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Glossary term · Security

EIA0

EPS Integrity Algorithm 0

Security →

EIA0 is the null integrity protection algorithm for the EPS that provides no authentication or verification, transmitting messages without an integrity checksum.

Introduced
Rel-8
Where
Security
Specifications
1 specs
EIA0 Description Purpose What changed Family Neighbours Detected Changes Specifications

Description

EPS Integrity Algorithm 0 (EIA0) is a defined security algorithm within the 3GPP Evolved Packet System (EPS) for LTE networks, specifically for the protection of control plane signaling. It represents the intentional choice of 'no integrity protection' for Radio Resource Control (RRC) signaling messages exchanged between the User Equipment (UE) and the eNodeB. During the Security Mode Command procedure in the Access Stratum (AS), the network indicates the selected integrity algorithm from a negotiated list. EIA0 is mandated to be supported by all compliant UEs and network elements. When activated, the integrity protection function within the PDCP layer is disabled; RRC messages are sent without the generation or verification of a Message Authentication Code (MAC-I).

Architecturally, EIA0 operates within the PDCP layer's integrity protection framework for signaling radio bearers (SRBs). Upon receiving a security configuration command specifying EIA0, the PDCP entity's integrity algorithm generates a null MAC-I. In practice, this means the integrity protection calculation returns a fixed, predictable value (often zero or a predefined constant) that is appended to the message, or the field is omitted as per the protocol specification. The receiving entity performs the corresponding null verification, accepting any message as valid from an integrity perspective. This process does not utilize the integrity key (derived from the Kasme) to generate a cryptographically secure checksum, offering no protection against message forgery or replay attacks.

The role of EIA0 is to provide operational flexibility and a guaranteed fallback. Its primary function is to allow RRC connection establishment and maintenance in scenarios where integrity protection is not feasible or desired. This includes initial network attach before security contexts are fully established, certain emergency service scenarios, or cases mandated by local regulations for monitoring purposes. However, using EIA0 leaves the control plane highly vulnerable. Without integrity protection, an attacker could forge or modify RRC commands, potentially leading to denial of service, redirection attacks, or unauthorized configuration changes. Consequently, its use is strictly limited by network security policies, and for normal operation, strong algorithms like 128-EIA1 (SNOW 3G) or 128-EIA2 (AES) are mandatory to protect the signaling plane.

Purpose & Motivation

EIA0 was standardized to address the need for flexibility and guaranteed interoperability in control plane security. During the development of LTE security in Release 8, designers acknowledged that while integrity protection for signaling is paramount, there must be a standardized method to disable it for legitimate operational, testing, and regulatory reasons. A null integrity algorithm ensures that a UE can always complete the RRC connection procedure with a network, even if there is a catastrophic failure in the security capability negotiation for the stronger algorithms.

It solves several practical problems. First, it allows for network debugging and protocol analysis where observing unaltered RRC messages is necessary. Second, in some jurisdictions, lawful interception or government monitoring requirements may necessitate access to plaintext signaling, which integrity protection would obstruct. Third, it provides a safe fallback during the early stages of network deployment or during roaming scenarios where visited and home networks might have misaligned security policies. Having a defined EIA0 is safer than relying on vendors or operators to implement non-standard, and potentially insecure, methods to bypass integrity.

Historically, UIA0 served a similar purpose in 3G UMTS. The creation of EIA0 for EPS continued this design pattern, ensuring consistency across generations. Its existence underscores a key principle in secure system design: security features must be manageable and sometimes disablable in a controlled, documented manner to handle edge cases and ensure overall network reliability. However, its specification includes strong warnings and recommendations against its use in normal operational scenarios to prevent undermining the overall security architecture of LTE.

What changed in its specifications

The latest release-to-release comparison of specifications that define EIA0. Each summary describes the whole specification, not only this term.

TS 33.401Rel-18 → Rel-19

Rel-19 adds security annex clauses for Store and Forward Satellite operation to TS 33.401. It also adds definitions for feeder link, service link, Store and Forward Satellite operation, and IOPS-enabled UE.

Full comparison in TS 33.401 →

Technology family

Ciphering and integrity algorithms · Security

  1. Phase 1 A5/1, A5/2, A8
  2. R97 GEA
  3. R98 B1, B2
  4. R99 A5/3, GEA3, KASUMI, UEA1, UIA1
  5. Rel-7 SNOW 3G, UEA2, UIA2
  6. Rel-8 128-EEA1, 128-EEA2, 128-EIA1, 128-EIA2, EEA0, EIA0
  7. Rel-9 A5/4, GEA4
  8. Rel-11 128-EEA3, 128-EIA3, ZUC
  9. Rel-13 GEA5, GIA4, GIA5
  10. Rel-15 128-NEA1, 128-NEA2, 128-NEA3, 128-NIA1, 128-NIA2, 128-NIA3, NEA0, NIA0
  • EIA0 reused as NIA0
    “The UE and SgNB shall not use NIA0 (which is the same as EIA0) between the UE and SgNB.” TS 33.401

Members and relations were proposed independently by several models and kept only where at least two agree; quotes are verified verbatim against the specifications. Release = first approved version of the defining specification.

Release Timeline

Detected Changes Across Releases

verified against 3GPP sources

Documented changes in 6 releases, each verified against the text of 3GPP specifications or approved change requests and shown with the exact wording. The release timeline above shows the same releases. A release without an entry has no documented change for this term.

Rel-8 introduced

Introduced in Rel-8 (release dating of the term; no individual change cited).

Rel-9 specification text

EIA0 is defined for the first time as the null integrity algorithm, to be used only for unauthenticated emergency calls in limited service mode, with optional implementation in MMEs and eNBs.

  • “This shall be accomplished by the network by selecting EIA0 for integrity protection of NAS and RRC. EIA0 shall only be used for unauthenticated emergency calls.” TS 33.401 v9.9.0
  • “"00002" EIA0 Null Integrity Protection algorithm” TS 33.401 v9.9.0
  • “Implementation of EIA0 in MMEs and eNBs is optional” TS 33.401 v9.9.0
Rel-10 specification text

Rel-10 adds requirements that UEs implement EIA0 for NAS and RRC integrity protection, restrict it to unauthenticated emergency calls, and forbid it between RN and DeNB.

  • “EIA0 is only allowed for unauthenticated emergency calls. EIA0 shall not be used for integrity protection between RN and DeNB.” TS 33.401 v10.7.0
Rel-12 specification text

The EIA0 implementation requirement was extended to relay nodes: EIA0 is optional in MMEs, RNs and eNBs and must be disabled where unauthenticated emergency calling is not a regulatory requirement.

  • “Implementation of EIA0 in MMEs, RNs and eNBs is optional, EIA0, if implemented, shall be disabled in MMEs, RNs and eNBs” TS 33.401 v12.16.0
  • “Clarification on implementation requirement of EIA0 in RN” TS 33.401 v12.16.0
Rel-15 specification text

A requirement was added that the UE and SgNB must not use the null integrity algorithm NIA0 (same as EIA0) on the UE-SgNB link.

  • “The UE and SgNB shall not use NIA0 (which is the same as EIA0) between the UE and SgNB.” TS 33.401 v15.12.0
Rel-16 specification text

EIA0 and EEA0 are specified for NAS and AS protection of unauthenticated UEs establishing RLOS (Restricted Local Operator Services) bearers in limited service mode, with MME configuration and UE acceptance rules.

  • “the MME shall for the NAS protocol use EIA0 and EEA0 as the integrity and ciphering algorithm respectively.” TS 33.401 v16.4.0
  • “the UE may accept the use of EIA0 for NAS and RRC signalling protection.” TS 33.401 v16.4.0

Defining Specifications

3GPP specifications that define or reference EIA0, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.

SpecificationTitleRelease
TS 33.401 vj20 EPS Security Architecture Rel-19 read