Description
The PIN Element (PINE) is a functional entity defined within the 5G system architecture to handle PIN-related operations. It acts as a secure repository and processing unit for PIN credentials associated with a User Equipment (UE) or a Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM). The PINE interfaces with other network functions, such as the Authentication Server Function (AUSF) and the Unified Data Management (UDM), to facilitate PIN verification during authentication procedures or for authorizing specific services that mandate an additional layer of user verification beyond standard network authentication.
Architecturally, PINE is specified to support various PIN types, including the traditional PIN for USIM access and potentially new PIN usages for application or service locks within the 5G ecosystem. Its operation involves secure protocols to transmit PIN verification requests and responses, ensuring that PIN data is protected against eavesdropping and tampering. The specifications detail procedures for PIN enablement, disablement, change, and unblock, integrating these lifecycle management functions into the broader 5G security framework.
The role of PINE is to decouple PIN management logic from the core authentication functions, allowing for more flexible and robust security implementations. By standardizing this element, 3GPP ensures interoperability between different network equipment vendors and UE manufacturers. It supports scenarios where a user must verify their identity via a PIN to access sensitive network services or to perform critical operations, thereby adding a user-centric security layer that complements the network-centric authentication provided by 5G-AKA or EAP-AKA'.
Purpose & Motivation
PINE was created to address the need for a standardized, network-based PIN management framework in 5G. Prior to Release 18, PIN handling was largely confined to the UE and USIM, with limited network involvement for services requiring PIN verification. This lack of standardization made it difficult to implement consistent, secure PIN-based service authorization across multi-vendor networks and for emerging 5G services like secure IoT device management or parental controls.
The motivation stems from the evolution of 5G services, which increasingly require granular user consent and verification. For instance, a parent might want to lock certain data services on a child's device with a PIN, or an enterprise might require PIN verification before a device can access corporate network slices. PINE provides the architectural hooks in the core network to support such use cases securely and reliably. It solves the problem of fragmented, proprietary implementations by defining clear interfaces and procedures within the 5G core, as outlined in specifications like 23.501 and 33.127.
Historically, PINs were primarily a USIM/UICC feature for device unlocking. PINE extends this concept into the network domain, enabling service providers to offer enhanced security features. It addresses limitations where the network had no standardized way to verify a user-known secret for authorizing service-level actions, thus bridging a gap between user authentication and service authorization in the 5G security model.
Classification
Release Timeline
Detected Changes Across Releases
from 3GPP Change RequestsSpecific changes extracted from the „Change history“ tables of 3GPP specifications (12 CRs across 3 releases). Complements the general historical overview above with the evidence-based evolution of this function.
In Release 18, enhancements to the PIN Element (PINE) function introduced corrections and clarifications to several key procedures, including PINE registration, update, and removal interactions with the PIN server. The release also specified the role of the PEMC in representing a PINE for registration and defined mechanisms for PEGC authorization failure handling and proper route selection for PINE join and leave requests. Furthermore, it detailed PINE communication via the 5GS and a PEGC, and added missing information elements to the PINE join request/response flow.
- Add missing information elements to information flow of PINE join into PIN request/response TS 23.542CR0001
- Correction of PINE remove request TS 23.542CR0010
- Correction of PINE update for port number TS 23.542CR0011
- Correction of PINE update registration to PIN server TS 23.542CR0012
- PEGC authorization failure and select proper route for PINE join/leave request TS 23.542CR0013
- PEMC represents the PINE to register TS 23.542CR0014
+ 4 more changes
In Release 19, the new functionality for the PIN Element (PINE) is the introduction of a PIN element discovery procedure. This addition provides a mechanism for devices within a Personal IoT Network (PIN) to discover each other, which is a foundational step for establishing the various communication paths—such as PIN internal communication or connections via a PEGC—defined in the architecture.
- PIN element discovery TS 23.542CR0061
In Release 20, the PINE (PIN Element) function was updated to enhance its profile visibility for discovery by other PINEs within the same PIN. This change specifically improves the mechanisms for PINEs to identify and interact with each other, facilitating the formation and management of the Personal IoT Network. The update supports the underlying architecture where PINEs, PEGCs, and PEMCs communicate for both data and management traffic.
- Update PINE profile visibility for discovery by other PINE TS 23.542CR0067
Explore further
Broader topics and technologies where PINE plays a role.
Defining Specifications
3GPP specifications that define or reference PINE, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.
| Specification | Title | Release |
|---|---|---|
| TS 23.501 vk00 | 5G System Architecture Stage 2 | Rel-20 |
| TS 23.542 vk10 | Application layer support for Personal IoT Network | Rel-20 |
| TS 23.700 vk00 | XR Services Application Enablement Layer | Rel-20 |
| TS 24.501 vj50 | 5G NAS Protocols Specification | Rel-19 |
| TS 24.583 vj00 | Application Layer Support for Personal IoT Network | Rel-19 |
| TS 33.127 vj50 | Lawful Interception Architecture and Functions | Rel-19 |
| TR 33.882 vi01 | Technical Report on 5G Security for Personal IoT Networks | Rel-18 |