Description
128-EEA1 is a 128-bit EPS Encryption Algorithm 1 standardized in 3GPP Rel-8 for LTE Evolved Packet System security. It provides confidentiality for NAS and AS traffic by using the SNOW 3G stream cipher. The algorithm is specified in TS 33.401 and is used together with EPS key hierarchy, NAS security mode procedures, RRC security mode procedures, and PDCP ciphering. Its main purpose is to prevent passive eavesdroppers from reading subscriber data or signaling payloads while they traverse the radio interface.
The operation of 128-EEA1 is based on keystream generation. The UE and network share a 128-bit cipher key, such as K_NASenc for NAS traffic or K_UPenc/K_RRCenc for AS traffic. SNOW 3G initializes a finite-state machine and a linear feedback shift register using the key and security parameters. The parameters include a COUNT value, a bearer identifier, a direction bit, and a length indicator. These inputs make the keystream unique for each packet, bearer, direction, and time instance. The generated keystream is XORed with plaintext to produce ciphertext, and the receiver performs the same XOR operation to recover plaintext.
In the EPS architecture, 128-EEA1 is applied after authentication and key agreement. The MME derives K_ASME from the authentication vector, then derives K_NASenc and K_NASint. The eNB derives K_eNB from K_ASME and cell-specific information, then derives K_RRCenc, K_RRCint, and K_UPenc. NAS encryption protects attach, detach, tracking area update, and other NAS messages. AS encryption protects RRC messages and user-plane packets delivered through PDCP. The security context is transferred or re-derived during handover so that encryption can continue without re-authentication.
PDCP and NAS maintain COUNT values to prevent keystream reuse. In PDCP, COUNT is derived from the PDCP sequence number and hyperframe number, and it is bound to the radio bearer and direction. In NAS, a 32-bit NAS COUNT is used with the NAS key. The bearer and direction fields ensure that the same key does not generate the same keystream for uplink and downlink or for different bearers. This binding is important because stream cipher security depends on never reusing the same key and initial state for different plaintext blocks.
SNOW 3G was selected because it offers strong cryptographic properties and efficient implementation. It operates on 32-bit words and can produce 128-bit blocks of keystream per iteration, which suits hardware accelerators and software stacks in mobile devices. Compared with earlier mobile encryption mechanisms, it provides a larger key and a more modern cipher construction. 128-EEA1 does not provide integrity protection; therefore, it is typically paired with an EPS integrity algorithm such as 128-EIA1. Encryption alone protects confidentiality but cannot prove that a message was not altered.
For engineers, 128-EEA1 is a configuration and debugging element in LTE security. The UE and network must agree on the selected algorithm during Security Mode Command, derive the correct keys, and synchronize COUNT values. Misconfigured bearer identifiers, direction bits, or sequence numbers can cause decryption failures or security warnings. Proper use of 128-EEA1 gives LTE networks a robust confidentiality mechanism for user data and control signaling while preserving interoperability across vendors and radio access technologies.
Purpose & Motivation
128-EEA1 exists because mobile networks need strong confidentiality for user data and control signaling over the radio interface. Earlier generations used encryption mechanisms that were either too weak, too complex, or poorly suited to modern packet-based networks. LTE introduced the EPS security architecture with clear key separation, NAS and AS protection, and modern algorithms. 128-EEA1 provides a SNOW 3G-based option that protects subscriber privacy while enabling efficient implementation in handsets and base stations.
The algorithm addresses the limitations of relying only on authentication or integrity. Authentication proves identity, and integrity detects tampering, but neither hides the content of messages. Without encryption, an attacker could observe attach parameters, user-plane packets, or RRC reconfiguration messages. 128-EEA1 solves this by generating a freshness-bound keystream that prevents passive eavesdropping. It also reduces the risk of keystream reuse by binding encryption to COUNT, bearer, and direction.
Its creation was motivated by the need for a robust, implementable cipher that could coexist with AES-based algorithms in 3GPP security. By specifying a 128-bit key and a stream cipher construction, 3GPP provided a strong confidentiality mechanism for LTE while maintaining compatibility with existing hardware and software practices.
What changed in its specifications
The latest release-to-release comparison of specifications that define 128-EEA1. Each summary describes the whole specification, not only this term.
Rel-19 adds security annex clauses for Store and Forward Satellite operation to TS 33.401. It also adds definitions for feeder link, service link, Store and Forward Satellite operation, and IOPS-enabled UE.
Full comparison in TS 33.401 →Technology family
Ciphering and integrity algorithms · Security
- Phase 1 A5/1, A5/2, A8
- R97 GEA
- R98 B1, B2
- R99 A5/3, GEA3, KASUMI, UEA1, UIA1
- Rel-7 SNOW 3G, UEA2, UIA2
- Rel-8 128-EEA1, 128-EEA2, 128-EIA1, 128-EIA2, EEA0, EIA0
- Rel-9 A5/4, GEA4
- Rel-11 128-EEA3, 128-EIA3, ZUC
- Rel-13 GEA5, GIA4, GIA5
- Rel-15 128-NEA1, 128-NEA2, 128-NEA3, 128-NIA1, 128-NIA2, 128-NIA3, NEA0, NIA0
- 128-EEA1 reused as 128-NEA1
“128-NEA1 is based on SNOW 3G (see TS 35.215 [14]).” TS 33.501
- 128-EEA1 reuses UEA2
“128-EEA1 is based on SNOW 3G and is identical to UEA2 as specified in [14].” TS 33.401
- 128-EEA1 builds on SNOW 3G
“"00012" 128-EEA1 SNOW 3G based algorithm” TS 33.401
- 128-EEA1 used together with 128-EIA1 (not stated verbatim in the specifications)
Members and relations were proposed independently by several models and kept only where at least two agree; quotes are verified verbatim against the specifications. Release = first approved version of the defining specification.
Release Timeline
Detected Changes Across Releases
verified against 3GPP sourcesDocumented changes in 2 releases, each verified against the text of 3GPP specifications or approved change requests and shown with the exact wording. The release timeline above shows the same releases. A release without an entry has no documented change for this term.
128-EEA1 is first specified in TS 33.401 as a SNOW 3G based EPS encryption algorithm, mandatory in UEs, eNBs and MMEs for RRC, UP and NAS ciphering.
- “128-EEA1 is based on SNOW 3G and is identical to UEA2 as specified in [14].” TS 33.401 v8.8.0
- “UEs and eNBs shall implement EEA0, 128-EEA1 and 128-EEA2 for both RRC signalling ciphering and UP ciphering.” TS 33.401 v8.8.0
- “UEs and MMEs shall implement EEA0, 128-EEA1 and 128-EEA2 for NAS signalling ciphering.” TS 33.401 v8.8.0
For dual connectivity with an SgNB, 128-EEA1 support is now mapped to 128-NEA1 support, so the UE must support 128-NEA1 whenever it supports 128-EEA1.
- “the UE shall have the same support for 128-NEA1 as 128-EEA1, 128-NEA2 as 128-EEA2” TS 33.401 v15.12.0
- “128- NEA1 (which is the same as 128-EEA1) for both RRC and UP confidentiality.” TS 33.401 v15.12.0
Defining Specifications
3GPP specifications that define or reference 128-EEA1, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.
| Specification | Title | Release |
|---|---|---|
| TS 33.401 vj20 | EPS Security Architecture | Rel-19 read |