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Glossary term · Network Slicing

NSSAA

Network Slice-Specific Authentication and Authorization

Network Slicing →

NSSAA is a 5G security framework that performs slice-specific authentication and authorization, ensuring a user device is explicitly permitted to access a particular network slice beyond general network access.

Introduced
Rel-16
Where
Core Network › 5G Core
Specifications
12 specs
Also in
Management, User Equipment
NSSAA Description Purpose What changed Family Neighbours Detected Changes Specifications

Description

Network Slice-Specific Authentication and Authorization (NSSAA) is a critical security mechanism introduced in 3GPP Release 16 to complement the primary authentication and authorization performed by the Authentication Server Function (AUSF). While primary authentication verifies the UE's identity for the 5G Core Network (5GC) as a whole, NSSAA provides an additional, granular layer of security for individual network slices. This is essential because different slices may have vastly different security requirements, business models, and trust domains. For instance, a slice for massive IoT sensors may have different security postures compared to a slice for ultra-reliable low-latency communication (URLLC) in industrial automation. NSSAA ensures that access to a high-security slice is not granted based solely on credentials valid for a lower-security slice.

The NSSAA procedure is typically triggered after successful primary authentication when a UE requests a network slice that requires slice-specific authentication, as indicated by the Subscribed Network Slice Selection Assistance Information (S-NSSAI). The procedure is orchestrated by the Network Slice-Specific Authentication and Authorization Function (NSSAAF), which acts as an intermediary. The NSSAAF receives an authentication request from the Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) and communicates with external, slice-specific Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) servers. These external AAA servers are considered part of the slice tenant's domain and are responsible for evaluating the UE's credentials against policies specific to that slice. The communication between the NSSAAF and the external AAA server can use protocols like the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), allowing for a wide range of authentication methods (EAP-AKA', EAP-TLS, etc.) as defined by the slice provider.

The architecture involves several 5GC network functions. The AMF is the main point of contact, initiating the procedure upon slice request. The NSSAAF, a dedicated logical function, can be deployed as a standalone Network Function (NF) or co-located with another NF like the AUSF. It interfaces with the external AAA server via the N33 reference point. The Unified Data Management (UDM) may store indications of which S-NSSAIs require NSSAA for a given subscriber. The procedure's result (success, failure, or on-going) is conveyed back to the AMF, which then allows or denies the UE's registration for the requested slice. A key aspect is that NSSAA can run in parallel for multiple slices, and its failure for one slice does not necessarily impact the UE's registration for other, already authorized slices. This provides flexibility and maintains service continuity where possible.

Purpose & Motivation

NSSAA was created to address the security and business model challenges inherent in network slicing. Prior to its introduction in Release 16, network slice access control was primarily based on subscription data stored in the UDM, which could indicate whether a subscriber was allowed to use a slice. However, this was a simple binary check and did not support dynamic, real-time authentication and authorization decisions that might involve external credentials or tenant-specific policies. This limitation was a significant barrier for enterprises and vertical industries wishing to operate their own slices with their own identity management systems.

The primary problem NSSAA solves is the need for enhanced security isolation between slices. In a shared physical infrastructure, it is paramount to ensure that a compromise or weak authentication in one slice does not become a vector to access a more sensitive slice. By delegating the final authorization decision to an external AAA server controlled by the slice tenant, NSSAA enables strong, domain-specific authentication. This is crucial for business models where a Mobile Network Operator (MNO) provides network-as-a-service to third-party enterprises. The enterprise can retain control over which of its devices or users are allowed onto its dedicated slice, using its existing corporate credentials and security policies, without the MNO needing to manage those identities directly. This separation of concerns facilitates the commercialization of network slicing.

What changed in its specifications

The latest release-to-release comparison of specifications that define NSSAA. Each summary describes the whole specification, not only this term.

TS 23.501Rel-18 → Rel-19

Rel-19 added MPQUIC steering to multi-access PDU sessions, XR and media handling, and an Energy Information Function. It also added Local Offloading Management for edge computing, Vertical Federated Learning for AI/ML, and Ambient IoT text.

Full comparison in TS 23.501 →
TS 24.501Rel-18 → Rel-19

Rel-19 adds satellite NG-RAN access text, LP-WUS/WUR assistance and disabling, ATUC RAT utilization control, and network-controlled slice selection with S-NSSAI time validity to TS 24.501. It also adds ATSSS Phase 4 multi-access and 5G ProSe multi-hop relay support.

Full comparison in TS 24.501 →

Technology family

Network slicing · Core Network › 5G Core

  1. Rel-15 Network Slice, Network Slice Instance (NSI), Network Slice Subnet, Network Slice Subnet Instance (NSSI), NSI ID, NSSAI, NSSF, S-NSSAI
  2. Rel-16 ENSI, GST, NSSAA, NSSAAF
  3. Rel-17 NSAC, NSACF, NSAG, NSSRG
  4. Rel-18 Alternative S-NSSAI

Also in this family (introduction release not pinned to a single defining specification): Service Profile, Slice Profile

Members and relations were proposed independently by several models and kept only where at least two agree; quotes are verified verbatim against the specifications. Release = first approved version of the defining specification.

Release Timeline

Detected Changes Across Releases

verified against 3GPP sources

Documented changes in 5 releases, each verified against the text of 3GPP specifications or approved change requests and shown with the exact wording. The release timeline above shows the same releases. A release without an entry has no documented change for this term.

Rel-16 introduced

Rel-16 defines NSSAA for the first time: the NSSAAF, the Nnssaaf_NSSAA service, AMF-triggered slice-specific authentication, Pending NSSAI handling and the rejected NSSAI for failed or revoked NSSAA.

  • “The Nnssaaf_NSSAA service provides slice-specific authentication and authorization for a given UE.” TS 29.526 v16.8.0
  • “the AMF shall initiate the Network Slice-Specific Authentication and Authorization procedure as described in clause 5.15.10 for each S-NSSAI that requires it” TS 23.501 v16.20.0
  • “A set of S-NSSAI(s) which is sent by the AMF with the rejection cause” TS 24.501 v16.15.0
Rel-17 1 CR

Rel-17 changes NSSAA behaviour: remote credential provisioning for NSSAA, allowed NSSAI handling when NSSAA fails, new rejection cause for failed or revoked NSSAA, and NSSAA with two AMFs.

  • “If the Network Slice-Specific Authentication and Authorization fails for all S-NSSAIs mapped to all S-NSSAIs in the Allowed NSSAI, the AMF determines a new Allowed NSSAI including default S-NSSAI(s).” TS 23.501 v17.15.0
  • “The UE may support remote provisioning of credentials for NSSAA, specified in clause 5.39.” TS 23.501 v17.15.0
  • NSSAA procedures for the UE when it is served by two different AMFs TS 23.502CR2738
Rel-18 1 CR

In Rel-18 NSSAA behaviour was extended: the AMF performs NSSAA for alternative S-NSSAIs before network slice replacement, and NSSAA results now feed partially allowed NSSAI handling and rejected NSSAI storage across equivalent PLMNs.

  • “The AMF shall perform NSSAA procedure for such alternative S-NSSAI and perform network slice replacement as specified above after the NSSAA procedure for the alternative S-NSSAI is completed as success.” TS 24.501 v18.14.0
  • “the AMF shall continue with the NSSAA procedure unaffected by the Network Slice Replacement and the AMF executes the Network Slice Replacement after the NSSAA procedure is completed.” TS 23.501 v18.12.0
  • The AMF sends the partially allowed NSSAI to the UE after NSSAA TS 24.501CR5433
Rel-19 1 CR

TS 24.501 now lets the UE perform a service request for emergency services fallback while the network is performing NSSAA, and the rejected NSSAI for failed or revoked NSSAA handling now uses mapped S-NSSAIs.

  • Performing service request for emergency services fallback when the network is performing NSSAA TS 24.501CR6397
  • “the rejected NSSAI is different from the rejected NSSAI for the failed or revoked NSSAA, the UE shall locally set the mapped S-NSSAI(s)” TS 24.501 v19.8.0
Rel-20 specification text

Rel-20 extends NSSAA to EPC: the UE signals NSSAA-EPC capability, the SMF+PGW-C runs EAP-based NSSAA via PCO, and the Nnssaaf_NSSAA service now also serves the SMF+PGW-C.

  • “Network Slice Specific Authentication and Authorization (NSSAA) by a AAA Server for a network slice over 3GPP access to EPC, is supported based on following principles:” TS 23.502 v20.3.0
  • “If the UE supports NSSAA over EPC, the UE shall set the NSSAA-EPC bit to "NSSAA over EPC supported"” TS 24.501 v20.1.0
  • “This service operation also permits the NF Service Consumer (i.e. the SMF+PGW-C) to initiate slice-specific authentication and authorization in EPC” TS 29.526 v20.1.0

Defining Specifications

3GPP specifications that define or reference NSSAA, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.

SpecificationTitleRelease
TS 23.501 vk30 5G System Architecture Rel-20 read
TS 24.501 vk10 5GS NAS Protocol Specification Rel-20 read
TS 28.204 vi11 Charging management Rel-18 read
TS 29.518 vk10 AMF Service Based Interface Rel-20 read
TS 29.526 vk10 Nnssaaf Service Interface Rel-20 read
TS 29.571 vk10 5G Common Data Types Rel-20 read
TS 31.105 vj20 Slice Subscriber Identity Module (SSIM) Application Rel-19 read
TR 31.826 vi00 Technical Report Rel-18 read
TS 32.291 vk10 5G Charging Service-Based Interface Rel-20 read
TR 32.847 vi00 Technical Report Rel-18 read
TS 33.501 vk30 5G Security Architecture Rel-20 read
TS 33.700 3GPP TR 33.700 Rel-16 read