Description
128-NEA1 is a 128-bit NR Encryption Algorithm 1 standardized in 3GPP Rel-15 for 5G New Radio security. It provides confidentiality for NAS and AS traffic by using the SNOW 3G stream cipher. The algorithm is specified in TS 33.501 and is used together with the 5G key hierarchy, NAS security procedures, RRC security procedures, and PDCP ciphering. Its main purpose is to protect subscriber data and control signaling on the NR radio interface against passive eavesdropping.
The operation of 128-NEA1 is similar to LTE EPS encryption but adapted to the 5G security architecture. The UE and network share a 128-bit cipher key, such as K_NASenc for NAS traffic or K_UPenc/K_RRCenc for AS traffic. SNOW 3G initializes its finite-state machine and linear feedback shift register using the key and security parameters. The parameters include a COUNT value, a bearer identifier, a direction bit, and a length indicator. These inputs generate a unique keystream for each packet, bearer, direction, and time instance. The keystream is XORed with plaintext to produce ciphertext, and the receiver performs the same operation to recover plaintext.
In the 5G architecture, 128-NEA1 is applied after authentication and key agreement. The AMF derives K_AMF from the authentication result, and the gNB derives K_gNB from K_AMF and cell-specific information. From these keys, NAS and AS encryption keys are derived. NAS encryption protects registration, deregistration, service request, and other NAS messages between the UE and AMF. AS encryption protects RRC messages and user-plane packets delivered through PDCP. The security context can be transferred during handover or re-derived from the same root key, allowing continuous protection as the UE moves between gNBs.
PDCP and NAS maintain COUNT values to prevent keystream reuse. In NR PDCP, COUNT is derived from the PDCP sequence number and hyperframe number, and it is bound to the radio bearer and direction. In 5G NAS, a 32-bit NAS COUNT is used with the NAS key. The bearer and direction fields ensure that the same key does not generate the same keystream for uplink and downlink or for different bearers. This binding is important because stream cipher security depends on never reusing the same key and initial state for different plaintext blocks.
SNOW 3G was retained for 5G because it offers strong cryptographic properties, efficient implementation, and compatibility with existing mobile security designs. It operates on 32-bit words and can produce 128-bit blocks of keystream per iteration, which suits hardware accelerators and software stacks in 5G devices. 128-NEA1 does not provide integrity protection; therefore, it is typically paired with an NR integrity algorithm such as 128-NIA1. Encryption alone protects confidentiality but cannot prove that a message was not altered.
For engineers, 128-NEA1 is a configuration and debugging element in 5G security. The UE and network must agree on the selected algorithm during Security Mode Command, derive the correct keys, and synchronize COUNT values. Misconfigured bearer identifiers, direction bits, or sequence numbers can cause decryption failures or security warnings. Proper use of 128-NEA1 gives 5G networks a robust confidentiality mechanism for user data and control signaling while preserving interoperability across vendors and radio access technologies.
Purpose & Motivation
128-NEA1 exists because 5G New Radio requires strong confidentiality for NAS and AS traffic over a more flexible and heterogeneous radio interface. 5G introduces new network elements such as AMF, AUSF, SEAF, and gNB, along with network slicing, higher data rates, and denser deployments. 128-NEA1 adapts the proven SNOW 3G encryption mechanism to the 5G security architecture, allowing subscriber data and control signaling to remain private.
The algorithm addresses the need for interoperable security options in 5G. Some networks and devices may prefer AES-based algorithms, while others benefit from SNOW 3G implementations inherited from LTE. 128-NEA1 provides a standardized 128-bit NR encryption option with COUNT, bearer, and direction binding, reducing keystream reuse and protecting against passive eavesdropping.
Its creation was motivated by 3GPP's goal to maintain strong security while supporting efficient hardware and software implementations. By retaining SNOW 3G, 5G can reuse mature cipher designs and key derivation principles, while extending protection to the new NR protocol stack and security context management.
What changed in its specifications
The latest release-to-release comparison of specifications that define 128-NEA1. Each summary describes the whole specification, not only this term.
Rel-19 TS 33.501 adds roaming and inter-PLMN indirect communication authorization, fast re-authentication for non-3GPP mobility, and AI/ML security clauses for positioning and federated learning. It also adds NPN security, NRF access token key retrieval, LTM security, and monitoring-of-signalling-traffic protection.
Full comparison in TS 33.501 →Technology family
Ciphering and integrity algorithms · Security
- Phase 1 A5/1, A5/2, A8
- R97 GEA
- R98 B1, B2
- R99 A5/3, GEA3, KASUMI, UEA1, UIA1
- Rel-7 SNOW 3G, UEA2, UIA2
- Rel-8 128-EEA1, 128-EEA2, 128-EIA1, 128-EIA2, EEA0, EIA0
- Rel-9 A5/4, GEA4
- Rel-11 128-EEA3, 128-EIA3, ZUC
- Rel-13 GEA5, GIA4, GIA5
- Rel-15 128-NEA1, 128-NEA2, 128-NEA3, 128-NIA1, 128-NIA2, 128-NIA3, NEA0, NIA0
- 128-NEA1 reuses 128-EEA1
“128-NEA1 is based on SNOW 3G (see TS 35.215 [14]).” TS 33.501
Members and relations were proposed independently by several models and kept only where at least two agree; quotes are verified verbatim against the specifications. Release = first approved version of the defining specification.
Detected Changes Across Releases
verified against 3GPP sourcesDocumented changes in 1 releases, each verified against the text of 3GPP specifications or approved change requests and shown with the exact wording. The release timeline above shows the same releases. A release without an entry has no documented change for this term.
128-NEA1 is specified for the first time in TS 33.501 as a SNOW 3G based 128-bit NR encryption algorithm, identical to 128-EEA1, for NAS, RRC and UP ciphering.
- “128-NEA1 is based on SNOW 3G (see TS 35.215 [14]).” TS 33.501 v15.20.0
- “128-NEA1 is identical to 128-EEA1 as specified in Annex B of TS 33.401 [10].” TS 33.501 v15.20.0
- “NEA0, 128-NEA1 and 128-NEA2 for NAS signalling ciphering, RRC signalling ciphering and UP ciphering;” TS 33.501 v15.20.0
Defining Specifications
3GPP specifications that define or reference 128-NEA1, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.
| Specification | Title | Release |
|---|---|---|
| TS 33.501 vk30 | 5G Security Architecture | Rel-20 read |