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Glossary term · Security

ASME

Access Security Management Entity

Security →

ASME is the logical function in 3GPP networks responsible for managing security keys for user equipment during authentication and for deriving the access-specific keys used to secure communications.

Introduced
Rel-8
Where
Security
Specifications
3 specs
ASME Description Purpose What changed Family Neighbours Detected Changes Specifications

Description

The Access Security Management Entity (ASME) is a pivotal logical security function defined within the 3GPP architecture, primarily specified in the 3GPP TS 33.401 series for the Evolved Packet System (EPS) and carried forward into 5G systems. It is not a standalone physical node but a functional role that can be implemented within a network entity. In LTE/EPC, this role is performed by the Mobility Management Entity (MME). In 5G Core (5GC), the corresponding function is integrated into the Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF). The ASME's core operation begins when a User Equipment (UE) attempts to attach to the network. The serving network's entity (MME or AMF), acting as the ASME, requests authentication vectors from the home network's Authentication Centre (AuC) via the Home Subscriber Server (HSS) in EPS or the Authentication Server Function (AUSF) and Unified Data Management (UDM) in 5GS. These vectors contain cryptographic keys and parameters, including the master session key (K_ASME in EPS, derived from CK/IK; or KAUSF in 5GS, derived from CK'/IK').

Upon receiving these authentication vectors, the ASME performs a crucial key derivation and management function. It uses the received master key to derive a hierarchy of subsequent keys specific to the access network. For example, in EPS, the ASME (MME) derives the K_eNB key from K_ASME. This K_eNB is then provided to the evolved NodeB (eNB) to secure the radio interface. The ASME ensures that the home network's long-term key material is never exposed outside the home domain; only derived, access-specific keys are shared with the serving network's radio access node. This architecture enforces key separation, meaning keys used in one access network (e.g., LTE) cannot be directly reused in another (e.g., 5G NR or non-3GPP access), enhancing overall system security.

The ASME's responsibilities extend beyond initial key derivation. It manages the key hierarchy during mobility events, such as handovers. When a UE moves between base stations, the ASME may trigger key derivation for new base stations (e.g., deriving a new K_eNB* for a target eNB in LTE handovers) based on existing keys and fresh parameters to maintain forward and backward security. Furthermore, the ASME handles security context management, storing the security context associated with a UE during its attached session. This context includes the master key (K_ASME), key set identifiers, and the associated security algorithms. If the security context needs to be established for a non-3GPP access (like trusted WLAN), the ASME also plays a role in facilitating the transfer of the necessary keying material to the appropriate network functions (e.g., the Trusted WLAN Access Gateway in EPS).

In 5G, the principles of the ASME function are preserved but enhanced within the service-based architecture. The AMF, acting as the ASME, interacts with the AUSF/UDM for primary authentication and receives the anchor key (KAUSF). The AMF then derives the subsequent key, K_AMF, which serves a similar role to K_ASME. From K_AMF, keys for the access network (K_gNB) and for NAS signaling protection are derived. The 5G system introduces enhanced key separation, explicitly separating keys for different network slices and service types. The ASME function, embodied by the AMF, is central to enforcing these separation policies, ensuring that the security of one slice does not compromise another. Its operation is fundamental to the 3GPP security architecture, providing a secure bridge between the home network's trust anchor and the volatile access network environment.

Purpose & Motivation

The ASME was introduced in 3GPP Release 8 with the Evolved Packet System (LTE/EPC) to address critical security shortcomings in previous 3GPP architectures and to establish a robust, scalable security framework for all-IP networks. In pre-Release 8 systems like UMTS, security key management was more tightly coupled between the core network and the radio network controller (RNC). The move to a flatter architecture in LTE, with the eNB directly handling radio security, created a new threat model: the eNB resides in a potentially less trusted domain (the access network) compared to the core. The primary purpose of the ASME is to resolve this trust issue by acting as a security mediator. It ensures that the long-term subscriber key, stored only in the home network, is never shared with the access network nodes. Instead, the ASME derives short-term, access-specific keys, limiting the impact of a potential compromise in the radio access network.

Another key problem the ASME solves is enabling secure mobility and interoperability across heterogeneous access networks. As networks evolved to include non-3GPP access (like WiFi) and later 5G New Radio, a mechanism was needed to provide consistent authentication and key agreement while maintaining key separation between different access technologies. The ASME provides this centralized key management point. It receives a single set of credentials from the home network and is responsible for deriving the appropriate keys for whatever access technology the UE is using, whether it's LTE, 5G NR, or a trusted WLAN. This design future-proofs the security architecture, allowing new access types to be integrated without redesigning the fundamental authentication process with the home network.

Furthermore, the ASME facilitates improved network efficiency and security context management. By centralizing the derivation and distribution of access keys, it simplifies handover procedures. During handovers, the ASME can efficiently compute new keys for the target cell without needing to re-authenticate with the home network, reducing latency and signaling load. The creation of the K_ASME (or K_AMF in 5G) as a middle-tier key in the hierarchy also allows for independent re-keying and cryptographic algorithm updates on the access link without affecting the core link to the home network. This layered approach to key management, orchestrated by the ASME, is a foundational concept that enables the advanced security features required for modern mobile broadband, massive IoT, and network slicing in 5G and beyond.

What changed in its specifications

The latest release-to-release comparison of specifications that define ASME. Each summary describes the whole specification, not only this term.

TS 31.102Rel-18 → Rel-19

Rel-19 adds sidelink multi-hop relay EFs, lower selection-priority PLMN EFs, 5G ProSe EFs, and MINT-EPS definitions for disaster conditions.

Full comparison in TS 31.102 →
TS 31.121Rel-18 → Rel-19

Rel-19 added harmonized test definitions for FDN, charging, PLMN selection, CSG; RedCap access control tests across EPS, NB-IoT, 5G NR; slice selection conformance clauses; SOR-CMCI test clauses for PDU release; and PLMN selection priority test changes.

Full comparison in TS 31.121 →

Technology family

Security functions and anchors · Security

  1. Phase 1 AuC
  2. R99 HLR/AuC
  3. Rel-5 HSS
  4. Rel-6 3GPP AAA Server, BSF
  5. Rel-8 ASME, MME
  6. Rel-9 HSS-FE
  7. Rel-15 AMF, ARPF, AUSF, SEAF, SEPP, SIDF
  8. Rel-16 AAnF

Members and relations were proposed independently by several models and kept only where at least two agree; quotes are verified verbatim against the specifications. Release = first approved version of the defining specification.

Release Timeline

Detected Changes Across Releases

verified against 3GPP sources

Documented changes in 4 releases, each verified against the text of 3GPP specifications or approved change requests and shown with the exact wording. The release timeline above shows the same releases. A release without an entry has no documented change for this term.

Rel-8 introduced

TS 33.401 first defines the ASME as the entity receiving top-level keys from the HSS, with the MME assuming that role for E-UTRAN, and specifies KASME sharing and derivation.

  • “Access Security Management Entity: entity which receives the top-level keys in an access network from the HSS.” TS 33.401 v8.8.0
  • “an intermediate key KASME shall be shared between UE and MME i.e. the ASME for EPS.” TS 33.401 v8.8.0
Rel-10 specification text

The MME must derive the NAS keys from K'ASME using the selected algorithm types and IDs as input to the NAS key derivation functions (Annex A.7) before sending the S1 HO Request.

  • “MME shall derive the NAS keys from K'ASME using the algorithm types and algorithm IDs as input to the NAS key derivation functions(see Annex A.7)” TS 33.401 v10.7.0
Rel-11 specification text

Mapped K'ASME handling in idle/active mobility changed: UE and MME derive KeNB and NAS keys from K'ASME with specified NAS COUNT start values, and CS-to-PS handover derivation was added.

  • “The MME shall derive KeNB by applying the KDF as defined in Annex A. 3 using the mapped key K'ASME and 232-1” TS 33.401 v11.9.0
  • “The MME shall create a mapped EPS security context by setting the K'ASME of the mapped EPS security context equal to the concatenation CK'PS || IK'PS” TS 33.401 v11.9.0
  • “The UE shall derive K'ASME, associate it with KSISGSN and derive KeNB in the same way the MME did in step 2” TS 33.401 v11.9.0
Rel-15 specification text

The UE's NAS Security Mode Command verification (using the KASME-based NAS integrity key) was changed so that missing UE NR security capabilities are not treated as a security capability mismatch.

  • “If the UE NR security capabilities are not included, the UE shall not consider this a mismatch of security capabilities.” TS 33.401 v15.12.0

Defining Specifications

3GPP specifications that define or reference ASME, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.

SpecificationTitleRelease
TS 31.102 vk00 USIM Application Specification Rel-20 read
TS 31.121 vj00 UICC Application Test Specification Rel-19 read
TS 33.401 vj20 EPS Security Architecture Rel-19 read