Description
UIA2, or UMTS Integrity Algorithm 2, is a 3GPP integrity protection algorithm for UMTS networks. It is specified in TS 33.102 and TS 35.215 and was introduced in Release 7. UIA2 provides data origin authentication and integrity protection for signaling messages between the user equipment and the network. It is based on AES-CMAC, which is the Cipher-based Message Authentication Code construction using the Advanced Encryption Standard. UIA2 is used after authentication and key agreement, when the UE and network have established a shared security context containing an integrity key, usually called IK. The network may select UIA2 during security mode procedures if the UE reports support for it and the operator policy permits AES-based integrity protection. UIA2 does not provide confidentiality; ciphering algorithms such as UEA2 are used to hide message content.
Technically, UIA2 computes a MAC over a message using AES-CMAC with the integrity key IK. The message input is not only the raw signaling payload; it is constructed from the payload and security parameters. These parameters typically include a counter value, direction indicator, length field, and a fresh value or other context-dependent input. The counter prevents replay attacks because the receiver can verify that the message was generated with an expected sequence number. The direction indicator prevents a message protected for one direction from being accepted in the opposite direction. The length field prevents truncation or extension attacks by binding the MAC to the size of the protected data. AES-CMAC processes the message in blocks, uses AES to derive subkeys for padding and finalization, and produces a fixed-size MAC. The sender appends this MAC to the signaling message. The receiver recomputes the MAC using the same key and parameters and compares it with the received MAC. A mismatch causes the message to be rejected and may trigger security error handling.
Within the UMTS architecture, UIA2 is part of the control-plane security mechanism. It is commonly used to protect RRC signaling and, in applicable contexts, NAS signaling. The security context includes IK, CK, and counter values for each direction and bearer. When a protocol layer needs to send an integrity-protected message, it invokes the UIA2 function defined in TS 35.215. The function returns the MAC, which is transmitted with the message. On the receiving side, the same function is called to verify the MAC before the message is passed to higher-layer procedures. This is especially important for messages such as security mode command, handover commands, radio bearer setup, and other procedures where an attacker could otherwise manipulate parameters, downgrade security, or impersonate the network or UE. UIA2 therefore adds assurance that the message originated from the expected party and has not been modified in transit.
UIA2 was introduced as a modern alternative to UIA1. UIA1 uses HMAC-SHA-1, which was widely accepted at the time of Release 99 but later became less attractive because SHA-1 has known collision weaknesses and because AES-based constructions are generally preferred in newer standards. UIA2 uses AES-CMAC, a standardized MAC construction that benefits from the same AES core used by UEA2. This creates a coherent security suite: AES-128 in counter mode for encryption and AES-CMAC for integrity. The shared AES implementation can be optimized in software and hardware, reducing cost and improving performance. UIA2 also provides stronger assurance against message forgery than a null integrity algorithm and offers a migration path away from SHA-1-based integrity. Like UIA1, UIA2 is not a confidentiality mechanism, and it is typically used together with a ciphering algorithm when both integrity and encryption are required for signaling.
Purpose & Motivation
UIA2 exists to provide a stronger and more modern integrity protection mechanism for UMTS networks. The original integrity algorithm, UIA1, was based on HMAC-SHA-1 and was introduced in Release 99 to address the need for data origin authentication and tamper detection in signaling. At the time, HMAC-SHA-1 was a practical and widely implemented construction. However, as cryptographic analysis advanced, SHA-1 became associated with collision weaknesses, and the industry increasingly preferred AES-based primitives for new security mechanisms. UIA2 was introduced in Release 7 to replace or complement UIA1 with AES-CMAC, a message authentication code built from AES.
The motivation was to strengthen UMTS control-plane security without changing the overall security architecture. UIA2 uses the same integrity key IK and similar security parameters as UIA1, including counter, direction, and length. This allows the algorithm to be selected during security mode procedures and to interoperate with existing UMTS key derivation and message flow. By using AES-CMAC, UIA2 aligns UMTS integrity protection with the cryptographic suite used in later 3GPP systems. It also allows devices to share AES implementations between UEA2 and UIA2, which can improve efficiency and reduce implementation overhead.
UIA2 addresses the limitations of earlier approaches. UIA0 provides no integrity protection, so signaling can be modified or replayed without detection. UIA1 provides integrity but relies on SHA-1, which is less favored in modern deployments. UIA2 solves these problems by providing a standardized, AES-based MAC that can detect message modification, replay, and certain substitution attacks. It does not provide confidentiality, so it is used together with ciphering algorithms such as UEA2. The introduction of UIA2 therefore improved the long-term security posture of UMTS and helped transition 3G networks toward AES-based cryptographic mechanisms.
What changed in its specifications
The latest release-to-release comparison of specifications that define UIA2. Each summary describes the whole specification, not only this term.
Added 128-bit encryption for GSM and GPRS with Kc128 derived from CK and IK. Added IMS emergency call support over GPRS and EPS.
Full comparison in TS 33.102 →Technology family
Ciphering and integrity algorithms · Security
- Phase 1 A5/1, A5/2, A8
- R97 GEA
- R98 B1, B2
- R99 A5/3, GEA3, KASUMI, UEA1, UIA1
- Rel-7 SNOW 3G, UEA2, UIA2
- Rel-8 128-EEA1, 128-EEA2, 128-EIA1, 128-EIA2, EEA0, EIA0
- Rel-9 A5/4, GEA4
- Rel-11 128-EEA3, 128-EIA3, ZUC
- Rel-13 GEA5, GIA4, GIA5
- Rel-15 128-NEA1, 128-NEA2, 128-NEA3, 128-NIA1, 128-NIA2, 128-NIA3, NEA0, NIA0
- UIA2 reused as 128-EIA1
“128-EIA1 is based on SNOW 3G and is implemented in the same way as UIA2 as specified in [14].” TS 33.401
Members and relations were proposed independently by several models and kept only where at least two agree; quotes are verified verbatim against the specifications. Release = first approved version of the defining specification.
Release Timeline
Detected Changes Across Releases
verified against 3GPP sourcesDocumented changes in 2 releases, each verified against the text of 3GPP specifications or approved change requests and shown with the exact wording. The release timeline above shows the same releases. A release without an entry has no documented change for this term.
UIA2 is specified for the first time: TS 35.215 defines the UEA2 and UIA2 algorithms, and TS 33.102 adds UIA2 (SNOW 3G) with an implementation requirement for UEs and RNCs.
- “The present document specifies the 3GPP confidentiality and integrity algorithms known as UEA2 and UIA2.” TS 35.215 v7.0.0
- “UEs and RNCs shall implement UIA1 and UIA2.” TS 33.102 v7.1.0
- “"00102" : UIA2, SNOW 3G.” TS 33.102 v7.1.0
TS 33.102 in Rel-9 adds a clause on support of the UIA2 and UEA2 algorithms, giving UIA2 a requirement in the UMTS security architecture.
- “Support of UIA2, UEA2 algorithms” TS 33.102 v9.6.0
Defining Specifications
3GPP specifications that define or reference UIA2, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.
| Specification | Title | Release |
|---|---|---|
| TS 33.102 vj10 | 3G Security Architecture Specification | Rel-19 read |
| TS 35.215 vj00 | 3GPP UEA2 & UIA2 Confidentiality & Integrity Algorithms | Rel-19 read |