping or man-in-the-middle attacks. The specifications require mutual authentication and establishment of secure channels before UICC commands are exchanged. The interface also supports the notion of a trusted relationship between the two devices, ensuring that only authorized remote devices can access the UICC's services.
In later releases, the terminology was refined to align with the UICC hosting architecture, explicitly naming the two endpoints as the Remote Device and the UICC Hosting Device. This clarification reflects the maturation of the concept from a WLAN-specific description to a more general UICC hosting framework applicable to a broader set of access technologies.
Purpose & Motivation
The Local interface exists to decouple the UICC from the device that uses its credentials. Historically, a UICC (SIM card) had to be physically inserted into the device that needed to authenticate to the network. This constrained device design, prevented sharing of credentials across multiple devices, and made it difficult to support small or sealed devices that could not accommodate a card slot. The UICC hosting concept, enabled by the local interface, allows a UICC to reside in one device while being used by another over a short-range link.
The interface solves the problem of securely extending UICC access beyond a physical card slot. Because the link between the remote device and the UICC hosting device is often wireless, it introduces new attack surfaces that did not exist with a direct electrical connection. The local interface specifications therefore define security mechanisms—mutual authentication, key establishment, and protected channels—that preserve the security properties of an embedded UICC.
The concept was motivated by WLAN interworking (Rel-8), where devices needed to authenticate to 3GPP networks using UICC credentials. Over time, the terminology evolved to a general UICC hosting model, reflecting broader applicability beyond WLAN. The local interface thus provides a standardized, secure foundation for separating the UICC from the terminal while maintaining the trust assumptions of the 3GPP security architecture.
What changed in its specifications
The latest release-to-release comparison of specifications that define Local interface. Each summary describes the whole specification, not only this term.
Rel-7 added authentication and authorization procedures for private network access from WLAN 3GPP IP Access using an External AAA Server. It also added IMS emergency call support in 3GPP-WLAN interworking, including UICC-less cases and authentication changes.
Full comparison in TS 33.234 →Rel-19 brings only minor changes to TS 33.259: 0 clauses changed, with no change attributed to a release feature.
Full comparison in TS 33.259 →Release Timeline
Evolution Across Releases
An overview written from the defining specifications, not a verified change history. For the exact text, open the specifications listed below.
Wording changed: the definition was rephrased to explicitly name the two endpoints, stating that 'the interface between the Remote Device and the UICC Hosting Device is named the local interface.' This generalized the concept beyond the WLAN UE framing and aligned terminology with the UICC hosting architecture.
Defining Specifications
3GPP specifications that define or reference Local interface, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.
| Specification | Title | Release |
|---|---|---|
| TS 33.234 vj00 | 3GPP-WLAN Interworking Security | Rel-19 read |
| TS 33.259 vj00 | Key Establishment between UICC Hosting & Remote Device | Rel-19 read |