Description
EPS Encryption Algorithm 0 (EEA0) is a security algorithm defined within the 3GPP Evolved Packet System (EPS) architecture, specifically for the LTE radio access network. It is not a cryptographic cipher in the traditional sense but represents the explicit selection of 'no encryption' for user plane and control plane data between the User Equipment (UE) and the network. Within the AS (Access Stratum) security procedures, the UE and the eNodeB negotiate a set of supported encryption algorithms during the Security Mode Command procedure. EEA0 is always required to be supported by all UEs and network elements as a baseline capability. When selected, the ciphering function within the PDCP (Packet Data Convergence Protocol) layer is effectively bypassed; data packets are forwarded without any cryptographic transformation, meaning the output ciphertext is identical to the input plaintext.
The algorithm's operation is architecturally integrated into the PDCP layer's security functions. The PDCP entity receives Security Activation commands from the RRC (Radio Resource Control) layer, which include the selected ciphering algorithm identifier. If EEA0 is indicated, the PDCP entity's ciphering function performs a null operation. It does not utilize a ciphering key (derived from the Kasme key in the core network) or an encryption stream. The input data (the PDCP Service Data Unit) is passed through unchanged to become the PDCP Protocol Data Unit for transmission. This process applies to both the user plane (DRB) and certain control plane (SRB) bearers, depending on network policy and the specific security context.
EEA0's role is critical for ensuring interoperability and handling exceptional cases. Its inclusion guarantees that a UE and network can always establish a basic radio bearer, even if there is a mismatch in supported cryptographic algorithms beyond the null option or if encryption needs to be disabled for legal intercept, debugging, or specific national regulatory requirements. However, its use significantly reduces the security level of the connection, leaving data vulnerable to eavesdropping. Therefore, its usage is strictly controlled by network policies and is typically avoided for normal subscriber traffic in favor of strong algorithms like 128-EEA1 (SNOW 3G) or 128-EEA2 (AES).
Purpose & Motivation
EEA0 was created to fulfill a fundamental requirement in any robust security architecture: the need for a reliable fallback mechanism. During the design of LTE's security in Release 8, engineers recognized that mandatory support for a specific strong encryption algorithm across all global deployments could face regulatory or technical hurdles. Some regions might have restrictions on the import or use of certain cryptographic technologies. Furthermore, for network operators and equipment vendors, having a 'no encryption' mode is essential for initial network bring-up, troubleshooting, protocol logging, and lawful interception functions where plaintext access to traffic is required.
The algorithm addresses the problem of guaranteed service establishment. Without a universally supported null algorithm, a UE that only supports, for example, Algorithm A, might be unable to connect to a network that only supports Algorithm B, resulting in a service failure. EEA0 ensures a lowest common denominator, guaranteeing that a PDCP bearer can be established. This is particularly vital for emergency services, where connectivity must be prioritized over confidentiality. It also provides a clear and standardized way to administratively disable encryption, as opposed to relying on non-standard or implementation-specific backdoors, which improves overall system integrity and auditability.
Historically, a similar null cipher (UEA0) existed in 3G UMTS, establishing a precedent. The creation of EEA0 for EPS/LTE continued this principle, ensuring backward compatibility in design philosophy and accommodating the wide range of deployment scenarios anticipated for LTE, from public safety networks to commercial mobile broadband. It solves the inherent conflict between mandatory strong encryption and operational flexibility, providing a standardized, controlled, and documented path for when encryption is not desired or permissible.
What changed in its specifications
The latest release-to-release comparison of specifications that define EEA0. Each summary describes the whole specification, not only this term.
Rel-19 adds security annex clauses for Store and Forward Satellite operation to TS 33.401. It also adds definitions for feeder link, service link, Store and Forward Satellite operation, and IOPS-enabled UE.
Full comparison in TS 33.401 →Technology family
Ciphering and integrity algorithms · Security
- Phase 1 A5/1, A5/2, A8
- R97 GEA
- R98 B1, B2
- R99 A5/3, GEA3, KASUMI, UEA1, UIA1
- Rel-7 SNOW 3G, UEA2, UIA2
- Rel-8 128-EEA1, 128-EEA2, 128-EIA1, 128-EIA2, EEA0, EIA0
- Rel-9 A5/4, GEA4
- Rel-11 128-EEA3, 128-EIA3, ZUC
- Rel-13 GEA5, GIA4, GIA5
- Rel-15 128-NEA1, 128-NEA2, 128-NEA3, 128-NIA1, 128-NIA2, 128-NIA3, NEA0, NIA0
Members and relations were proposed independently by several models and kept only where at least two agree; quotes are verified verbatim against the specifications. Release = first approved version of the defining specification.
Release Timeline
Detected Changes Across Releases
verified against 3GPP sourcesDocumented changes in 5 releases, each verified against the text of 3GPP specifications or approved change requests and shown with the exact wording. The release timeline above shows the same releases. A release without an entry has no documented change for this term.
EEA0 is specified for the first time as the null ciphering algorithm, mandatory for UEs, eNBs and MMEs, behaving as an all-zero KEYSTREAM with no security.
- “The EEA0 algorithm shall be implemented such that it has the same effect as if it generates a KEYSTREAM of all zeroes” TS 33.401 v8.8.0
- “UEs and eNBs shall implement EEA0, 128-EEA1 and 128-EEA2 for both RRC signalling ciphering and UP ciphering.” TS 33.401 v8.8.0
- “B.0 EEA0 Null ciphering algorithm” TS 33.401 v8.8.0
Rel-9 specifies use of EEA0 (with EIA0) for unauthenticated emergency calls in limited service mode, including MME/eNB algorithm selection, UE acceptance of NAS SMC with EEA0, and handover handling.
- “This shall be accomplished by the network by selecting EEA0 for confidentiality protection of NAS, RRC and user plane.” TS 33.401 v9.9.0
- “except that the UE shall accept a NAS SMC selecting EEA0 and EIA0 algorithms from the MME.” TS 33.401 v9.9.0
- “Select EIA0 and EEA0, regardless of the supported algorithms announced previously by the UE as the NAS algorithms” TS 33.401 v9.9.0
Rel-11 adds an optional 128-EEA3 algorithm that UEs, eNBs and MMEs may implement for RRC, UP and NAS ciphering alongside the mandatory EEA0, 128-EEA1 and 128-EEA2.
- “UEs and eNBs may implement 128-EEA3 for both RRC signalling ciphering and UP ciphering.” TS 33.401 v11.9.0
- “UEs and MMEs may implement 128-EEA3 for NAS signalling ciphering.” TS 33.401 v11.9.0
TS 33.401 now states that NEA0 is the same as EEA0 for RRC and UP confidentiality, and that NEA0 support is set equal to EEA0 support.
- “NEA0 (which is the same as EEA0) for both RRC and UP confidentiality.” TS 33.401 v15.12.0
- “Set the support of NEA0, 128-NEA1, 128-NEA2, 128-NEA3, 128-NIA1, 128-NIA2, 128-NIA3 to the same as EEA0” TS 33.401 v15.12.0
Unauthenticated UEs in LSM may now be allowed RLOS bearers, with the MME configured to use EIA0 and EEA0 for NAS protection in that case.
- “If an MME is configured to allow unauthenticated UEs in LSM to establish bearers for an RLOS call, the MME shall for the NAS protocol use EIA0 and EEA0” TS 33.401 v16.4.0
Defining Specifications
3GPP specifications that define or reference EEA0, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.
| Specification | Title | Release |
|---|---|---|
| TS 33.401 vj20 | EPS Security Architecture | Rel-19 read |