Description
NIA0 is the null integrity algorithm for 5G NR security, defined in 3GPP TS 33.501 as part of the set of NR integrity algorithms used to protect signalling messages. Unlike NIA1, NIA2, and NIA3, which compute a message authentication code over RRC or NAS messages using cryptographic primitives such as SNOW 3G, AES, or ZUC, NIA0 does not perform any integrity calculation. When NIA0 is selected, the integrity value is effectively absent or set to a defined null result, and the receiver does not verify message authenticity or freshness through an integrity MAC. Its role is therefore not to provide security, but to provide a standardized way to express that integrity protection is not applied while still participating in algorithm negotiation and protocol compatibility.
In the 5G security architecture, integrity protection is primarily used for NAS signalling between the UE and AMF and for RRC signalling between the UE and gNB. NAS integrity helps prevent modification, replay, and impersonation of control-plane messages such as authentication, security mode, registration, and service accept messages. RRC integrity protects radio control messages that configure bearers, handovers, and security parameters. Because integrity protection is mandatory for many 5G procedures, NIA0 is used only in limited contexts: before security is activated, for certain messages that standards exempt from integrity protection, when integrity protection is explicitly not required, or as a fallback when no stronger common integrity algorithm can be negotiated. It is also useful for interoperability, because a UE or network may advertise NIA0 as a supported null option while still preferring NIA1, NIA2, or NIA3 when available.
From an implementation perspective, NIA0 simplifies the security stack. The algorithm identifier is carried in security capability information elements and in security mode command messages. When the selected integrity algorithm is NIA0, the MAC generation and verification functions are bypassed. The protocol may still carry fields associated with integrity, but they are not used for cryptographic validation. This means that the security mode procedure can complete without establishing an integrity key usage for protected messages, although encryption may still be selected separately using NEA algorithms. The separation between encryption and integrity algorithms allows operators to decide which protection mechanisms are required for a given interface, procedure, or deployment.
The importance of NIA0 lies in its explicitness. Instead of leaving integrity protection undefined or relying on vendor-specific behavior, 3GPP defines a null algorithm that can be negotiated, logged, and audited. It makes the absence of integrity protection visible in signalling and configuration. This is valuable for network planning, security testing, and compliance, because engineers can distinguish between a failure to activate security and an intentional decision to use no integrity protection. However, using NIA0 reduces the security level of the affected signalling path. It exposes messages to tampering or replay if used outside permitted contexts, so it is generally avoided for procedures that require assurance of authenticity.
NIA0 also reflects the layered nature of 5G security. The 5G system uses distinct algorithms for NAS and AS layers, and the same algorithm identifiers may be reused across contexts with different key derivations. NIA0 is not a replacement for real integrity algorithms; it is a standardized placeholder that supports protocol completeness, fallback behavior, and controlled exceptions. In a secure deployment, NIA0 should be used only where the standards allow it and only when the threat model accepts the loss of integrity protection.
Purpose & Motivation
NIA0 exists because 5G security negotiation must be able to represent both protected and unprotected signalling states in a standards-compliant way. In early mobile systems, the absence of integrity protection was often implicit: if a device did not support integrity, messages were simply unprotected. This created ambiguity in security mode procedures and made it difficult to distinguish intentional fallback from implementation failure. By defining a null integrity algorithm, 3GPP gives the UE and network a concrete identifier that can be advertised, selected, and recorded. The identifier makes it clear that integrity protection is not being applied, while still allowing the security mode command procedure to complete.
NIA0 also supports the practical reality that not every message or interface can be integrity protected. Some signalling occurs before keys are established, some messages are intentionally exempt, and some deployments or emergency procedures may not require integrity protection. A null algorithm allows these cases to be handled within the same framework used for strong algorithms such as NIA1, NIA2, and NIA3. It prevents the need for separate non-standard signalling paths and keeps the protocol state machine consistent.
The motivation behind NIA0 is therefore not to weaken 5G security, but to make security behavior explicit and interoperable. Real integrity protection is provided by NIA1, NIA2, and NIA3, and those algorithms should be used whenever the standards require integrity. NIA0 is a controlled exception that preserves compatibility, supports fallback scenarios, and helps operators audit whether integrity protection is enabled or intentionally disabled.
What changed in its specifications
The latest release-to-release comparison of specifications that define NIA0. Each summary describes the whole specification, not only this term.
Rel-19 TS 33.501 adds roaming and inter-PLMN indirect communication authorization, fast re-authentication for non-3GPP mobility, and AI/ML security clauses for positioning and federated learning. It also adds NPN security, NRF access token key retrieval, LTM security, and monitoring-of-signalling-traffic protection.
Full comparison in TS 33.501 →Technology family
Ciphering and integrity algorithms · Security
- Phase 1 A5/1, A5/2, A8
- R97 GEA
- R98 B1, B2
- R99 A5/3, GEA3, KASUMI, UEA1, UIA1
- Rel-7 SNOW 3G, UEA2, UIA2
- Rel-8 128-EEA1, 128-EEA2, 128-EIA1, 128-EIA2, EEA0, EIA0
- Rel-9 A5/4, GEA4
- Rel-11 128-EEA3, 128-EIA3, ZUC
- Rel-13 GEA5, GIA4, GIA5
- Rel-15 128-NEA1, 128-NEA2, 128-NEA3, 128-NIA1, 128-NIA2, 128-NIA3, NEA0, NIA0
- NIA0 reuses EIA0
“The UE and SgNB shall not use NIA0 (which is the same as EIA0) between the UE and SgNB.” TS 33.401
Members and relations were proposed independently by several models and kept only where at least two agree; quotes are verified verbatim against the specifications. Release = first approved version of the defining specification.
Release Timeline
Detected Changes Across Releases
verified against 3GPP sourcesDocumented changes in 2 releases, each verified against the text of 3GPP specifications or approved change requests and shown with the exact wording. The release timeline above shows the same releases. A release without an entry has no documented change for this term.
TS 33.501 first specifies NIA0 as the null integrity algorithm for 5G NR, restricting it to unauthenticated emergency sessions and barring it for DRBs and, otherwise, SRBs.
- “The UE shall implement NIA0 for integrity protection of NAS and RRC signalling. NIA0 is only allowed for unauthenticated emergency session” TS 33.501 v15.20.0
- “"00002" NIA0 Null Integrity Protection algorithm;” TS 33.501 v15.20.0
If the UE accepts a NAS SMC selecting NEA0 and NIA0 during Emergency Registration, primary authentication is considered unsuccessful and the newly generated KAUSF is not stored.
- “then the primary authentication performed if any shall be considered as unsuccessful and the newly generated KAUSF is not stored.” TS 33.501 v17.16.0
Defining Specifications
3GPP specifications that define or reference NIA0, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.
| Specification | Title | Release |
|---|---|---|
| TS 33.501 vk30 | 5G Security Architecture | Rel-20 read |