Description
NR Encryption Algorithm 0 (NEA0) is the null ciphering algorithm defined for the 5G New Radio (NR) air interface within the 3GPP 5G system architecture. It is specified for use in both the control plane (for RRC signaling) and the user plane to provide no confidentiality protection, meaning data is transmitted in plaintext. Within the 5G Access Stratum (AS) security context, the gNodeB and the User Equipment (UE) negotiate supported encryption algorithms during security activation. NEA0 is required to be supported by all 5G NR-compliant UEs and gNodeBs as a common baseline. When selected, the ciphering function within the 5G Packet Data Convergence Protocol (PDCP) layer is effectively a pass-through operation.
The algorithm's integration is a core part of the PDCP security procedures in 5G. The PDCP entity, configured by the RRC layer with a security policy that includes the selected ciphering algorithm identifier, processes data packets accordingly. For NEA0, the ciphering operation involves no cryptographic transformation. The ciphering key (derived from the anchor key K_gNB in the 5G security context) is not used to generate a keystream. The input data (PDCP SDU) is copied directly to the output (PDCP PDU) without modification. This applies to data radio bearers (DRBs) and signaling radio bearers (SRBs), depending on the network's configuration and the specific service requirements. The absence of encryption means the data is vulnerable to interception over the air interface.
NEA0's role in 5G is multifaceted. Primarily, it guarantees interoperability and provides a failsafe mechanism for establishing a PDCP bearer under any circumstances, such as during a security algorithm mismatch between roaming partners or in networks operating under specific regulatory regimes that prohibit encryption. It is also essential for network functions like lawful interception, real-time debugging, and protocol analysis where access to unencrypted traffic is necessary. However, due to the severe security implications, its use is highly restricted and governed by subscriber policies, network slicing policies, and regulatory requirements. For virtually all commercial data services, strong algorithms like 128-NEA1 (SNOW 3G), 128-NEA2 (AES-CTR), or 128-NEA3 (ZUC) are used instead to ensure user privacy and data security.
Purpose & Motivation
NEA0 was introduced in 3GPP Release 15 to maintain continuity of a critical design principle from previous generations (EEA0 in LTE, UEA0 in UMTS) within the new 5G NR security framework. Its creation was motivated by the need for a standardized, universally supported method to disable air interface encryption. This addresses several real-world constraints: regulatory requirements in certain countries that mandate access to plaintext communications, the operational needs of network operators for troubleshooting and performance monitoring, and the imperative of guaranteed service establishment for critical communications like emergency alerts.
It solves the problem of inflexibility in a pure 'always-encrypted' model. While strong encryption is a cornerstone of 5G security, an absolute mandate would prevent deployment in markets with cryptographic restrictions and hinder essential network management functions. NEA0 provides a controlled, documented, and interoperable 'off switch' for confidentiality. Furthermore, in the context of 5G Network Slicing, different slices may have different security requirements; a slice used for public safety device testing might legitimately use NEA0, while an eMBB slice for consumer data would not.
The historical context shows a clear evolution from UEA0 to EEA0 to NEA0, each serving the same fundamental purpose in their respective 3GPP generations. For 5G, with its expanded use cases spanning enhanced Mobile Broadband (eMBB), Ultra-Reliable Low-Latency Communications (URLLC), and massive Machine-Type Communications (mMTC), the need for such flexibility is even greater. NEA0 ensures that the 5G system can be deployed and operated globally, across diverse legal and technical landscapes, without compromising the ability to implement strong encryption where it is permitted and desired.
What changed in its specifications
The latest release-to-release comparison of specifications that define NEA0. Each summary describes the whole specification, not only this term.
Rel-19 TS 33.501 adds roaming and inter-PLMN indirect communication authorization, fast re-authentication for non-3GPP mobility, and AI/ML security clauses for positioning and federated learning. It also adds NPN security, NRF access token key retrieval, LTM security, and monitoring-of-signalling-traffic protection.
Full comparison in TS 33.501 →Technology family
Ciphering and integrity algorithms · Security
- Phase 1 A5/1, A5/2, A8
- R97 GEA
- R98 B1, B2
- R99 A5/3, GEA3, KASUMI, UEA1, UIA1
- Rel-7 SNOW 3G, UEA2, UIA2
- Rel-8 128-EEA1, 128-EEA2, 128-EIA1, 128-EIA2, EEA0, EIA0
- Rel-9 A5/4, GEA4
- Rel-11 128-EEA3, 128-EIA3, ZUC
- Rel-13 GEA5, GIA4, GIA5
- Rel-15 128-NEA1, 128-NEA2, 128-NEA3, 128-NIA1, 128-NIA2, 128-NIA3, NEA0, NIA0
Members and relations were proposed independently by several models and kept only where at least two agree; quotes are verified verbatim against the specifications. Release = first approved version of the defining specification.
Release Timeline
Detected Changes Across Releases
verified against 3GPP sourcesDocumented changes in 3 releases, each verified against the text of 3GPP specifications or approved change requests and shown with the exact wording. The release timeline above shows the same releases. A release without an entry has no documented change for this term.
TS 33.501 first specifies NEA0 as the null ciphering algorithm in 5G security, used for NAS/AS ciphering selection, including unauthenticated emergency sessions.
- “"00002" NEA0 Null ciphering algorithm;” TS 33.501 v15.20.0
- “NEA0, 128-NEA1, 128-NEA2 as defined in Annex D of the present document.” TS 33.501 v15.20.0
- “Select NIA0 and NEA0, regardless of the supported algorithms announced previously by the UE as the NAS algorithms” TS 33.501 v15.20.0
UE selecting a PLMN other than the registered PLMN/EPLMN in 5GMM-IDLE must discard a NAS security context that uses NEA0 and follow the initial NAS message protection procedure.
- “the UE has a NAS security context containing the NEA0, then the UE shall discard the NAS security context” TS 33.501 v16.20.0
For emergency registration, the UE must accept a NAS SMC selecting NEA0/NIA0 and treat primary authentication as unsuccessful, and the handover text on forwarded UE security capabilities was reworded.
- “the UE shall accept a NAS SMC selecting NEA0 and NIA0 algorithms from the AMF” TS 33.501 v17.16.0
- “then the primary authentication performed if any shall be considered as unsuccessful and the newly generated KAUSF is not stored” TS 33.501 v17.16.0
Defining Specifications
3GPP specifications that define or reference NEA0, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.
| Specification | Title | Release |
|---|---|---|
| TS 33.501 vk30 | 5G Security Architecture | Rel-20 read |