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Glossary term · Security

UEA1

UMTS Encryption Algorithm 1

Security →

UEA1 is a foundational UMTS (3G) encryption algorithm, also known as KASUMI in f8 mode, that provides confidentiality for user data and signaling messages over the radio access network.

Introduced
R99
Where
Security
Specifications
2 specs
UEA1 Description Purpose What changed Family Neighbours Detected Changes Specifications

Description

UMTS Encryption Algorithm 1 (UEA1) is the primary confidentiality algorithm defined for the third-generation (3G) UMTS system. It is an implementation of the KASUMI block cipher used in a specific stream cipher mode of operation known as the f8 algorithm. UEA1 is applied in the Access Stratum (AS) between the User Equipment (UE) and the Radio Network Controller (RNC) to encrypt data transmitted over the Uu (radio) interface. Its operation is a fundamental part of the UMTS security mechanisms, which were significantly strengthened compared to their 2G GSM counterparts.

The algorithm works by generating a keystream that is XORed with the plaintext data to produce ciphertext. This process is initialized using several inputs: a 128-bit confidentiality key (CK) derived during the Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) procedure, a 32-bit COUNT-C hyperframe number for synchronization and anti-replay, a 5-bit BEARER identity specifying the radio bearer, a 1-bit DIRECTION indicator (uplink/downlink), and the required length of the keystream. The KASUMI block cipher core, in f8 mode, uses these inputs to produce a pseudo-random keystream. This keystream is then bitwise XORed with the plaintext data block to achieve encryption. The same process, using identical inputs, is performed in reverse for decryption. The use of a fresh COUNT-C for each data block ensures cryptographic freshness and protects against replay attacks.

Architecturally, UEA1 is executed within the security functions of the UE and the RNC. In the UE, it is typically implemented in the USIM or the mobile equipment's security module. In the network, it runs within the RNC's security context. The algorithm is applied at the Packet Data Convergence Protocol (PDCP) layer for packet-switched domains and at the Radio Resource Control (RRC) layer for certain signaling messages. UEA1 was designed to offer a high level of security with efficient implementation in both hardware and software, balancing performance with the robust cryptographic strength required for 3G services. It formed the backbone of UMTS air interface confidentiality for many years, protecting voice calls (in CS domain) and data sessions from eavesdropping.

Purpose & Motivation

UEA1 was created as a cornerstone of the new security architecture introduced with UMTS (3G). The 2G GSM system used the A5/1, A5/2, and A5/3 algorithms for encryption, which, over time, were shown to have vulnerabilities or insufficient key lengths. The move to 3G presented an opportunity to design a security system from the ground up with stronger cryptography, mutual authentication, and enhanced key lengths. UEA1 was developed to provide this stronger confidentiality service, addressing the limitations of previous GSM encryption algorithms.

The primary problem UEA1 solved was providing robust over-the-air encryption for the new Wideband CDMA (W-CDMA) radio technology with a scalable and exportable algorithm. It was based on the well-studied MISTY1 cipher, adapted into KASUMI, and was designed to be efficient for fast, real-time encryption needed in mobile communications. Its creation was motivated by the need for a standardized, world-wide algorithm that could be legally exported (due to its published specification) while still offering significant cryptographic strength. UEA1, as part of the UMTS security suite, ensured that user communications and sensitive signaling data were protected against interception, establishing a higher baseline of trust for 3G mobile services and enabling new secure applications.

What changed in its specifications

The latest release-to-release comparison of specifications that define UEA1. Each summary describes the whole specification, not only this term.

TS 33.102Rel-8 → Rel-9

Added 128-bit encryption for GSM and GPRS with Kc128 derived from CK and IK. Added IMS emergency call support over GPRS and EPS.

Full comparison in TS 33.102 →

Technology family

Ciphering and integrity algorithms · Security

  1. Phase 1 A5/1, A5/2, A8
  2. R97 GEA
  3. R98 B1, B2
  4. R99 A5/3, GEA3, KASUMI, UEA1, UIA1
  5. Rel-7 SNOW 3G, UEA2, UIA2
  6. Rel-8 128-EEA1, 128-EEA2, 128-EIA1, 128-EIA2, EEA0, EIA0
  7. Rel-9 A5/4, GEA4
  8. Rel-11 128-EEA3, 128-EIA3, ZUC
  9. Rel-13 GEA5, GIA4, GIA5
  10. Rel-15 128-NEA1, 128-NEA2, 128-NEA3, 128-NIA1, 128-NIA2, 128-NIA3, NEA0, NIA0
  • UEA1 used together with UIA1
    “Within the security architecture of the 3GPP system there are two standardised algorithms: A confidentiality algorithm f8, and an integrity algorithm f9.” TS 35.201
  • UEA1 builds on KASUMI (not stated verbatim in the specifications)

Members and relations were proposed independently by several models and kept only where at least two agree; quotes are verified verbatim against the specifications. Release = first approved version of the defining specification.

Release Timeline

Detected Changes Across Releases

verified against 3GPP sources

Documented changes in 4 releases, each verified against the text of 3GPP specifications or approved change requests and shown with the exact wording. The release timeline above shows the same releases. A release without an entry has no documented change for this term.

R99 introduced

UEA1 (Kasumi) appears for the first time in the Rel-99 security architecture specification as a listed UMTS encryption algorithm.

Rel-5 specification text

Rel-5 adds a mechanism letting the SGSN/VLR select UEA0 instead of UEA1 based on IMEISV for UEs with faulty UEA1 implementations, with a second integrity-protected IMEISV check.

  • “the SGSN/VLR may configure the security mode command based on the UE’s IMEISV so that certain UEs which claim to support UEA1” TS 33.102 v5.7.0
  • “then the SGSN/VLR shall request the IMEISV from the UE for a second time immediately after the security mode set-up procedure” TS 33.102 v5.7.0
Rel-6 specification text

UEs are required to implement UEA1 (together with UEA0) as a mandatory requirement in TS 33.102.

  • “It shall be mandatory for UEs to implement UEA0 and UEA1.” TS 33.102 v6.5.0
Rel-7 specification text

The UE requirement changed: UEs must now implement UEA0, UEA1 and UEA2, replacing the earlier mandate to implement only UEA0 and UEA1.

Defining Specifications

3GPP specifications that define or reference UEA1, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.

SpecificationTitleRelease
TS 33.102 vj10 3G Security Architecture Specification Rel-19 read
TS 35.201 vj00 3GPP Confidentiality & Integrity Algorithms f8/f9 Rel-19 read