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Glossary term · Security

A5/4

Encryption Algorithm A5/4

Security →

A5/4 is a GERAN encryption algorithm based on SNOW 3G, standardized in 3GPP Rel-9 to modernize GSM confidentiality with a stronger stream cipher than legacy algorithms.

Introduced
Rel-9
Where
Security
Specifications
2 specs
A5/4 Description Purpose What changed Family Neighbours Detected Changes Specifications

Description

A5/4 is a GERAN encryption algorithm based on SNOW 3G, standardized in 3GPP Rel-9 to provide stronger confidentiality for GSM and GPRS radio traffic. SNOW 3G is a synchronous stream cipher originally developed for UMTS, where it underpins the UEA1 confidentiality algorithm and UIA1 integrity algorithm. A5/4 adapts this cipher to the GERAN environment, allowing networks that still operate GSM radio access to use a modern 3GPP algorithm instead of relying only on legacy GSM ciphers or KASUMI-based A5/3.

The algorithm works by generating a keystream from a 128-bit ciphering key and a 128-bit initialization value. The initialization value is constructed from parameters associated with the radio block, such as the frame number, direction, bearer or channel identifier, and other context values defined by the GERAN ciphering procedure. SNOW 3G combines a linear feedback shift register with nonlinear filtering and finite-field operations to produce a sequence of pseudorandom 32-bit words. These words are concatenated or aligned to the length of the plaintext block, and the plaintext is encrypted by XORing it with the keystream. Decryption is identical because the receiver generates the same keystream using the same key and initialization parameters.

A5/4 was introduced because the security requirements of GSM networks had increased, and older algorithms were no longer considered sufficiently robust for many deployments. A5/1 and A5/2 had known weaknesses, and A5/3, while stronger, is based on a 64-bit block cipher and may have performance or cryptographic limitations compared with modern stream ciphers. SNOW 3G offers a high-speed, software-friendly design and was already trusted in UMTS. By reusing SNOW 3G in GERAN, 3GPP provided a path to upgrade GSM confidentiality without redesigning the entire radio interface or forcing immediate migration to LTE or NR.

In the network architecture, A5/4 operates at the radio interface and is selected through GERAN security procedures. The core network and authentication infrastructure provide the keys and security parameters, while the base station controller or packet control unit and the UE apply the ciphering algorithm to radio blocks. A5/4 provides confidentiality only; it does not by itself provide integrity protection or authentication. Those functions remain separate, although later security frameworks may combine encryption and integrity in other access technologies. A5/4 can be supported by multi-mode devices and used when both the network and UE indicate support for the corresponding ciphering capability.

A5/4 is significant because it extends UMTS cryptographic strength to legacy GSM access. It represents a transitional security mechanism for operators that continued to maintain 2G services while gradually moving traffic to 3G, 4G, and 5G networks. It also demonstrates 3GPP's approach of reusing proven algorithms across generations: SNOW 3G, originally specified for UMTS, could be leveraged to improve GERAN security. As a result, A5/4 provides a stronger, more modern encryption option for GSM radio traffic and helps reduce reliance on vulnerable legacy ciphering algorithms.

From an engineering perspective, A5/4 benefits from SNOW 3G's word-oriented output, which maps efficiently to radio block processing and software implementations. It also allows operators to align 2G and 3G security capabilities in devices that already support UMTS algorithms. This reduces fragmentation and supports smoother migration paths, because the same cryptographic building blocks can be reused across access technologies. Nevertheless, A5/4 remains a GERAN-specific encryption mechanism, and its security depends on correct key management, synchronization of initialization values, and protection of the ciphering key from disclosure.

Purpose & Motivation

A5/4 exists to provide a stronger, modern encryption algorithm for GERAN radio traffic while reusing the SNOW 3G cipher already standardized for UMTS. By the time Rel-9 was developed, GSM networks remained widely deployed, but their original ciphering mechanisms were increasingly viewed as insufficient. A5/1 had known weaknesses, A5/2 was deliberately weakened, and A5/3, although an improvement, relied on KASUMI, a 64-bit block cipher adapted into a stream-like mode. Operators and standards engineers needed an algorithm that could offer better security margins, efficient software implementation, and a clearer path to alignment with 3G security primitives.

SNOW 3G was selected because it had been designed for UMTS confidentiality and integrity, uses a 128-bit key and 128-bit initialization vector, and can generate high-speed keystreams suitable for radio block encryption. Introducing A5/4 allowed GERAN to benefit from this design without requiring a complete change to the GSM radio architecture. It also supported multi-mode terminals that already implemented SNOW 3G for UMTS, reducing implementation cost and encouraging adoption.

The motivation was therefore both security and interoperability. A5/4 addresses the limitation that legacy GSM ciphering could expose user traffic to passive eavesdropping and cryptanalytic attacks. It does not eliminate all 2G security problems, because key management, authentication, and integrity remain separate concerns, but it raises the strength of radio confidentiality. A5/4 is particularly relevant for networks that continued to operate 2G services during the migration to 3G and 4G, providing a standardized upgrade path for GSM encryption.

What changed in its specifications

The latest release-to-release comparison of specifications that define A5/4. Each summary describes the whole specification, not only this term.

TS 43.020Rel-14 → Rel-15

Rel-15 brings only minor changes to TS 43.020: 1 clause changed, with no change attributed to a release feature.

Full comparison in TS 43.020 →

Technology family

Ciphering and integrity algorithms · Security

  1. Phase 1 A5/1, A5/2, A8
  2. R97 GEA
  3. R98 B1, B2
  4. R99 A5/3, GEA3, KASUMI, UEA1, UIA1
  5. Rel-7 SNOW 3G, UEA2, UIA2
  6. Rel-8 128-EEA1, 128-EEA2, 128-EIA1, 128-EIA2, EEA0, EIA0
  7. Rel-9 A5/4, GEA4
  8. Rel-11 128-EEA3, 128-EIA3, ZUC
  9. Rel-13 GEA5, GIA4, GIA5
  10. Rel-15 128-NEA1, 128-NEA2, 128-NEA3, 128-NIA1, 128-NIA2, 128-NIA3, NEA0, NIA0
  • A5/4 builds on A5/3
    “The only essential change is the change of external key length input from 64 bits to 128 bits.” TS 55.226
  • A5/4 builds on KASUMI
    “Each of these algorithms is based on the KASUMI algorithm that is specified in TS 35.202 [5].” TS 55.226

Members and relations were proposed independently by several models and kept only where at least two agree; quotes are verified verbatim against the specifications. Release = first approved version of the defining specification.

Release Timeline

Detected Changes Across Releases

verified against 3GPP sources

Documented changes in 2 releases, each verified against the text of 3GPP specifications or approved change requests and shown with the exact wording. The release timeline above shows the same releases. A release without an entry has no documented change for this term.

Rel-9 introduced

A5/4 is specified for the first time as a 128-bit-key GSM and ECSD stream cipher, identical to A5/3 except for key length, and made optional in mobile stations.

  • “In this document are specified three ciphering algorithms: A5/4 for GSM, A5/4 for ECSD, and GEA4 for GPRS (including EGPRS).” TS 55.226 v9.0.0
  • “GSM A5/4 is the same algorithms as GSM A5/3 but with KLEN changed from 64 to 128 bits.” TS 55.226 v9.0.0
  • “It is optional to implement A5/4 in mobile stations.” TS 43.020 v9.4.0
Rel-11 specification text

A5/4 implementation became mandatory in mobile stations (previously optional) and mandatory in the BSS for GSM security in Rel-11.

  • “It is mandatory for A5/1, A5/3, A5/4 and non encrypted mode to be implemented in mobile stations.” TS 43.020 v11.6.0
  • “It is mandatory for A5/3 and A5/4 to be implemented in the BSS.” TS 43.020 v11.6.0
  • “It is optional to implement A5/4 in mobile stations.” TS 43.020 v11.6.0

Defining Specifications

3GPP specifications that define or reference A5/4, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.

SpecificationTitleRelease
TS 55.226 vj00 A5/4 & GEA4 Encryption Algorithms Specification Rel-19 read
TS 43.020 vj00 Security Procedures for GSM Rel-19 read