Description
128-EIA1 is a 128-bit EPS Integrity Algorithm 1 standardized in 3GPP Rel-8 for LTE Evolved Packet System security. It provides integrity protection for NAS and RRC signaling using the SNOW 3G-MAC construction. The algorithm is specified in TS 33.401 and is used after authentication and key agreement to protect control-plane messages. Its main purpose is to detect modification, replay, insertion, or deletion of signaling messages, thereby preserving the trustworthiness of network commands and UE responses.
The operation of 128-EIA1 is based on a message authentication code. The UE and network share a 128-bit integrity key, such as K_NASint for NAS messages or K_RRCint for RRC messages. SNOW 3G-MAC initializes a finite-state machine and a linear feedback shift register using the key and security parameters. The parameters include a COUNT value, a bearer identifier, a direction bit, and a length indicator. The message is processed in blocks, and the algorithm produces a 32-bit MAC-I value. The receiver recalculates the MAC and compares it with the received value to verify authenticity and integrity.
In the EPS architecture, 128-EIA1 protects NAS and RRC signaling. NAS integrity is applied to messages exchanged between the UE and MME, including attach, detach, tracking area update, and security mode procedures. RRC integrity is applied to messages exchanged between the UE and eNB, such as RRC connection setup, security mode command, reconfiguration, and handover commands. The integrity key is derived from K_ASME and K_eNB, so NAS and AS keys are separated. This separation limits the impact of a compromised access-layer key on core-network signaling.
COUNT values are essential for replay protection. In NAS, a 32-bit NAS COUNT is maintained and incremented for each message. In RRC, the COUNT is derived from sequence numbers and direction. The bearer and direction fields bind the MAC to a specific security context and traffic direction. If an attacker replays an old message, the COUNT will not match the expected value, and the receiver will reject it. If an attacker modifies a message, the MAC will not verify. This makes 128-EIA1 a critical defense against signaling manipulation.
SNOW 3G-MAC was chosen for efficiency and security. It uses the same underlying SNOW 3G cipher family as 128-EEA1, which simplifies implementation in devices that already support SNOW 3G. The 32-bit MAC output is sufficient for many LTE control-plane use cases, although it is shorter than some modern MAC outputs. 128-EIA1 does not provide confidentiality; therefore, it is typically paired with an EPS encryption algorithm such as 128-EEA1. Integrity alone can authenticate messages but cannot hide their content.
For engineers, 128-EIA1 is a key element of LTE security mode procedures. The UE and network must agree on the selected integrity algorithm, derive the correct keys, and maintain synchronized COUNT values. Integrity failures can cause attach rejection, RRC release, or handover failure. Proper use of 128-EIA1 gives LTE networks a robust way to protect control-plane signaling against tampering and replay while interoperating with encryption algorithms that protect payload confidentiality.
Purpose & Motivation
128-EIA1 exists because LTE control-plane signaling must be protected against tampering, replay, and insertion. Authentication alone does not prove that a NAS or RRC message has not been modified after it was sent. Integrity protection gives the receiver a cryptographic check value, allowing it to reject messages that do not match the expected MAC. 128-EIA1 provides this function using SNOW 3G-MAC with a 128-bit key and freshness parameters.
The algorithm addresses weaknesses in earlier mobile networks where signaling could be manipulated by rogue base stations or man-in-the-middle attackers. By binding the MAC to COUNT, bearer, and direction, it prevents an attacker from replaying old messages or moving a valid message into the wrong context. This is essential for procedures such as attach, tracking area update, security mode command, RRC reconfiguration, and handover.
Its creation was motivated by the need for a strong, efficient integrity mechanism that could be implemented alongside SNOW 3G encryption. By using the same cipher family as 128-EEA1, 3GPP allowed devices and network equipment to share implementation effort while protecting control-plane signaling against active attacks.
What changed in its specifications
The latest release-to-release comparison of specifications that define 128-EIA1. Each summary describes the whole specification, not only this term.
Rel-19 adds security annex clauses for Store and Forward Satellite operation to TS 33.401. It also adds definitions for feeder link, service link, Store and Forward Satellite operation, and IOPS-enabled UE.
Full comparison in TS 33.401 →Technology family
Ciphering and integrity algorithms · Security
- Phase 1 A5/1, A5/2, A8
- R97 GEA
- R98 B1, B2
- R99 A5/3, GEA3, KASUMI, UEA1, UIA1
- Rel-7 SNOW 3G, UEA2, UIA2
- Rel-8 128-EEA1, 128-EEA2, 128-EIA1, 128-EIA2, EEA0, EIA0
- Rel-9 A5/4, GEA4
- Rel-11 128-EEA3, 128-EIA3, ZUC
- Rel-13 GEA5, GIA4, GIA5
- Rel-15 128-NEA1, 128-NEA2, 128-NEA3, 128-NIA1, 128-NIA2, 128-NIA3, NEA0, NIA0
Members and relations were proposed independently by several models and kept only where at least two agree; quotes are verified verbatim against the specifications. Release = first approved version of the defining specification.
Release Timeline
Detected Changes Across Releases
verified against 3GPP sourcesDocumented changes in 3 releases, each verified against the text of 3GPP specifications or approved change requests and shown with the exact wording. The release timeline above shows the same releases. A release without an entry has no documented change for this term.
128-EIA1, a SNOW 3G-based EPS integrity algorithm, is specified for the first time, mandatory for UEs, eNBs and MMEs to protect RRC and NAS signalling integrity.
- “128-EIA1 is based on SNOW 3G and is implemented in the same way as UIA2 as specified in [14].” TS 33.401 v8.8.0
- “UEs and eNBs shall implement 128-EIA1 and 128-EIA2 for RRC signalling integrity protection.” TS 33.401 v8.8.0
- “UEs and MMEs shall implement 128-EIA1 and 128-EIA2 for NAS signalling integrity protection.” TS 33.401 v8.8.0
For dual connectivity with an NR SgNB, 128-EIA1 is mapped to 128-NIA1, so UE support for NR integrity algorithms follows its EPS algorithm support, and 128-NIA1 is used for RRC integrity protection.
- “128-NIA1 (which is the same as 128-EIA1) for RRC integrity protection.” TS 33.401 v15.12.0
- “128-NIA1 as 128-EIA1, 128-NIA2 as 128-EIA2 and 128-NIA3 as 128-EIA3.” TS 33.401 v15.12.0
128-EIA1 is now required for UEs (and optional for eNBs) for user plane integrity protection, and 128-NIA1 (same as 128-EIA1) covers both RRC and UP integrity protection.
- “UEs shall and eNBs may implement 128-EIA1 and 128-EIA2 for the user plane integrity protection.” TS 33.401 v17.7.0
- “128-NIA1 (which is the same as 128-EIA1) for both RRC and UP integrity protection.” TS 33.401 v17.7.0
Defining Specifications
3GPP specifications that define or reference 128-EIA1, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.
| Specification | Title | Release |
|---|---|---|
| TS 33.401 vj20 | EPS Security Architecture | Rel-19 read |